

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PERIODICALS ROOM

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The New Republic in More's *Utopia**

RICHARD G. STEVENS
University of Waterloo

The modern republic is a restoration of republicanism in the West after more than a millennium during which monarchy was the rule. That restoration was preceded by a theoretical preparation and the new republic understood itself to be an improvement upon as well as a transformation of the old. The leading feature of the new republic is that it is limited by explicit declarations. One of the limitations permits its citizens the free exercise of religion. In the United States that limitation is often spoken of as the "separation of church and state," though the Constitution itself speaks in more precise terms. Those terms allow some latitude of construction, however, and that latitude imposes upon us the task of understanding the evil sought to be met by those terms and the delicacy of the problem of cure. The construction associated with the expression "separation of church and state" supposes that the cure is a simple and straightforward one, but it is the argument of this paper that the province of priests and the province of rulers are not simply separable, that there is a connection between piety and

* This is an expanded version of a portion of a talk delivered at St. John's College, Santa Fe, New Mexico, on April 15, 1966. I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Robert Sasseen of San Jose State College. Professor Marvin Zetterbaum of the University of California at Davis, Professor Robert D. Snider of Seattle Pacific College, and especially to Professor Morton J. Frisch of Northern Illinois University.

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magistracy which cannot be severed, and that Thomas More's *Utopia* presents a view of the appropriate relations between "church" and "state" which provides an understanding of the evil and an example of cure which greatly assist interpretation of the constitutional limitations in question.

I

The *Utopia* consists of two books, the first of which is in the form of a dialogue. In the presence of a fourth, but silent, person, the participants in the dialogue are More himself, his friend Peter Giles, and a stranger named Raphael Hythloday. The second book continues the formal dialogic structure but is, in substance, simply a long narration by the stranger Raphael. The dialogue in the first book is upon the question whether or not it is futile for a wise and good man to advise a prince. A good deal of the content of the dialogue is a powerful denunciation of the vices—one might call them the cardinal vices—of sixteenth-century England. The narration in the second book shows the greatly superior state of the laws in Utopia. These laws are few and so they are simple and comprehensive. And, while the "rule of law" does prevail there, the laws are administered by a hierarchy of elected officials who have great discretion. But they are *elected* officials. The rule is emphatically republican.[1]

More's *Utopia*, we would argue, is a part of that theoretical preparation which leads ultimately to the restoration of republican institutions in the West. The difference between ancient and modern republics is that modern republics are liberal republics. They are based on and dedicated to the preservation of *liberties* which are said by modern political theory to be pre-political in nature. The emphatic pre-political character of such liberty seems to be the meaning of the first paragraph of Rousseau's *Social Contract*. Whereas the republics of antiquity were founded on

[1] Compare Plato's *Laws* where the discussion takes place among three old men, one of whom is a critical stranger. There, however, there is no fourth person present and it is explicitly stated that it is permissible to question the laws because there are no young persons present. The fourth and silent member of the company in the *Utopia* is a young student of More's.

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the view that the good country formed men rightly so that they could achieve freedom, the modern republic is founded on the theory that the business of government is to preserve or insure freedom, as though the freedom were somehow there beforehand and as though law, or rulership, or authority—indeed, political life as such—were somehow antithetical in principle to freedom, or were an exception to it.

To say that modern republics are based on and dedicated to the preservation of pre-political liberties is to say that they are limited, or constitutional, in the strict sense. Now every country is "constitutional" in the sense that it is *constituted* in one way or other, but when people speak of "constitutional government" they must be supposed to mean something more than that. They mean that the government is constituted in a particular way. Constitutional government is government in which the governors are strictly circumscribed in their governing by something which is emphatically beyond their control. In this sense, then, to speak of the "English Constitution" in one breath and the supremacy of Parliament in the next, is to contradict oneself. What is so constitutional about the English Constitution? What is the irreducible principle of it? All are agreed: Parliament is supreme, over the crown, that is. And within Parliament the Commons have fully mastered the Lords. In the Commons it is a leadership wholly responsible to the population which governs. And that Parliament, which can change any and every law it likes, knows very well which laws it cannot change. That is, precisely insofar as the English Constitution is republican and written it is constitutional.[2]

England may well be quite as good and quite as just a country as the United States. Indeed it may be twice as good and twice as just. But what is characteristic of the modern West, and what distinguishes modernity from antiquity, politically, is represented implicitly and mixed in England and occurs explicitly and unmixed in the United States. That is the limited or constitutional republic. Burke may have preferred the American to the French Revolution because the latter was too theoretical whereas the former was mindful of experience and tradition,

[2] See James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (London, 1891), I, 249.

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but, while we can subscribe to both Burke's distinction and his preference, and while admitting the respect which the American Founding shows for the past, there must be no doubt whatsoever that the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and *The Federalist* are clearly, thoroughly, and immediately based on theory: that is, on *modern* theory. The core of that theory affirms the superiority of republican over monarchical government and the legitimacy of only limited government, that is, government which clearly knows it may not, and quite clearly dares not, touch certain clearly marked things.

But to say that the ancient Western tradition was republican and that after a long spell of monarchical government and a careful theoretical preparation the West restored itself to an improved republicanism presupposes agreement as to what the word "republican" means. The word is not used by everyone in exactly the same way, but it is possible to get at it and to discern what the one thing is that everyone has in mind when he uses it. While *The Federalist* does not, because it does not need to, present a thematic discussion of the essential character of republican government, it is, as a whole, a discussion of the various principles of a correct republic and in at least two places a very short definition is given. It is that republican government is characterized by an absence of titles of nobility.[3] Carried to completion that definition could be seen to mean that republican government is marked by a complete equality of persons in the most important respects. The regime is, as Aristotle indicated, identical with the ruling part, the part that comprises the citizens who rule and are ruled in turn. In a republic, then, we would have to have a true *res publica*. The public thing would have to be truly public. All who were *in* the country would have to be truly *of* it, or participants in it.

The republic of modernity appears as a truer version of republican government than that of antiquity, precisely on the grounds employed by Aristotle to explain citizenship. The republics of antiquity never pretended to include everyone whom they covered. The modern perfection of republican government

[3] Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist* (New York, 1937), No. 39, p. 245, No. 84, p. 557. Compare the first sentence of No. 20, p. 119.

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is based upon an egalitarianism which wants to extend membership in the regime to everyone comprehended by the regime. To begin with it argues that this amounts only to the abolition of permanent and inheritable rank and the erection in its place of the recognition that everyone is, in principle, capable of becoming qualified to participate. But perhaps the egalitarianism and the view that the polity is somehow derivative of pre-political or sub-political things must play themselves out. The principle of qualification gives way to the principle of interests. Every interest is thought to be equally deserving of representation and so everyone is not only potentially but is actually qualified to participate in rule and, so, if everyone is qualified, then to be qualified is no longer a qualification. The greatest perversity shamelessly demands to know what is so perverse about perversion and why it ought not to be represented in the public deliberations.

But there is always at least the hope that the principle of interest may be chastened or moderated and the principle of qualification restored or strengthened. The principle of extension of participation in the regime to every man in the regime is not, strictly speaking, the special mark of the republic of modernity. Universal potentiality of participation in rulership is the mark of republican government as such. It is true that modern republics tend to press—perhaps to their peril—for a more immediate and effective realization of that universality, and that pressing may or may not be tied to the immediacy of the relation between theory and practice characteristic of modernity, but the principle of universality can be found in ancient theory, and, interestingly enough, in an author not now regarded as friendly to popular government: Plato has such a scheme in the *Laws*.[4]

II

The republic of modernity is based on theory in two ways. First, while every regime may be said to "have some theory behind it," modern regimes tend to be virtually applications of theory and this is exactingly true of the American regime. But second,

[4] See Books V and VI, *passim.*, particularly 744 bc.

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and more important for our purposes, modern republicanism is a restoration after a long spell of monarchy, and the restoration itself is the result of a long theoretical preparation which argues that republican government is the only truly legitimate government and that it ought to be re-established.[5] It certainly would not make sense to suggest that Thomas More is *the* theorist of the new republic. In a certain way, More's contemporary, Machiavelli, deserves more the credit for that, and, as for theory which comes down to us in explicit teachings that men subscribe to, Locke is the true craftsman of modern republicanism. But in a strange way, Thomas More addressed himself to political questions strikingly like those Machiavelli faced. Needless to say, they faced these questions differently.

More and Machiavelli both desired a restoration of ancient virtues, though they surely understood very different things to be the virtues which were lost and needed to be recovered. But if one puts himself in, say, the place of More, what stands in the way of restoration? The single most significant—perhaps the only significant—matter encumbering a return to classical antiquity was the existence of Christianity. Its universality, its vision of a single, comprehensive kingdom beyond, toward which all things tend, and its establishment of a church, catholic and enduring, presented men with a Christendom which was a quasi-polity comprehending all actual polities. The enrollment of the entire human race in an organized entity to which that race owes its highest allegiance is theoretically and administratively the companion of empire, not of a multiplicity of polities. Revelation, obedience, and the fatherhood of God are the signs of monarchy, not self-rule. Indeed, it is not unfriendly to Christianity to remember that its successful spread was in practice dependent upon the transformation of the Roman republic into the Roman empire. There is, then, both a theoretical and a historical connection between Christianity on the one hand and empire and monarchy on the other, and so there is an appar-

[5] For the historical origins of the modern understanding of the relation between theory and practice, see Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago, 1953), 177-81. For More's view of that relationship, see Richard G. Stevens, "On the Practicality of More's Utopia," *Social Research*, XXXIII (1966), 30-46.

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ent tension between Christianity and republican government, which tension would have to be accounted for by anyone who, living in a Christian kingdom, wanted to restore republican rule and republican virtues. There is, in fact, a natural and necessary tension between the province of priests and the province of rulers. The tension can be adjusted, eased, accommodated, and sometimes skirted, but unless one province be subordinated to the other, it cannot be resolved. Or can it?

Even if the office of priest be reduced to that of sacrifices, even if religion itself be so reduced, the tension is still bound to exist. In fact, no religion which commands the communion of more than a handful of men is so reduced. The ties between men and gods are the commandments of gods and, in every religion, these commandments include more than those which direct the conduct of men toward gods—that is, sacrifices. How men are to be, to and in themselves, and how they are to behave toward other men, are also the subjects of commandments. How men are to be and how they are to behave are, of course, the staple business of rulers. It may be that rulers are concerned with ends here and now and priests with ends beyond, but the fact remains that the commands of nations and cities and the commandments of the gods both direct the being and behaving of men here and now.

The problem crops up in practice every day. One can see it in the bishop who, wishing to get his flock to vote one way or another on a given issue, will piously and poker-facedly protest that it is a moral, not a political issue upon which he is making his pronouncement—as though the two had nothing to do with each other, or as though the connection between the two were unidirectional. The same sort of foolishness can be heard from those who, anxious to repeal all laws relating, say, to the banning of pornographic literature from the mails and the unrestricted use of narcotics, will, with the utmost of moral indignation and assurance, proclaim that you "can't legislate morality." Antiquity understood legislation to be the very source of all morality, though simply to leave it at that would be to equivocate on the word "legislation." There was in antiquity simply no such notion, as we have now, that it is the proper business of a body of men to sit down and make up their minds

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how things should be, and that such a body should sit day in and day out.[6]

The tension between magistrates and priests was resolved in antiquity by the fact that the ancient city had a completeness to it which has caused some present-day writers to speak of it as "totalitarian." The religion of antiquity was a political religion; that is, it was the religion of this or that polis. This relation between city and gods is characterized, not to say burlesqued, in Plato's *Republic*, but the Socrates whom Plato represents there as making up a theological "story" which is to be the orthodoxy of the city he is founding in speech[7] was himself put to death for his alleged deviation from the orthodoxy of Athens. There is, simply, a tension between the pronouncements of the polity and something beyond the polity toward which man is drawn. The situation of Socrates, however, is not that to which More addresses himself. The distinction between Socrates or philosophy and Christianity is clear and decisive. Philosophy calls only to the few and it calls to them one by one. Religion calls to the many and offers to them an allegiance. But allegiance is, preeminently, the property of the polis. Christianity offers the many an allegiance which is trans-political. That is, while philosophy questions orthodoxy, it does not contend for the right to replace that orthodoxy with another. Only in the very special and very improbable circumstance envisioned in the *Republic* would philosophy offer an orthodoxy and that orthodoxy would be emphatically political. It could be so, because the philosophy which ruled and the orthodoxy it devised would remain distinct. Contrariwise, the orthodoxy of Christianity absolutely resists politicization. It must always remain trans-political.[8]

If one wanted to restore the republican tradition of antiquity in the sixteenth century, one could not simply "go back." The restoration had to be in the face of the trans-political character of Christianity. Whether one were a believing Christian or a thoroughgoing unbeliever, if he wished to restore a republicanism, he would have to do so in the shadow of the church. The historical fact of the coincidence of Christianity and monarchy,

[6] See Aristotle, *Politics*, 1297b41-98a1, 1328b13-15.
[7] *Republic*, 414e.
[8] See Edward A. Goerner, *Peter and Caesar* (New York, 1965), 20.

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not to say empire, is more than mere historical coincidence. If republicanism were to be recovered, an honorable compromise between its consequences and Christianity would have to be found. It would perhaps be silly to suggest that More was not a Christian. All that one need suggest is that even a non-Christian would have had to approach the problem as More does in *Utopia*. In other words, for the ends sought by the *Utopia* More's Christianity is irrelevant or nearly so.

Within a hundred years of Constantine's conversion the imperial control of Europe was broken, the centrifugal dissolution of imperial rule was vastly accelerated, and, finally, Rome itself was sacked by the barbarians. Augustine assures us that this affront to Rome is not attributable to Christianity. However that may be, empire receded to the East where it had always been more at home anyhow and the West gave itself over to a multiplicity of kingdoms. Subsequent to this multiplication of kingdoms, and dependent upon it, there develops what comes to be known as the struggle between "temporal and spiritual powers." The necessary, if not the sufficient condition of a return of harmony between "church and state," given the universality of the church, is the universality of the state. If the priests sacrifice to a God who transcends every political boundary and whose people are the whole human race, then rulers, if they are to reach concord with the priests, must consolidate. One can imagine, for a moment at least, one world with one capitol and one cathedral. Politics, the activity proper to the polis, disappears, because not only the polis disappears, but every vestige of it, every distinction between one people and another, disappears in the perfect unity of the human race. That unity is represented in an obedient people. The government of men gives way to the administration of men. A teaching church, claiming to know beyond cavil the good of man, can administer the affairs of an obedient human race through magistrates who are at once leaders of men and higher officers of the church. That church and its teaching can inform the conscience of the administration. Excommunication would be, prima facie, grounds for conviction upon impeachment. The rule of the world would then be, simply and properly, a grand trusteeship pending doomsday.

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III

Given a *multiplicity* of kingdoms, and a universal church, there must be an unresolved tension between rulers and priests. A multiplicity of concordats is, in principle, indefensible. By a kind of Gresham's law, every kingdom which has conceded more power to the priests will necessarily make demands for revision in the light of those concordats which have given less power to them. Popes, if they are not to abdicate altogether their claims to rule men must, of necessity, demand more power in every kingdom. Quite aside from the individual character of this or that pope, it would seem that the sheer multiplicity of kingdoms makes the church-state conflict, which is the characteristic issue of the Middle Ages, an irrepressible conflict. One church and many kingdoms must, willy-nilly, constantly be at odds, and often be at arms over the relation between rulers and priests. What is more, the fact of the multiplicity of kingdoms gives popes a natural advantage in the struggle. It is, after all, hard to oppose papal supremacy over the king without slipping into protestantism, or perhaps, out of Christianity. Kings cannot, even if their case for the public good is rationally quite clear, easily give to their people new modes and orders in the realm of sacrifices and beliefs.

What is the answer? Dante's answer seems to be a single monarchy over the whole world. This is Dante's answer because Dante is an imperialist, as contradistinguished from a papalist; this is Dante's *answer* because Dante's *problem* is papal supremacy. Once again, if one addresses himself to the resolution of the irrepressible conflict between church and state from the stance of an anti-papalist, then the answer from that stance and within that problem is the strengthening of the state—that is to say, the king. You must find a king as *big* as the pope and you must destroy every opportunity for the pope to drive a wedge in between parts of the king's front. For this you must have a restoration of the Roman empire in full vigor, which means, in principle, single monarchical rule over the entire human race. In practice it means rule over all of Christendom, which would be sufficient unto the day. The Crusades remind us that settling the problem would not quite settle the problem.

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Dante's apparent answer has added advantages. It abolishes, in principle, war within the empire and makes the empire invincible vis-à-vis the remainder of the world. Of course, so to say blithely overlooks the practical difficulties which stand in the way of the restoration of empire—say, the killing of all those kings who will not submit, along with the soldiers who support them—and also overlooks the problem of the possibility of civil war in parts of the empire or, worse, a civil-war-of-the-whole-world. All this is merely another way of saying that even world empire would not do away with war. It would simply confuse terminology. What is perhaps worse, though, is that world empire would in fact tend toward the dreadful prospect of the mere administration of the whole human race. All human qualities might well be suppressed in favor of the single quality of obedience. Whether or not Dante supposed there really was such a thing as a *res publica orbis*, the fact that he could write as though there were such a thing or as though others believed so illustrates the tension between polity and Christianity which presented itself to Thomas More.[9]

More does not address himself to the same problem as the one to which Dante speaks. He is not simply an anti-papalist, as for present purposes we can say Dante is. Like Dante—in fact, like Machiavelli, too—More would go back, somehow, to restore lost goods. Whatever may be said of Dante, at least More and Machiavelli knew that one could not simply "go back." More and Machiavelli both appreciate that any political movement must cope with Christianity. To put this another way, More, while he addresses himself to another problem than that to which Dante argues, cannot ignore the fact of papal-imperial struggles which seems to be the whole matrix of Dante's argument. Where Machiavelli's answer to the problem posed by the struggles which we now call "church-state" struggles was an easy cynicism, More hopes to find a genuine resolution of those struggles. His answer is religious toleration, but religious toleration of a kind theretofore unknown. It amounts to something very like what we would now call "separation of church and state," but it is a separation which acknowledges the natural tension between

[9] *Le Opere di Dante Alighieri*, V, *Monarchia* (Florence, 1965), Secs. ii, iv-v.

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rulers and priests, whereas the rule by which our Supreme Court attempts to regulate these matters seems to rest on the view that the two are simply and clearly separable.

To repeat, it is only a soft view of religion which reduces it to a series of homilies, but a religion, if it is to be complete, must include moral teachings at least as a part of the higher casuistry. Yet while priests cannot do their work without guiding the lives of men, the country as country cannot abdicate to the priests the guidance of men's lives. It cannot even delegate that guidance to priests unless the priests are subordinate to the rulership of the country. It cannot so abdicate or delegate because the very business of the constitution is to fashion men in a certain way. It cannot choose to do or not to do that. What men are, how they are formed, is the very definition of the regime, or constitution. The constitution is the formative principle of the country and so of its constituent parts, the citizens. To take only the narrowest example, a country must teach the moral virtue of courage to its citizens, because the country may have need of that virtue. It must form its men rightly as it is given to see the right, for a country full of men in bad condition is in bad condition. If, then, the country as country is the teacher and the guardian of moral virtues and if priests, too, are compelled to teach and guard them, how can they be reconciled each to the other unless the priests are priests *of* the country, fully and unreservedly, or unless the country belongs to the priests?

Thomas More resolved the problem in a way which adumbrates the principles of the new republic. He creates a priesthood which is subordinate to the country and which supervises and preserves the common religion of the country. That common religion includes the common moral teaching and a common, minimal doctrine of natural theology. The connection between the two and the irreducible necessity of the latter need to be explained, but first it must be noticed that the public theology is sufficiently general as to be capable of being held simultaneously with other, privately held religious views.

> In Utopia . . . the religion of all is not the same, and yet all its manifestations, though varied and manifold, by different roads as

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it were, tend to the same end, the worship of the divine nature. Therefore nothing is seen or heard in the temples which does not seem to agree with all in common. If any sect has a rite of its own, it is performed within the walls of each man's home. Therefore no image of the gods is seen in the temple so that the individual may be free to conceive of God with the most ardent devotion in any form he pleases. . . . The prayers formulated are such as every man may utter without offense to his own belief.[10]

Notice that there is no worship in public except the public worship. More emphatically shows the plurality of religions by telling us that there are "different kinds of religion not only on the island as a whole but also in each city." Yet, time and time again he refers to the *common* religion. Sun worship, moon worship, and the worship of outstanding men exist, but we are told that they are giving way to the common view. "But gradually they are all beginning to depart from this medley of superstitions and are coming to unite in that one religion which seems to surpass the rest in reasonableness."

Nor is there any doubt that the other beliefs would all have disappeared long ago had not an untoward event, which chance brought upon one of their number when he was deliberating on a change of religion, been construed by fear as not having happened by chance but as having been sent from heaven—as if the deity whose worship he was forsaking were thus avenging an intention so impious against himself.[11]

It would not be unreasonable at this point in his argument to expect More to promote Christianity. We might wonder if the "one-religion which seems to surpass the rest in reasonableness" is Christianity, but it isn't. The next sentence tells us:

But after they had heard from us the name of Christ, His teaching, His character, His miracles, and the no less wonderful constancy of the many martyrs whose blood freely shed had drawn as many nations far and wide into their fellowship, you would not believe how readily disposed they, too, were to join it, whether through the rather mysterious inspiration of God or because they thought

[10] More, *Complete Works of St. Thomas More*, E. Surtz, S.J., and J. H. Hexter (eds.), IV, *Utopia* (New Haven, 1963), 233.
[11] *Ibid.*, 217.

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it nearest to that belief which has the widest prevalence among them.[12]

Christianity is only "near" to that reasonable religion prevalent in Utopia.

Upon reflection we recall that Christianity does not present itself as "reasonable" at all. "Reasonable" religion is the fruit of reason not of revelation. Natural theology discerns it. Natural theology is that study of divine things undertaken by man without any assistance whatsoever. As such, it is a part of philosophy. What are its principles? If that part of philosophy which pursues the truth about divine things were simply successful, it would finish once and for all its work. That completion would be the full articulation of all of the truths about the divine. According to Raphael, the Utopians—that is, the wiser majority of them—believe in a single divinity who is understood as "*incognitum, aeternum, immensum, inexplicabile*" and beyond the grasp of the human mind.[13] According to the Utopians, then, what one can know about divine things is that one cannot know very much about divine things, at least not in the way in which men ordinarily know things. Christianity can, of course, subsist harmoniously with such a view. One can be a Utopian "believer" and a believer in Christ at once, but he is not the latter by way of but rather by the way of the former. One cannot argue for Christianity, for argument is subordinate to reason, so More has Raphael say, "whatever it was that influenced them not a few joined our religion."[14]

IV

It might be argued that More's purpose is to present that case for Christianity which can be presented on the basis of natural theology alone, or that he wants to make politics safe for Christianity, or that he molds policy so as to prepare the ground for Christianity or that he is compelled to show how the best and wisest country would be if it lacked revelation, but that he also wants to say that greater things can be expected, now that the

[12] *Ibid.*, 217, 219.
[13] *Ibid.*, 216.
[14] *Ibid.*, 219.

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Word has reached Utopia through Raphael and his companions.[15] It is doubtless true that he wants to make politics safe for Christianity. But he also makes it safe for an almost endless variety of religions. And, he makes religion safe for politics. The title of the work is, after all, not simply "Utopia." That word is one of no less than eight words in the title and it presents itself there only as illustrating the subject matter of the book. The subject matter, proper, is not "economics," nor is it religion, nor the true religion. The subject matter is, as the title states, the best regime. The book is about Utopia only because it is in Utopia that one sees the best regime. Or, rather, it is not about Utopia at all. It is about the best regime as that regime can be seen in Utopia.[16]

What we are arguing is that the *Utopia* does not emanate from More's Christianity but from that concern of political philosophy to discover what is the best regime. So free from a partisanship for the church is the *Utopia* that one cannot even say that it tries to discover what is the best regime for Christianity. It does not view the regime from the position of modernity which sees the church and a number of other things as primary and the regime as derivative. It does not see politics from the viewpoint of a partisanship for the church. On the contrary, it views the church from the position of political philosophy. Our argument is that the *Utopia* raises the question of the best regime in the light of the transconstitutional character of Christianity, but the question it raises is emphatically the question of the best regime.

Once again, even an unbeliever who took seriously the quest for the best regime, and who was unwilling to engage in means

[15] See Edward L. Surtz, *The Praise of Wisdom* (Chicago, 1957), pp. 9 ff. Father Surtz carefully distinguishes between "natural revelation" and "supernatural revelation." Throughout my argument I have used simply the term "revelation" to refer to something out of the order of nature. I take it Surtz means that all sound men can see God through his works. I have not called that the *result* of "natural revelation" but *simply* of "nature." By "revelation" I mean what I suppose Surtz means by "supernatural revelation." There would be "revelation" in the sense in which I use the term only if God were to reveal himself specially at a time and place to particular persons.

[16] See *Utopia*, cxciv, 267. It probably would be safe to say that the *Utopia* is modeled more after Plato's *Laws* than after his *Republic*. It is more properly a search for the best practicable regime than for the best regime, simply.

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which would defeat the very ends sought, would have to face the question of the church as More faces it. If Machiavelli were only concerned to cope with the church and did not wish to overthrow the whole of classical political philosophy, he would have had to write the *Utopia* rather than the *Discourses*. If it be supposed that More's purpose is to show the best or highest religion by nature as a prelude to and a foundation for its perfection in Christianity—that is, if it be supposed that he aims to show the philosophic commonwealth from the condescending view of the City of God—certain grave difficulties arise. In the First Book we are told that Raphael and five companions had separated from the remaining eighteen of the twenty-four whom Vespucci had left "at the fort" at the farthest point of the last of his four voyages, and those six had gone off on a number of travels. Now, in the discussion of religion in Utopia and of the Utopians' reception of Christianity, More has Raphael say: "But because among us four (for that was all that was left, two of our group having succumbed to fate), there was, I am sorry to say, no priest, they were initiated in all other matters, but so far, they lack those sacraments which with us only priests administer."[17] One is enticed to wonder if one of those unfortunate other two might not have been a priest. How easy it would have been to save his life.

Though there was no priest among the four, the four were Christians and it appears that they made some converts in Utopia. Raphael, who often speaks of Christ and Christianity in the Second Book, harshly criticizes England in the First Book and closes that criticism by invoking the name of Christ. We are therefore most surprised to discover that when he set out upon his fourth voyage, although he "put on board . . . a fairly large package of books," having made up his mind "never to return rather than to come back soon," he took no book which would in any way promote the spread of Christianity, or help to preserve his own devotion to it. He took Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Lascaris, Hesychius, Dioscorides, Plutarch, Lucian, Aristophanes, Homer, Euripides, Sophocles, Thucydides, Herodotus, Herodian, and Galen.[18]

[17] *Utopia*, 51, 219.
[18] *Ibid.*, 101, 181-83.

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Mention of Hesychius and Dioscorides raises very special problems. According to the commentary by Surtz and Hexter in their Yale edition of the *Utopia*, Hesychius was "first published in 1514 at Venice," and, in 1515, "Josse Bade wrote to Erasmus that Jehan Ruelle was preparing his translation if Dioscorides' *De medicinali materia* for printing. It appeared in April 1516."[19] Now Vespucci's account of his alleged voyages was circulated throughout Europe beginning some time between 1504 and 1507, which means that at the latest the fourth voyage of Vespucci (about which there is, of course, historical doubt) would have taken place in 1507 or before. How could Raphael have taken with him in 1507 books not published until 1515 and 1516? Nothing at all is surprising about the use of anachronisms in a work of fiction. But why this one and not others? Erasmus published his Greek New Testament in 1516, and, of course, More knew of that work while he was writing the *Utopia*.[20] Why does not More, who is so often spoken of as a "humanist" concerned to "delight" as well as to teach and who playfully promotes his friends and their works and praises the new publishers and is so fond of Greek learning, send the New Testament to Utopia? Can there be any other reason than a wish somehow to suppress Christianity in his account of the best regime?

And there is at least one other special problem. Raphael and his friends are not the first from "our" world to visit *Utopia*. Apparently Utopus conquered the place in about 245 B.C., which puts that founding of the best regime in a markedly non-Christian light.[21] Five hundred and sixty years later when Utopian ways, so well established by the founder, must have been well set, a visitation of note occurred. Raphael tells More and Giles:

> According to their chronicles, up to the time of our landing they had never heard anything about our activities (they call us the Ultraequinoctials) except that twelve hundred years ago a ship driven by a tempest was wrecked on the island of Utopia. Some Romans and Egyptians were cast on shore and remained on the island without ever leaving it. Now mark what good advantage their industry

[19] *Ibid.*, 469, 276.
[20] See R. W. Chambers, *Thomas More* (Ann Arbor, 1958), 118, 144.
[21] *Utopia*, 121, and see 113.

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> took of this one opportunity. The Roman empire possessed no art capable of any use which they did not either learn from the shipwrecked strangers or discover for themselves after receiving hints for investigation—so great a gain was it to them that on a single occasion some persons were carried to their shores from ours.[22]

"Twelve hundred years ago" would have been in 315 A.D., after the granting of toleration, after Constantine's conversion, after the Edict of Milan. There were by then many Christians in the empire. Were some on that ship? The Utopians learned from those strangers every "art capable of any use." Might there not have been a Christian on that ship? Might he not have taken the Gospel with him? Was there among those Romans and Egyptians a Christian? If so, why is it that when Raphael took the Good News to Utopia it was news to the Utopians?

But More emphatically keeps Christianity suppressed. *Utopia* is not a Christian commonwealth. His purpose is not to make a Christian republic, or a republic to be Christianized. His purpose is not anti-Christian; it is simply extra-Christian. It is to make a republic, as republic. It must, however, be a new republic. It must take into account what is new since the republics of old. What is new is Christianity.

There being no priest among the four Ultraequinoctials who visited Utopia sometime shortly before 1507, the Utopians who had been baptized Christians began to debate whether they might choose a priest themselves, without one being sent them. We do not know how they resolved this difficulty. We do know from More's letter to Giles, which stands in the place of a dedicatory epistle, that there is a fellow "burning with an extraordinary desire" to visit Utopia as a bishop sent by the pope "for the purpose of fostering and promoting our religion, began there so felicitously." Unfortunately More can't help him because he forgot to ask Raphael one little detail about Utopia, namely, where it is.[23]

Though they have no Christian priests, already some Christian preachers have cropped up and one, more zealous than discreet, who condemned all the non-Christians as profane, im-

[22] *Ibid.*, 109.
[23] *Ibid.*, 219, 43.

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pious, and sacrilegious, and so worthy of everlasting fire, had to be exiled.

> Utopus had heard that before his arrival the inhabitants had been continually quarreling among themselves. He had made the observation that the universal dissensions between the individual sects who were fighting for their country had given him the opportunity of overcoming them all. From the very beginning, therefore, after he had gained the victory, he especially ordained that it should be lawful for every man to follow the religion of his choice, that each might strive to bring others over to his own, provided that he quietly and modestly suggested his own by reasons nor bitterly demolished all others if his persuasions were not successful nor used any violence and refrained from abuse. If a person contends too vehemently in expressing his views, he is punished with exile or enslavement.[24]

Here is the first rule under which the religious freedom of Utopia flourishes. It is not the only one, but before turning to the others note the character of this rule. Whatever the religion one is promoting, he must do so in a manner which is respectful or tolerant of others. This rule is strictly and sternly enforced by the magistrates; that is, public toleration of religions *cannot extend to religious intolerance.* Restraint of public action upon private things does not disable the public from restraining one private thing from acting upon another so as to harm the other in precisely the way in which the public, but for the restraint, might harm it. That is, the very first principle of religious toleration is that the public, so far from turning its back altogether on religion, is a zealous guardian of religion. It is not an amused spectator in a struggle to the death.

One must notice the incontestably political orientation of this. Utopus saw that religious contests weakened the people he was conquering. One recalls that President Eisenhower, who formally allied himself with a church about the time of his inauguration as president, called upon other Americans to go to church also, on the grounds that the country would be stronger if a lot of Americans went to church often. Academic theologians danced with delicious displeasure. Even if it were admitted that God

[24] *Ibid.*, 219-21.

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was on our side, these theologians were not yet willing to naturalize Him. One can admit that invocation of His grace runs to pretty silly things at times, as when a ball player claims that winning a game resulted from prayer, and still regard the difference between Utopus and Eisenhower, on the one hand, and these theologians, on the other, as a hard case. If it is wrong to "use" God in the national interest, does that mean that one must go so far, for example, as to contend that from the point of view of the question of the ultimate truth of religion, mere civil dissension or mere weakness in war is trivial beyond a serious man's concern? To put in plainly, if a sect arose which shrieked that it had had revealed to it God's Purpose and Word and that God had found the whole race of men foul and, instead of ordaining a flood, had appointed this sect to murder every other living man and then commit suicide, would the First Amendment require that the police leave hands off? Anticipating this problem at least in principle, More has Raphael say: "Utopus laid down these regulations not merely from regard for peace . . . but because he thought that this method of settlement was in the interest of religion itself." For, while Utopus did not know but that God liked a variety of worships, "he was certain in thinking it both insolence and folly to demand by violence and threats that all should think to be true what you believe to be true," and even if "one single religion is true and all the rest are false," he believed that "truth by its own natural force would finally emerge. . . ."[25]

The Utopian orthodoxy is not confined to this one negative rule. There is also a positive side. Let it be detailed in the order in which More has Raphael present it: "The soul is immortal and by the goodness of God born for happiness. After this life rewards are appointed for our virtues and good deeds, punishment for our crimes." Then there is the view of the one divinity, "unknown, eternal, immense, inexplicable" and beyond the grasp of the human mind, which view we mentioned. The ghosts of the dead keep an eye on the living, reinforcing the salutary effect of shame. The Utopians "despise and deride auguries and all other divinations," but it seems that they believe in miracles,

[25] *Ibid.*, 221.

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which occur "often" in their country. In "great and critical affairs"—apparently affairs of the country as country— they pray for and get miracles, or so they believe. There are thirteen priests in each of the fifty-four cities, elected by the citizens, who supervise worship, other religious rites, and the uprightness of citizens' lives. Excommunication, if not lifted, results in punishment by magistrates. The priests supervise the education of children, implanting good opinion. There is confession—but to husbands and parents, not to priests. There is a kind of communion, in that the colorful vestments of the priest, in striking contrast to the plain garb of the communicants, strikes awe in those communicants while they are reverently prostrate and silent before the priest in the large, dark temples, such that one would think that "some divine power were really present."[26] And there is a Credo. In part it is thus:

> At the end [of services] the priest and the people together repeat solemn prayers fixed in form, so drawn up that each individual may apply to himself personally what all recite together. In these prayers every man recognizes God to be the author of creation and *governance* and all other blessings besides. He thanks Him for all the benefits received, *particularly that by the divine favor he has chanced on that* [*republic*] *which is the happiest* and has received that religion which he hopes to be the truest.[27]

It would appear that the officials in Utopia, who are called "priests," are truly the priests *of* the polity in more than one respect. They are little other than public school teachers who inculcate salutary opinions and form character[28] and, in so doing, invoke the authority of God and the fear of hell. This is service to God if it be believed that God calls upon man to be good and if what it is to be good depends upon inquiry, for inquiry shows that the goodness of man depends upon the good-

[26] *Ibid.*, 161-63, 217, 225, 227, 229, 233, 235.

[27] *Ibid.*, 237, emphasis added. I have bracketed "republic" because, while the Latin text uses that word, the English translation here quoted has chosen to use the word "commonwealth" which choice is explained at pp. cxciv and 267.

[28] In *Wiemann* v. *Updegraff*, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), Mr. Justice Frankfurter (concurring) speaks of teachers as "priests of democracy," p. 196. Perhaps he had something of this in mind.

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ness of regimes—that, given the goodness of the regime, to be a good man includes being a good citizen. There is, moreover, as much religious liberty as one could ask for. Everything tolerable is tolerated. The several religions can exist in harmony with the public religion because the public religion has about as much substantive religious content as a New York public school prayer composed by a committee which included the Pope, Mao, Nietzsche, a Jehovah's Witness, and Mr. Justice Douglas.

V

More comes very close to dividing religion into two parts. One part, concerning what is *truly* religion, is wholly left to private sects. The other, which is only incidentally related to religion —the formation of character and the maintenance of patriotism and domestic tranquillity—is vested in public officers who are merely *called* priests. If only he had called them something else —say, "syphobors" or "tranigrants"—then, one might argue, he would truly have built an unscalable wall of separation of church and state. But More does not do that. He does not because he cannot and he cannot for at least two good reasons—a positive and a negative one.

The positive reason is that the public realm has need of religion as such. Kant was wrong to suppose that the "problem of organizing a state, however hard it may seem, can be solved even for a race of devils, if only they are intelligent."[29] The categorical imperative is too bloodless and cold a doctrine to animate the public acts of a race of men with a publicly salutary spirit. It may be that a clever atheist could rule a people well. It may be that, as Machiavelli taught, a prince need not be, but need only appear to be, religious. Whether or not an atheistic people could be well ruled is another matter, and that an atheistic people could rule itself well is by no means evident. The problem of republican government is that it tends to reduce itself to its own extremity. If a people believes that freedom and equality are the right conditions of men and acts on that belief and proceeds to the belief that to be free means simply to be free of ex-

[29] *Perpetual Peace*, ed. Lewis White Beck (New York, 1957), 30.

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ternal restraint, it may come to think of itself as free to think anything it likes about freedom and equality and it may come to think even that freedom and equality are thought good simply because they are free to think them so. Freedom and equality, then, are seen as not simply the right conditions of men, but as merely the arbitrary decree of a people free to decree what it likes. Might not such a people arbitrarily decree inequality and unfreedom? What would prevent it from doing so? One or the other of only two things could slow the approach of that self-destruction of republican government which is inherent in the structure of republican government. Only philosophy or religion could check that tendency and populations do not philosophize. For all practical purposes, fear of God is the "greatest and almost the only stimulus to the practice of virtues,"[30] and, as we argued above, rulers are bound to concern themselves with the development of virtues. When More has Raphael say only that fear of God is "almost" the only stimulus to virtue, he silently acknowledges the view shamelessly and irresponsibly asserted by Machiavelli that a prince need not be, but need only appear to be, religious. But by so asserting that it is almost the only such stimulus, he explicitly argues, as we suggested above, that an atheistic people could not rule itself well. That is the positive reason why there cannot simply be a "wall of separation."

Then there is a negative reason. Even if the "state" tried to keep altogether out of religion, it would have to mediate between the varying sects and to do so inevitably involves it in determining what is and what is not tolerable. The mention above of the hypothetical cult of chosen murderers illustrates the difficulty. The country cannot sit back and let itself be murdered. Either it must tell the cult that it is incorrect in its religious view that murder is called for by God or it must tell the cult that it is free to believe that God calls for murder, but that the country must abridge the cult's free exercise of its belief. The country cannot simply wash its hands.

The negative principles are three in number. As previously indicated, one rule is that whatever religious view one is trying

[30] *Utopia*, 235.

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to spread, he may not spread it with intemperate evangelism that offends other views and threatens the public peace. The other two rules are substantive. One may think that man's soul is mortal or that there is no providence of God. One may *think* these two thoughts in Utopia; but he may not hold office if he thinks so. Nor may he argue so in public, though he *may* argue so, and is encouraged to do so, "before the priests and important personages."[31] The public permits in Utopia complete freedom of religion but it does not permit complete freedom of everything which has to do with religion. What constitutes religion is a matter for public decision because what belongs to the public and what to the private realm is, after all, always and everywhere a public question.[32]

It is difficult to demand a principle of religious freedom which does not have these Utopian reservations without inviting grave dangers both for understanding and for political life. The case of religious rights is a kind of test case for the whole modern doctrine of rights which are pre-political and absolute and against which acts of the "state" are to be measured. That modern view of the constitutional or strictly limited republic is self-destructive if it is not constantly referred to and rectified by the pre-modern view out of which it arose but from which it is a departure.

While the founders of the American Constitution were surely firm in their devotion to the principles of "the rights of man" and while it is surely true that the First Amendment is a concrete enactment of those principles, it is a mistake to read that amendment as though the men who wrote it were adherents of present-day value-free social science. What is more, while the amendments to the Constitution must be rigorously adhered to and while it must be admitted that those amendments consciously and strictly limit the government created by the Constitution, it is a mistake to suppose as some partisan renderings of the Constitution do suppose, that the amendments can be understood *as* the Constitution—that is, to suppose that one can understand the Constitution as though it were simply a collection

[31] *Ibid.*, 221.

[32] See Joseph Cropsey, "On the Relation Between Political Science and Economics," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (1960), 3.

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of concrete enactments in behalf of pre-political liberties against government. The argument of *The Federalist* is to the effect that the best safeguard of republican liberty is the sound construction of republican government, and a part of the argument in behalf of a sound construction of republican government was the argument that the first principle of sound republican government is *government*.[33] One cannot govern well without governing. Surely the First Amendment forbids congressional laws respecting an establishment of religion and laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion. It does not declare, however, that anyone may ordain himself a priest of whatsoever he himself has ordained should be called a religion, and thereby free himself of the nuisance of being governed.

We have argued that antiquity was characteristically republican in the West, that that republicanism was succeeded by a millennium of monarchy, empire, and Christianity, that modernity is characterized by a restoration of republicanism, and that the new republic is limited or constitutional. We have argued further that that restoration was introduced by a long sequence of theoretical preparation and that More's *Utopia* is an important element in that sequence because its establishment of religious toleration rises to the level of a constitutional principle which sets aside a whole realm as beyond the reach of the public. Finally, we have argued that that reservation *from* public control can only be understood if it is understood with reservation. Thus the sound and soundly republican principles of religious toleration in the *Utopia* can lead to a salutary and constitutionally sound interpretation of the First Amendment such that the church might be free of governmental domination but also such that the government might be free to govern.

[33] See *The Federalist*, No. 51, p. 337, No. 70, p. 455.

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Majority Tyranny in Tocqueville's America: The Failure of Negro Suffrage in 1846

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The question of the place of the Negro in American life has been and is still the greatest problem in American politics. Neither the formal mechanism of government nor the party system has been able adequately to cope with the problem of absorbing the Negro into the normal pattern of life. From the earliest days of the Republic, Americans have agonized over the problem, and their reactions, rationalizations, and generalizations over the Negro question are not wholly different today from what they were in the decades before the Civil War.

Some historians have mistakenly assumed that the polarization of party opinion on the Negro, which plunged the country into civil war, was a normal pattern in American politics. They have assumed that the relationship between Whigs and Negroes was the same as that which later prevailed between Republicans and Negroes, that on the fundamental question in American politics, the Whigs and the Republicans were the same party and by implication had the same constituency. This was the case of Dixon Ryan Fox, who, while writing of such dynamic aspects of New York politics as the "Decline of Aristocracy," nevertheless emphasized a certain continuity in the politics and the class basis of the Federalists and Whigs. Part of this continuity, as expressed by Fox, emphasized that the close relationship of New York State Whigs with Negroes was inherited from their Federalist predecessors and transmitted, in turn, to the Republican party.

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In recent years some of Fox's judgments have been called into question by Professor Lee Benson; the latter calls for a re-evaluation of the Jacksonian period through the use of voting data and census material. But Benson, while critical of Fox's class interpretation of Jacksonian democracy, accepts Fox's judgments on the relationship between Whigs and Negroes. Benson has been criticized for excessive reliance on the 1844 election and for improper methodology in his own study.[1] While calling for modern methods in historical re-evaluation of New York politics, Benson sometimes fails to live up to the precise requirements of the brave new methodology.

Fortunately, a wealth of voting data, which was not used by either Fox or Benson, is available to the student of New York politics. For example, Benson asserts that town-by-town voting statistics do not exist for some years such as 1846,[2] when in fact contemporary newspapers make them available in many of the townships of the state. During the entire Whig period newspapers reported town-by-town returns on referenda on a number of issues and these returns provide an invaluable resource for the study of public opinion in antebellum America.

The most important of the referenda held in New York in the nineteenth century were the three on the question of whether or not to remove the $250 property qualification requirement from Negro voters—a qualification which was not imposed on white voters since 1821. These referenda, held in 1846, 1860, and 1869, tell much about the place of the Negro in American life. The study of the voting returns on these referenda is particularly revealing when compared to previous judgments about American politics in general and New York politics in particular.

As we have said, part of the continuity emphasized by Fox between Federalists and Whigs is found in their attitudes toward the Negro. Fox made this point early in his career in an article entitled "The Negro Vote in Old New York."[3] In regard to the Whigs, Fox

[1] See, for example, Frank Otto Gatell, "Money and Party in Jacksonian America: A Quantitative Look at New York's Men of Quality," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXXII (1967), 235-52.

[2] Lee Benson, *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case* (New York, 1964), 339. Benson makes the same incorrect claim with regard to property assessments.

[3] *Political Science Quarterly*, XXXII (1917), 264.

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said four things: (1) The Negro voted steadily Whig to such an extent that in several elections Negro voting "swelled Whig majorities" in a number of city wards. (2) This support stemmed from the fact that Whig leaders endorsed full Negro suffrage in the state constitutional convention of 1846 and in the referendum on Negro suffrage which was submitted to the people by that convention; Whig voters "followed the direction of their leaders" by voting in favor of suffrage. The Democrats were solidly opposed to suffrage, and the suffrage referendum of 1846 was defeated by a Democratic majority at the polls. (3) Abolitionists of the Liberty party played little or no part in the results of the referendum, and (4) the presence or absence of Negroes was not a factor in the outcome of the voting.[4]

Benson agrees with Fox that the Negroes were Whig. Though he makes the important point that differences in attitudes toward the Negro were due partly to cultural factors, Benson maintains that Whigs favored suffrage—particularly the Greeley-Seward-Weed wing of the party—and cites Fox's "pioneering article" to support his contention that, on the question of suffrage, the major parties "differed radically."[5] However, Benson says that little evidence was available to him on the question and calls for a study of how parties have functioned to dispell prejudice in American politics. It will be the function of this article to examine that relationship by studying the attitude of New York's Whigs toward the Negro.

I

The first of Fox's propositions, that the Negro vote was steadily Whig, is certainly quite true. In fact, Gerrit Smith, the Liberty party candidate for governor in 1844, proclaimed his doubts about Negro suffrage because the latter would only succeed in adding votes to the Whig ranks. His view evoked howls of protest from Negro leaders in New York,[6] but none of them denied the charges.

[4] *Ibid.*, 270-75.

[5] Benson, *Concept of Jacksonian Democracy*, 318-20, 303-04; also 8, 10, 315, 179.

[6] Madison County *Whig* (Cazenovia, New York), March 4, 25, 1846; New York *Weekly Tribune*, Feb. 25, 1846; Gerrit Smith, *Gerrit Smith's Reply to the Colored Citizens of Albany*, printed circular, Cornell University Collection.

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Fox greatly overestimates the effectiveness of Negro voting in New York, however, by maintaining that Negro voting "swelled Whig majorities" in Albany's first and tenth wards. The 1845 New York State Census (which many students of the period have failed adequately to utilize) lists only four Negro voters in each of these wards.

There is a glaring contradiction in Fox's own presentation. Though he draws a picture of nineteenth-century black power, he devotes substantial space to a detailed analysis of the referendum held in 1846 on whether or not to remove the $250 property qualification which had effectively disenfranchised most Negroes in New York State. Full suffrage would have meant about 10,000 Negro voters in the state. As it stood only 3,000 Negroes were eligible to vote and only about 1,000 were actually registered.[7] Said Tocqueville: if Negroes actually come forward to vote "their lives are in danger. If oppressed, they may bring an action at law, but they will find none but whites among their judges."[8]

The main contention of Fox (and by implication of Benson also) that the question of Negro suffrage was "as straight a party question as one finds"[9] is less easily disposed of. Both Fox and Benson miss the fact that Negro leadership was highly critical of the rather lackadaisical attitude of Whigs toward suffrage. Thus Charles Ray, editor of *Colored American*, pointedly asked why the Whig-controlled legislature of 1840 failed to enfranchise Negroes.[10]

As far as party leadership was concerned, there is little doubt that the Democrats opposed suffrage with near unanimity. With nearly ten thousand additional Whig voters they might have lost the election of 1844 to Clay. The Democrats were playing for high stakes and, however morally reprehensible their opposition to suffrage may have been, it was perfectly logical. Similarly it is true that most men in public life who supported Negro suffrage were

[7] New York *Tribune*, Oct. 19, 1846. Estimation of potential Negro voters is confirmed by *Census of the State of New York for 1845* (Albany, 1847). The latter also contains the number of actual Negro voters. Queen's county was ten per cent Negro. Yet out of an electorate of six thousand only forty-four were Negro.

[8] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York, 1945), I, 373.

[9] Fox, "The Negro Vote in Old New York," 272.

[10] *Colored American*, Oct. 10, 1840.

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Whigs. This is a far cry, however, from saying that the Whigs as a party supported the principle of Negro suffrage.

Benson concedes that the Whigs in New York had not "*officially* adopted the principle of equal suffrage," but made their stand known through "nonofficial agents."[11] This plainly understates the case as witnessed by such a "nonofficial agent" as Horace Greeley, who in 1845 was rebuffed when he attempted to pass a pro-suffrage resolution at the New York City Whig convention.[12] This convention went on to nominate candidates for delegate to the 1846 state constitutional convention. Four of the candidates were endorsed by the American Republican party—Native Americans—whose sympathizers abounded in the Whig party. The conservative attitude of most Whigs in the southern counties of New York reduced the liberal Greeleyites, by Benson's own admission, to "token opposition."[13]

Similarly, in the roll-call votes in the 1846 constitutional convention, most of the Whig delegates from southern New York and Buffalo opposed suffrage while the delegates from the Hudson Valley abstained on the issue. Again those who supported suffrage were mostly Whigs from the northern and western sections of the state, but what has always been ignored is that there were two main suffrage roll-call votes at the convention. Though the first vote found two-thirds of the Whigs favoring suffrage, the second found forty per cent of Whig delegates in active opposition to suffrage while another fifteen per cent of the Whigs abstained.[14] The Democrats opposed suffrage both times with near unanimity, but Whig leaders were far less in favor of suffrage than the Democrats were against it.

Nor were all the Whig papers happy about suffrage; Greeley's *Tribune* was virtually alone in southern New York in its support of suffrage. Colonel Webb of the Whig *Courrier and Enquirer* opposed suffrage. He also opposed Whig gubernatorial candidate John Young because the latter wished, according to Webb, "to obtain political

[11] *Concept of Jacksonian Democracy*, 320 n. 60 (italics are Benson's).

[12] New York *Tribune*, Oct. 30, 1845, and New York *Weekly Tribune*, Nov. 3, 1845.

[13] *Concept of Jacksonian Democracy*, 121.

[14] *Debates and Proceedings in the New York State Convention for the Revision of the Constituion*, ed. Albany *Argus*, Crosswell and Sutton, reporters (Albany, 1846), 830-36.

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control of the state through 10,000 colored voters."[15] Greeley even accused Webb of a breach of confidence on the part of one Whig to another in disclosing Young's views on the subject. Obviously Greeley was afraid of the reaction of public opinion when the Whig candidate for governor was found to be a proponent of suffrage. Although Greeley did not go so far as to conceal his own views on the subject, Thurlow Weed, the Albany Whig boss allied with the Greeley wing of the party, said nothing in reference to suffrage in his Albany *Evening Journal* after the convention had decided to submit the question in a separate referendum. Both the Democrats at the convention and Weed knew that public opinion was overwhelmingly opposed to suffrage and that no amount of propaganda on the part of the Whig party could change the mind of the public. Thus the Democrats at the convention prevented suffrage from being written into the new state constitution and avoided responsibility for denying it by submitting a separate referendum on suffrage, along with the state constitution, to the voters. They could do so safely; suffrage was not an issue between the parties but a question which split Whig party leaders into two fairly even camps. By the time of the November referendum which accompanied the 1846 gubernatorial vote many of the suffragite Whigs including Weed had been cowed into silence by hostile public opinion and the hostility of the conservative opposition.

But the division of Whig leadership on the question of suffrage was nothing compared to that found among rank-and-file Whig voters. Fox contends that Whig voters "followed the direction of their leaders" and supported suffrage in the 1846 referendum. The referendum was lost, according to Fox, and suffrage was rejected because the Democrats obtained a majority at the polls. But the suffrage referendum was rejected by a vote of 223,834 as against only 85,306, that is by two and a half to one. Only ten of New York's fifty-eight counties voted in favor of suffrage. Yet the Whigs won the gubernatorial election by 17,000 votes.[16] Assuming all of the pro-suffrage votes were Whig, *at best only forty per cent of Whig voters actually supported Negro suffrage.*

[15] Skeneatilis *Democrat*, Oct. 30, 1846, and New York *Weekly Tribune*, Oct. 19, 1846.

[16] County-by-county returns are found in New York *Tribune*, Nov. 25, 1846, and in *The Whig Almanac and United States Register for 1847* (New York, 1848), 44.

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Now the heaviest anti-suffrage vote came from the southern areas of the state and from the old Dutch settlements of the Hudson Valley. These were also the areas which had by far the highest percentages of Negro population. Table 1[17] lists in order the counties

TABLE 1

Potential Effect of Enfranchised Negro on Party Balances in Twelve Most Negro Counties

County	*Estimated Number of Potential Negro Votes*	*Per Cent of Population Negro*	*Democratic Margin in 1844 (Polk)*	*Number of Surplus Whig Votes if 80 Per Cent of Negroes Voted Whig with 60 Per Cent Turnout*
Queens	750	10.9	204	66
Suffolk	450	5.5	900	nil
Dutchess	430	4.0	37	125
Orange	540	3.9	750	nil
New York	3,040	3.8	1,917	nil
Kings	880	3.7	(—239)	535
Westchester	550	3.6	154	44
Richmond	160	3.5	14	44
Rockland	120	3.3	893	nil
Ulster	310	3.2	152	60
Greene	200	2.9	600	nil
Columbia	290	2.9	370	nil

which had the highest Negro population—all of which are in southern New York or the Hudson Valley. These counties contained a quarter of the states' voters and would have contained about three-quarters of the Negro voters had the latter been enfranchised. All but one of these counties voted for Polk in 1844. If the Whig vote had remained constant the table shows that six of these counties would have voted Whig if fully enfranchised Negroes had voted 80 per cent Whig with a 60 per cent turnout. Benson estimates that 95 per cent of the Negroes would have voted Whig. On this assumption New York City would have swung to the Whig column.

[17] Estimations for Table 1 are made from data in *Census of the State of New York for 1845*. Voting data for 1844 are from O. L. Holley (ed.), *New York State Register, 1845-6* (Albany, 1845).

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Very possibly the whole state (and thus the nation) would have voted for Clay.

Surely it would have been in the interest of Whig leaders and the rank-and-file partisans to have obtained Negro suffrage in full. But the table assumes that the number of white Whig voters would have remained the same. Yet it was precisely in those areas in which the Whigs as a party had the most to gain from Negro suffrage that voting against suffrage was the heaviest and in which enfranchisement was most offensive to Whig voters.

Table 2 shows that in six of the counties shown in Table 1 *at least 45 per cent of the Whigs voted against suffrage* while in the same counties *only 15 per cent of the Whigs favored it*. Table 2 assumes that all Democrats and Nativists voted against suffrage and that all who voted for suffrage were Whigs. The minimum number of anti-suffrage Whigs is calculated by subtracting the Democratic and Nativist vote from the (always larger) total anti-suffrage vote. The remainder must have been Whigs (the Liberty party received practically no votes in these counties). In fact, the anti-suffrage vote in southern New York counties was almost unanimous. In some eight towns in Long Island and Westchester no pro-suffrage votes were recorded. In Jamaica, Queens, at least 90 per cent of the Whig voters opposed suffrage; there were only three pro-suffrage votes against 545 opposed.[18] In these counties Negro suffrage was not a party issue; it was a question of overwhelming public antagonism. It was, in Tocqueville's phrase, an example of the "tyranny of the majority" which had no respect whatever for party.

It has been said that competition between parties produced the expansion of the electorate which occurred in the nineteenth century.[19] In this instance circumstances were such that, if anything, the opposite was true. The Democrats opposed suffrage for the logical reason that they wished to prevent an increment in the Whig vote. But the conservative "cotton Whigs" who predominated in

[18] For the Queens vote, see the Long Island *Democrat*, (Jamaica), Nov. 17, 1846; the Westchester vote is found in Westchester *Herald* (White Plains), see also Catskill *Democrat, Independent Republican* (Goshen), *Republican Watchman* (Greenport), Sag Harbor *Corrector*, Scoharie *Republican*, Ulster *Republican*. All of these are weeklies; see their issues for Nov. 1846. For the anti-Negro attitudes of the Nativists, see *The American* (Poughkeepsie), Oct. 31, 1846.

[19] E. E. Schattschneider, *Political Parties and Democracy* (New York, 1964), 51; *idem*, *Party Government* (New York, 1942), 48.

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TABLE 2

Party Voting on Negro Suffrage in Twelve Counties with Largest Negro Population

County	Number of Votes for Governor		Number of Suffrage Votes		Minimum Number of Whigs Anti-Suffrage	Minimum Per Cent of Whigs Anti-Suffrage	Maximum Possible Per Cent of Whigs Pro-Suffrage	Per Cent of all Gubernatorial Voters Abstaining	Town-by-Town Coefficient of Correlation: Whig Pro-Suffrage Voting
	Whig-Lib.	Dem.-Nat.	Pro	Anti					
Queens	1,657	2,187	70	3,218	1,131	68.2	4.2	12.1	+.09
Suffolk	1,583	2,054	239	2,772	718	45.3	15.2	17.2	+.41
Dutchess	4,564	5,384	858	6,523	1,139	24.9	18.9	25.8	+.51
New York	17,483	26,623	5,249	29,946	3,373	19.0	30.1	20.2	+.88
Kings	4,395	5,393	1,491	5,869	476	10.8	34.3	24.8	N.A.
Westchester	3,334	3,490	225	5,303	1,813	53.4	6.8	19.0	+.02
Richmond	692	849	55	1,161	312	45.1	7.9	21.1	N.A.
Rockland	722	1,169	48	1,286	117	16.2	6.6	29.5	N.A.
Orange	3,808	4,127	453	6,142	2,015	52.9	11.9	16.9	+.80
Ulster	4,293	4,347	323	6,932	2,585	60.2	7.5	16.0	+.34
Greene	2,758	2,467	234	4,163	1,676	60.8	8.5	16.2	.00
Columbia	4,220	3,348	666	5,261	1,913	45.3	15.8	21.7	N.A.
Totals:									
County	49,509	61,438	9,911	78,526	17,268	34.8	20.0	20.3	+.36
N.Y. State	210,606	193,627	85,306	223,834	30,208	14.3	40.0	20.8	+.21

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southern New York were almost as opposed to suffrage as the Democrats. Some of these Whigs more than likely opposed suffrage for fear of adding strength to the ranks of the Greeleyite or "Conscience Whigs." If ever there was a case in which the internal "ecological balance" of a party forbade portions of it from supporting an addition to its own ranks, the suffrage referendum of 1846 was such an instance.

Nor did the upstate sections of the Whig party take up the question of suffrage with great enthusiasm. Here, undoubtedly, Whig leaders favored suffrage as reflected in the roll-call votes of the convention and in Whig newspapers, but the rank and file seemed apathetic if not downright hostile to suffrage. Again Fox says the question was

> as straight a party question as one finds. . . . Acquaintance with the black man seemed to count for little. In St. Lawrence (county) where there were only thirty-seven Negroes . . . their anti-suffrage position was maintained in that county by a vote of nearly two to one. Neighboring Franklin County gave equal suffrage a majority . . . Essex County had forty Negroes; the adjacent Warren, with a population somewhat less, had thirty-five. Essex went for equality; Warren by nearly the same majority, against. Livingston, with about the same proportion of colored population as Steuben, next to it in the South, went in favor and Steuben against. The same was true of Oneida and Herkimer, Cortland and Tioga, and other pairs of counties in different sections of the state. Yet when one looks at the political complexion of these counties, the inference is plain, Whig counties followed the direction of their leaders and Democratic counties did the same.[20]

Unfortunately Fox was more than a little careless with the evidence at hand. Several of the county results which he cites are incorrect. Warren County is said to have opposed suffrage, yet the official statistics in Albany plus the same statistics published in every available newspaper and almanac show that Democratic Warren County voted in favor of suffrage. The same sources also reveal that neither Livingston nor Steuben voted for suffrage. In fact, Democratic Steuben County voted twenty-eight per cent pro-suffrage while Livingston, one of the strongest Whig counties in the state, voted only twenty-seven per cent in favor of suffrage. While Whig Oneida County did vote more favorably on suffrage than its Demo-

[20] Fox, "The Negro Vote in Old New York," 272-73.

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cratic neighbor Herkimer, both voted less than forty per cent pro-suffrage. Finally, Fox ignores completely that the leading pro-suffrage county in the state, Clinton, was a Democratic county. Town-by-town results show that in two cities in Clinton County the number of pro-suffrage votes exceeded the number of combined Whig and Liberty votes (proving the existence of some Democratic pro-suffrage votes).[21] In fact, eight heavily Whig counties voted against suffrage, while three of the ten pro-suffrage counties were Democratic, and only three were Whig. The remaining four were highly competitive counties, one of which voted Democratic in 1846.[22]

It might be contended that the competitive nature of the party systems in four pro-suffrage counties may have been promoted by the high Liberty party (abolitionist) vote in these counties. The knowledge that the Liberty rank and file acted as a balance of power between the major parties might have prompted some county Democratic papers to attenuate criticism of suffrage. In competitive Cortland County the Cortland *Democrat* announced its support of Negro suffrage and accused the Whigs of being "secretly hostile to giving the right of suffrage to the colored population. . . ."[23] No doubt some of them were; for it was prejudice and not party advantage that motivated Whig voters (as distinguished from Whig leaders) to vote against suffrage. It is therefore less than likely that the average voter, moved by a calculation of the competitive position of the party, voted for suffrage accordingly. The Whig party, torn by Nativist sentiment in the South and abolitionism in the North, was divided hopelessly on the suffrage question. Both small parties received the greater portion of their membership from the Whigs, and

[21] Plattsburg *Republican*, Nov. 21, 1846.

[22] This evaluation is also found in the abolitionist Albany *Patriot*, Dec. 2, 1846, though it maintained that *four* of the ten pro-suffrage counties were Democratic. In analyzing the voting returns for each county for the preceding decade this writer classified counties according to party turnover and strength of majority. One-party counties changed party not more than twice and marginal counties changed more than twice or held majorities for one party for less than eight years. The Whig press also agreed that its support of suffrage was uneven. See the New York *Tribune*, Nov. 6, 1846, and Jamestown *Journal*, Dec. 5, 1846.

[23] Cortland *Democrat*, April 22, 1846. The Cortland County Democratic party resolved to abolish the property qualification for Negroes, *ibid.*, Feb. 25, 1846.

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the party could not gravitate toward or away from suffrage without offending potential supporters from one or the other.

Thus competitive party systems were not productive of pro-suffrage rank-and-file voting. Only six of the fourteen counties in which abolitionists acted as the balance of power voted over forty per cent pro-suffrage. No systematic typology of party voting can be discerned from the Liberty party margins of victory. There was, however, a correlation between Liberty and pro-suffrage voting which was much higher than that found between Whig and pro-suffrage voting or combined Whig-Liberty voting. The most likely explanation for this is that rather than acting as a catalyst for party competition, the Liberty party was supported by the same fundamental sentiment which promoted sentiment for Negro suffrage.

II

We should ask what the common sources of both abolition and suffrage sentiment were. The most obvious starting point is the effect of Negro population on the sentiment about suffrage. As we have already noted, the greatest anti-suffrage voting came from the area of the state which had the highest percentage of Negroes. Although Fox asserts that "acquaintance with the black man seemed to count for little," there was a higher negative correlation between Negro population and pro-suffrage voting than positive correlation for Whig and pro-suffrage voting, though the correlation for pro-suffrage and Liberty voting was higher.

TABLE 3

Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Pro-Suffrage Voting and Four Factors by County

Negro Population	−.60
Whig Voting (Governor)	+.21
Combined Whig-Liberty Voting	+.41
Liberty Voting	+.69

Though much higher than that for Whig voting, the correlation between absence of Negroes and pro-suffrage voting is rather moderate. Some heavily anti-suffrage voting returns came from south-

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ern counties such as Putnam which had low Negro populations. Benson is probably correct when he implies that anti-suffrage voting is partly due to historical patterns of development in New York State rather than to direct acquaintance with the Negro. At the time of the referendum most Negroes who had settled in the state had done so during the slaveholding period which ended in 1828 when upstate New York was sparsely settled. The southern counties had seen the development of a modest slaveholding system, particularly in the Dutch patroon areas in the Hudson Valley, and the slaveholding mentality prevailed in these areas more than in the upstate frontier areas.

Cultural predispositions against Negro suffrage played an important part in the 1846 referendum voting; rural Albany County, an old slaveholding area, showed some correlation between Negro population and anti-suffrage voting, whereas western counties such as Ontario, with comparable percentages of Negroes, showed little or no such correlation.[24] Towns such as Ledyard in Cayuga County had relatively high Negro populations and voted pro-suffrage at the same time.[25] Negro population was not a direct cause of anti-suffrage voting—save for two or three counties it was always too low for that—but served as an "index" of anti-suffrage or slaveholding tradition. It was not the presence of a few Negroes which produced such hostility to suffrage but a complex series of historic beliefs which conditioned the attitudes of the white population toward their Negro brethren. The southern counties also feared the migration of hundreds of thousands of additional Negroes from states which denied the suffrage. The historic predisposition of men in New York State before the Civil War was that the Negro was not fit to enjoy political rights.

Why, then, did ten of New York's fifty-eight counties vote in favor of Negro suffrage? Why did a number of counties in the northern and western part of the state vote against suffrage by far lower percentages than counties near New York City? V. O. Key has emphasized the importance of ecological patterns in the study

[24] Town-by-town returns are found in the Albany *Argus*, Nov. 21, 1846, and the Geneva *Gazette*, Nov. 20, 1846.

[25] County and the town of Ledyard, see Auburn *Daily Advertiser*, Nov. 14, Auburn *Journal and Advertiser*, Nov. 18, 1846. Negro population by town is found in *Census of the State of New York for 1845*.

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of politics.[26] Great value is derived from analyzing the historical settlement patterns of New York.

During the first half of the nineteenth century the northern and western parts of the state were settled by large groups of New Englanders. Frederick Jackson Turner asserts that there were two upstate New Yorks: the Hudson Valley, which was dominated by the great Dutch estates and the western and northern interior, settled by Yankee pioneers.[27] The Hudson Valley Dutch produced a far different political culture than the restless Yankees breathing Calvinist fire and capitalist economics. Even Dixon Ryan Fox, who ignores Yankee culture in his analysis of suffrage voting, contends that the differences between "Yankees and Yorkers" constituted, among other things, the differences between a relatively equalitarian culture and an aristocratic one. James Fenimore Cooper, the old Yorker, described the Yankees as "incapable of appreciating the width of the void that separates the gentleman from the man of coarse feelings" and saw the Dutch patroons as standing at the capital of society free from the pernicious equalitarian doctrine that every man should be a freeholder. The Yankees' relatively democratic church polity, their town meeting system, and their communitarian land settlement system lay in stark contrast to the semi-feudal, authoritarian social structure established by the great patroons.[28] Every Dutch farmer who was able to do so had slaves, according to one observer,[29] but the Yankees possessed a political and religious tradition which was opposed to slavery, a tradition which could be traced back to Jonathan Edwards.[30] The Yankee political and religious culture was taken with them to western New York; the latter was named the "burned-over district" to characterize the religious intensity of its predominantly Yankee inhabitants. Enthusiastic evangelism reached such a fever pitch in New York

[26] See *American State Politics* (New York, 1956), 218-27, and V. O. Key Jr. and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: the Case of Indiana," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (eds.), *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959), 281-99.

[27] Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York, 1920), 83.

[28] Dixon Ryan Fox, *Yankees and Yorkers* (New York, 1940), 66, 200.

[29] Levi Beardsley, *Reminiscences* (New York, 1852), 20.

[30] Jonathan Edwards, *The Injustice and Importance of the Slave Trade and of the Slavery of the African* (Boston, 1822), contains Edward's anti-slavery views.

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in the decade prior to 1846 that it touched upon secular reforms such as anti-slavery. In 1837 Old School Scotch Presbyterians ousted four Yankee-dominated synods for damning slavery more intensely than sin.[31] Though Benson notes that there were few differences between Whig and Democratic leaders, there was a distinct Yankee Protestant religious background in a disproportionate number of abolitionist leaders.[32]

The Yankee attitudes against slavery extended to the question of Negro suffrage. The counties and towns with the highest proportion of people characterized in the 1846 census as "born in New England" also tended to have the highest percentages of pro-suffrage voting. The ten pro-suffrage counties all had New England-born populations in excess of thirteen per cent while only four counties voting less than forty per cent pro-suffrage had such high percentages of Yankees. The latter also had many people from other areas who tended to vote against suffrage.

TABLE 4

Correlation of Pro-Suffrage Voting by County with Place of Birth

New England	+.80
Other States	−.27
Foreign Born	+.05

This pattern continues on the town-by-town as well as on the county level. Few statistics are available for counties for both the elections and suffrage referenda for 1846 and for 1860.

Tompkins County in the Finger Lakes region of New York State was one of the few counties for which town-by-town statistics were available for both years. Data on voting indicates that there was a low correlation between New England birth and Whig voting but a higher correlation between New England birth and pro-suffrage voting, which carried over to 1860. Unlike the statewide pattern, in Tompkins County a considerable shift took place in pro-

[31] Whitney R. Cross, *The Burned Over District* (Ithaca, 1950), 2.

[32] John L. Myers, "The Major Effort of Anti-Slavery Agents in New York State, 1836-1837," *New York History*, XLVI (1965), 149.

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suffrage voting between 1846 and 1860. Tompkins County had a number of Yankee Democrats who were cross-pressured into abstaining on suffrage in 1846, while the Whigs had a considerable number of Penn-Jerseyites who were hostile to suffrage. By 1860 these Yankees had shifted to the Republican party and the bulk of the anti-suffrage vote probably went to the Democrats. As a result the pattern of pro-suffrage voting shifted, but the source remained the same and was bolstered by being in one party.

TABLE 5

Correlation Between Factors in Voting in Tompkins County

	Born in New England	*Pro-Suffrage 1846*	*Republican 1860*
Pro-Suffrage 1846	+.70	—	+.39
Pro-Suffrage 1860	+.65	+.45	+.89
Lincoln Vote 1860	+.64	+.39	—
Liberty Vote 1846	+.74	+.40	+.80
Whig Vote 1846	−.17	+.11	+.15

Other counties show similar if not identical voting patterns. In Broome, Madison, Ontario, Yates, and Lewis the relatively pro-suffrage towns had high New England populations while the anti-suffrage towns had low Yankee populations or populations in which those born in "other states of the union" were as high as the Yankee population. Furthermore, a county-by-county and a town-by-town analysis in most counties reveals a low correlation with those born in New England and Whig voting but a higher correlation between New England settlement and Liberty party voting. It is not surprising, therefore, that a disproportionate number of pro-suffrage votes should come from the Liberty party despite the strictures of Gerrit Smith. Lee Benson is probably correct in saying that only about fifty-five per cent of the Yankees were in the Whig party. The Conscience Whigs were predominantly Yankee, but even in upstate New York not all Whigs were either Yankees or Conscience Whigs. Yankees overwhelmingly predominated in the Liberty party, however. When Conscience Whiggery was strong, so was abolitionism, and many of the Yankee Whigs—up to a quarter in some counties—went over to the Liberty men leaving the Whig

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TABLE 6

Selected Correlation Coefficients Between Suffrage and Party Voting and Yankee Birth (by County)

	Born in New England	*Pro-Suffrage 1846*	*Vote for Lincoln 1860*
Pro-Suffrage 1846	+.80	—	+.69
Pro-Suffrage 1860	+.78	+.82	+.91
Lincoln Vote 1860	+.77	+.69	—
Liberty Vote 1846	+.56	+.69	+.64
Whig Vote 1846	+.16	+.21	+.17
Pro-Suffrage and Republican Voting in 1869		+.97	

rank and file that much more apathetic about suffrage. Some Yankees, it is true, did not support suffrage but fewer voted against it than any other group. The Yankee Democrats in the far northern counties of the state did support suffrage in some towns, as we have said. These northern areas were also the center of Free Soil strength in 1848. When these Free Soil Democrats joined with the abolitionists and Conscience Whigs to form the Republican party, many of the Yankees who had not voted at all on suffrage in 1846 did so in 1860. By that time the second suffrage referendum, though rejected, was refused by a considerably narrower margin than in 1846. Because the Yankees had gravitated more toward one party there was also a very high correlation between Republican and pro-suffrage voting, as is shown in Table 6. Only then did the Republican party turn suffrage into a party question; only then was the bulk of pro-suffrage support—the Yankees—to be found in the ranks of one party. In the final referendum on Negro suffrage in 1869 suffrage was rejected by only a very narrow margin, and it was entirely a party question. By that time the outlook and mood of the Yankees, bolstered by the trauma of civil war, made Negro suffrage part of the ideological baggage of practically every Republican.

Economic factors played little or no discernible role in suffrage voting. Contrary to Benson's view, some counties did produce some correlation between high assessment valuations and Whig voting, but this correlation did not extend to suffrage voting. In the Hudson Valley area pro-suffrage voting was about evenly distributed

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between low and highly assessed per-voter land valuations. In none of the rural counties for which data was available was there a high correlation between per capita wealth and pro-suffrage voting.[33]

III

Dixon Ryan Fox might have done well to confine his analysis to the cities. Benson states that there were no differences between rural and urban party preferences, and this seems to be true. There seemed, however, to be a considerable difference between rural and urban voting behavior on the question of suffrage.

The available evidence indicates that: (1) Cities of over twenty thousand population were somewhat more tolerant of suffrage than their proximate rural surroundings. Then as today the small town appeared as the bastion of conservatism. Despite the fact that it was situated in Yankee Monroe County, the city of Rochester favored suffrage; the surrounding towns, however, opposed it. Even New York City was more tolerant than the counties within a two hundred mile radius of it. This is surprising in light of what has been said of the large number of immigrants, working-class people, Nativists, and the like, who, for status or economic reasons, were deeply hostile to the Negro.

(2) Part of the reason for this probably lies in the fact that, Rochester aside, there was a considerable correlation between Whig and pro-suffrage voting in the cities—again far more than in the surrounding towns. The cities revealed a higher attachment of anti-suffrage voting to political parties than to either ethnic attachment or to class. (See Table 7.)

Why this relative degree of tolerance should have existed is difficult to determine with complete certainty, but one of the major

[33] See particularly the Delaware *Gazette*, Dec. 30, 1846. Benson is wrong in asserting that the figures for this county are available only starting in 1855. Again he misses the newspapers. In Delaware five of the six wealthiest towns voted Whig in 1844, while only three of the fifteen remaining towns did so. This was not true of the 1846 election in which the organized tenant farmers or anti-renters supported the Whigs. In counties where the anti-renters were a factor in increasing the Whig vote I have used the 1844 returns. But they did not alter the Whig margin for the state drastically though they probably give John Young his necessary margin of victory in 1846. This is so because Malcomb Gardiner, the Democratic candidate for Lt. Governor, nominated by anti-renters, also won.

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TABLE 7

*Comparison of Urban and Rural Voting on Equal Suffrage Referendum**

City	*Per Cent Pro-Suffrage*	*Per Cent Whig*	*Correlation of Whig and Suffrage Voting by Wards*	*Nearest Rural County*	*Per Cent Pro-Suffrage*	*Per Cent Whig*	*Town-by-Town Correlation of Whig and Suffrage Voting*
New York	14.2	39.6	+.88	12 Nearest Counties	11.2	50.4	+.36
Brooklyn	21.0	44.4	N.A.	Kings County	2.5	45.8	N.A.
Buffalo	21.9	52.9	+.86	Erie County	31.4	60.0	N.A.
Albany	34.2	52.2	+.80	Albany County	19.6	50.1**	+.23
Rochester	53.5	54.7	+.47	Monroe County	44.0	58.3	+.50
Troy	59.6	60.6	+.91	Rensalaer Co.	27.3	51.7**	+.50

* Percentage data computed from town-by-town figures in New York *Tribune*, Nov. 25, 1846; Buffalo *Courrier and Pilot*, Nov. 5, 1846; Albany *Argus*, Nov. 21, 1846; Troy *Daily Whig*, Nov. 13, 1846; Rochester *American*, Nov. 21, 1846; Brooklyn *Daily Eagle*, Nov. 1846. Percentages for Albany and Rensalaer Counties in 1844 (to compensate for the anti-rent vote) are from *New York State Register, 1845-6*.

** Figures for 1844 are used in order to compensate for the anti-rent vote.

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TABLE 8

*New York City Wards Ranked in Order by Six Characteristics**

Naturalized Immigrants		*Mechanics*		*Democratic 1844*		*Pro-Suffrage*		*Merchants and Professions*		*Democratic 1846*	
Ward Number	*Per Cent*	*Ward Number*	*Per Cent*	*Ward Number*	*Per Cent*	*Ward Number*	*Per Cent*	*Ward Number*	*Per Cent*	*Ward Number*	*Per Cent*
1	30.6	14	79.6	11	65.6	6	7.6	11	4.7	4	71.7
14	25.2	10	78.7	6	64.4	4	9.1	13	6.3	6	70.5
5	21.0	11	65.1	12	61.4	11	9.9	6	7.7	14	63.9
8	18.8	8	60.7	14	58.9	14	11.0	4	10.1	1	58.8
7	18.7	5	58.9	4	58.8	17	11.4	14	11.2	12	55.6
6	18.6	7	55.2	13	57.4	1	11.9	17	12.2	11	52.1
15	18.4	13	54.8	10	53.5	13	12.2	16	12.5	13	51.9
12	18.0	16	49.7	17	53.3	10	13.4	9	13.1	16	51.8
11	17.7	17	47.5	16	52.5	16	14.0	10	15.3	7	51.0
13	16.2	6	45.1	7	50.3	12	15.0	8	17.3	17	48.9
17	16.1	9	44.1	9	50.0	9	15.3	7	19.2	2	48.4
2	15.8	4	34.6	8	49.6	7	16.7	5	20.5	10	48.2
10	15.6	12	33.9	5	45.8	5	17.2	12	23.2	5	47.6
3	14.6	3	33.6	1	44.8	3	19.2	2	24.3	9	47.5
4	13.5	2	32.7	2	39.4	8	19.5	3	26.7	8	47.4
16	13.1	15	25.9	3	36.4	2	20.1	15	29.9	3	36.2
9	8.6	1	11.8	15	33.0	15	26.1	1	88.0	15	27.4

* Computed from *Census for the State of New York for 1845; New York State Register, 1845-6; The Whig Almanac and United States Register for 1846.*

TABLE 9

*Social Character of Voting in Albany, New York (Ranked)**

Naturalized Immigrants		*Mechanics*		*Democratic 1846*		*Pro-Suffrage*		*Business and Professions*		*Democratic 1844*	
Ward Number	*Per Cent*	*Ward Number*	*Per Cent*	*Ward Number*	*Per Cent*	*Ward Number*	*Per Cent*	*Ward Number*	*Per Cent*	*Ward Number*	*Per Cent*
8**	27.6	3	49.9	1	69.2	1	8.0	1	0.9	1	63.0
1	21.6	10	47.7	8	61.3	7	14.0	8	3.1	8	62.5
5	20.6	1	47.1	7	57.9	8	29.6	7	5.9	7	56.3
9	16.8	9	43.8	2	50.9	2	30.5	2	12.9	2	55.4
4	15.4	2	42.8	3	48.3	3	31.3	9	13.2	3	45.9
10	14.2	4	39.6	6	42.9	9	39.5	10	14.2	5	44.7
3	11.9	6	36.0	10	42.1	4	40.0	3	14.9	10	43.0
6	11.8	7	33.3	4	41.7	6	44.6	5	17.6	4	39.8
2	9.0	8	29.9	5	41.3	5	46.8	6	21.7	9	39.7
7	8.6	5	25.0	9	34.5	10	48.5	4	25.0	6	38.7

* Computed from *Census for the State of New York for 1845*; Albany *Argus*, Nov. 21, 1846.

** Underlined wards are three most heavily Democratic wards.

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factors is probably that the function of political parties in urban areas was different than it was in small towns. In the latter politics was a "club game," while in the cities the parties acted as a socializing device for immigrant groups and even in 1846 had welfare and patronage machinery beyond the scope of the good citizens of Chemung county. As a result ethnic groups probably gravitated to one party sooner in the cities than in the small towns: Irish and Germans to the Democratic party, while Yankees or New English or Scots gravitated toward the Whigs.

Fox is criticized by Benson for using New York wards which were, even then, too large to avoid the ecological fallacy (though he uses counties himself and the counties are about the same as New York wards in population). If we turn to smaller cities such as Albany, however, we find (as in Table 9) that the rank order of anti-suffrage wards coincides rather well with pro-suffrage voting.

Great variations are apparent in the degree of pro-suffrage feeling in the various cities. Troy and Rochester were more heavily settled by Yankees than was Albany or New York. But urbanism seems to have augmented Yankee birth as a factor in pro-suffrage voting. This is particularly apparent in Troy and Rochester whose surrounding rural areas had about the same percentage of Yankee inhabitants. In Buffalo, the only city to show a relatively low pro-suffrage vote, Whig boss Millard Fillmore was secure in his control of the party, and as a future Know Nothing presidential candidate, his desire for Negro suffrage was limited indeed; conversely, Albany boss Thurlow Weed's greater liberalism may have had a bearing on returns in that city.

It is difficult to determine whether Irish and German immigration or working-class status was more responsible for anti-suffrage voting in the city. The two characteristics certainly overlapped. Together they worked as a powerful factor in securing anti-suffrage majorities in Buffalo and New York. The Irish had a well-documented antipathy toward Negro suffrage.[34] But since many Irish were not naturalized at this time and did not vote and since there were many Whig immigrant groups such as the English, little correlation between immigrant and anti-suffrage voting is perceivable from the statistics.

[34] See Florence E. Gibson, *The Attitude of the New York State Irish Toward State and National Affairs, 1848-1892* (New York, 1951), 104.

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A slightly higher correlation is found between city wards with a high working-class "mechanic" population and anti-suffrage voting. Here again, however, associating working-class wards with anti-suffrage sentiment leads to complications. There is little question that many non-immigrant working-class men voted Whig and constituted a source of anti-suffrage Whig voting. The Workingmen's party, which had flourished in the eighteen thirties, bequeathed a large portion of its membership to the Whigs. George Evans, the editor of *Young America*, the successor to the *Workingman's Advocate*, stated that the new state constitution should ensure the right of all to suffrage. But Evans was rebuffed by a meeting of his National Reform League on February 16, 1846, in New York City in which a resolution favoring Negro suffrage was tabled.[35] Evans did not speak for most workingmen. Some New York and Albany working-class wards were anti-suffrage though others, like the eighth New York ward or the Albany tenth ward, were relatively tolerant working-class wards.

It is also interesting to observe the strength of nativism among men of the working class. In New York the leading Nativist ward (eleven) had the third highest number of workers and the lowest per capita wealth of any New York ward. Thus the high correlation between party affiliation and voting on suffrage in New York City may stem partly from the fact that the Nativists were drawn largely from the ranks of Whigs who had defected and who had brought a disproportionate share of Whig anti-suffrage votes with them,[36] while the Liberty party in the cities was too weak to siphon off many Whig pro-suffrage votes. As a result most pro-suffrage votes stayed in the Whig party except in Rochester, where there was little Nativist voting and a strong Liberty vote.

IV

The Negro question has divided American political parties, not polarized them; it has produced factions and splits in parties and not unanimity. This was as true for the Whigs in the eighteen-

[35] *Young America*, Feb. 17, 1846.

[36] Thus in 1844 the Democratic vote remained constant while the Nativist vote was about fifty per cent of the New York City vote and the Whig, two per cent.

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forties as it is true for the Democratic party today. Nothing is more indicative of the failure of the Whig party to cope with the Negro question and the suffrage question allied to it than the rise of the Liberty party in protest against the temporizing of major parties on the subject of the Negro. The Republican party was not merely the Whig party in new clothing, but a new party with a new program and a realigned constituency.

The basic misunderstanding behind Fox's (and to a limited extent Benson's) assertions on the Whig support of suffrage lies in the fundamental fact that the Whig party was destroyed in large part because its membership could not agree on the fundamental issue of American life. It was not until 1860 that the party system was polarized on the Negro question and that the principle source of pro-Negro sentiment gravitated to the Republican party. The polarization of parties, which is reflected in the high correlation between the party vote and the vote for suffrage in 1860, produced a result so disruptive that the union became embroiled in civil war.

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The Problem of Reform in France: The Political Ideas of Local Elites*

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The French circle of political stagnation, crisis, and return to administrative politics has once again revolved a full cycle. Like the political hopes raised at the Liberation and at all those moments in French history when political routine and bureaucratic order disintegrate, the posssibilities that the crisis of May-June 1968 seemed to open for a radical reform of politics and society already appear to be beyond the capacity and will of the restored regime.

The missed opportunities of the May crisis have brought into sharp focus the lag between the political and social systems and the resilience of those features of the political system which insulate it against external disruption and internal reform. Since the war France has missed the opportunities which crises produce, and more important, has failed to exploit the possibilities for political reform latent in the profound social and economic changes of the last twenty years. The political institutions, al-

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liances, personnel, and ideas of previous regimes have survived in a society whose demographic, economic, and social structures have been transformed. The problems of a modern industrial society are translated into public issues by ideologies and categories whose original content has evaporated with the passing of traditional society, and they are converted into policy by parties and public institutions largely fashioned by the issues of the Third Republic.

I

In order to explore the obstacles to political reform in modern French society, we chose to focus our research on the city of Grenoble and its region.[1] Grenoble, a city in the Isère department in eastern France, is for many Frenchmen the image of the country's future. It is a rapidly growing city, with a metropolitan population that between 1962 and 1968 increased from 253,088 to 317,040 (25.3 per cent). Close relations between the University of Grenoble and industry have encouraged industrial research, innovative management, and the implantation in Grenoble of advanced industries, which have attracted to the city large numbers of engineers, technicians, and white-collar workers. The young mobile population, advanced industry, and modern urban structures are regarded as the elements of the future way of life of a nation of "fifty million Grenoblois," as the title of one of many books on the city predicts.

In contrast to Grenoble, however, the towns and villages in its region are experiencing not the pains of rapid modernization, but the difficulties of inadaptation to economic change and of imperfect insertion in modern society.[2] The economies of these

[1] The case of Grenoble as a model for future French politics has attracted much interest and is the subject of several recent books, among them, Claude Glayman, *50 millions de Grenoblois* (Paris, 1967), and Christiane Marie, *Grenoble (1871-1965): l'évolution du comportement politique dans une ville en expansion* (Paris, 1966).

[2] On the problems of small towns outside metropolitan Grenoble, see Pierre Clement and Nelly Xydias, *Vienne sur Rhône* (Paris, 1955), and J. Dumazedier, "Enquête sur les attitudes des habitants du canton de La Mûre (Isère) à l'égard du développement économique, social et culturel" (unpublished study). For a brilliant treatment of the problems of the coexistence of modern and traditional structures, see Edgar Morin, *Commune en France* (Paris, 1967).

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towns depend largely on traditional industries which are now in rapid decline. The weakness of the resource base and infrastructure of the towns makes it difficult to attract new industries. Within the Isère region, then, traditional and modern structures coexist and combine, and the range of their amalgams reproduces the principal social types of contemporary France.

The great social and economic changes of the past two decades have had little impact on the politics of the region. Those political shifts which have taken place have cut across the strata of economic and social development and are not simple functions or obvious consequences of modernization or traditionalism. There has been one significant development in the politics of the region: the emergence of new alliances and programs in certain municipal elections.[3] This new local politics has succeeded not only in modern Grenoble, but in a declining coal town (La Mure) and in a semi-agricultural village (Crolles) as well. Another important political change since the war—a gradual shift to the Right—appears neither to correlate with degrees of modernization nor to be irreversible. In brief, modernization in this region is not linked to any obvious set of political sequels. Our research sought to understand why, to discover the obstacles that insulate the political system from changes in society and in the economy.

Focusing on obstacles to political reform implies, of course, that politics is typically more responsive to social and economic change. While the structures of politics are not mere reflections of economic and social structures, nonetheless the autonomy of the political system typically is not complete enough to allow the maintenance of political operating rules and goals that are very different from those prevailing elsewhere in society. By contrast the political system we observed seems peculiarly immune to change in two respects. First, the perception of new problems and needs, the emergence of different clusters of interests and axes of conflicts, and substantial changes in attitudes have produced neither new political alignments nor new political projects. Secondly, changes on one level of the political system have not significantly altered other elements in the system.

[3] François Goguel and Georges Lavau (eds.), "Les Elections municipales de 14 et 21 mars 1965," *Revue française de science politique*, XV (1965), 911-63.

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Political change in municipal government, for example, has been encapsulated at the level of local politics and its effects narrowly confined.

Interviews with members of the political elite offer special advantages for the study of obstacles to political change, since these men constantly confront the contradictions that arise from the inadaptation of the political system. The lag between social reform and political reform is nowhere so apparent as in the attitudes of the elite toward politics. The individual counterpart of the collective lag is the contradiction between a respondent's recognition of new problems and values and his acceptance of the ideas and institutions of the unreformed political system. Many of our conclusions are based on an analysis of the recurrent inconsistencies between attitudes expressed on different questions in the same interview.

Seventy-one members of the elite were interviewed in 1967 and 1968.[4] Comparisons among members of the different elites pro-

[4] The interviews were conducted in January and June 1967 (before and after the March legislative elections) and in June 1968 (after the May political crisis and before the June 23 legislative elections). A quarter of those interviewed were reinterviewed at least once. The interviews were conducted in an open-ended fashion in order to elicit from each respondent his own list of political priorities and to question him about the solutions he proposed.

The following table of respondents classifies each by the position he held at the time of the interview. Though many interviewees held more than one position and many were interviewed several times, each individual is counted only once:

Senators and Deputies	9
Candidates for Deputy	4
Municipal Councilors	5
Mayors	8
Officials of Voluntary Associations	
Peasant groups	6
Business groups	5
Trade unions	3
Associations of the quarters	4
Educational groups	3
Professional groups	2
Other	2
Party Leaders	7
Civil Servants	4
Businessmen and Cadres	2
Professors	5
Journalists	2
TOTAL	71

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vided little valuable information on the problem of political lag; no systematic differences appear between the elites of different milieux. Political reformers and political traditionalists appeared in each milieu. The interesting questions lie in identifying the obstacles that block the emergence of new political conceptions even in those individuals and groups located in the most modern sectors of French society.

In these interviews with members of the elite, the most striking point of agreement is the acceptance of the changes in society and in the economy of the last twenty years and the belief that further and more profound changes are inevitable and likely to be beneficent. There was general agreement, too, on the character of the process of change. What has transformed French society, according to their analyses, has been an extraordinary expansion—of the economy, of the young active classes of the population, of the standard of living, and of the material aspirations of individuals. Some men noted that all groups had not profited equally from these changes, but even these respondents emphasized the expansion of the national pie, rather than the differential effects of expansion on the size of the shares distributed to various groups in the population. In the attitudes of the elite, at least, Malthusianism is dying out.

Declining groups in France used to blame their misfortunes on the malevolence of politics or on misguided economic policy. Today the elite of those groups whose collective position has deteriorated during the general expansion explain their relative decline as an automatic and impersonal result of an ineluctable process. Moreover, they see this process as, on the whole, positive; even the representatives of groups whose relative status and fortunes have been eroded by economic change tend to believe that in the general expansion they will find compensation on some other ledger.[5]

What is striking about this consensus on expansion and op-

[5] The political elite of the declining textile town of Vienne, for example, though they identify the Common Market as an important factor in their town's difficulties, nonetheless consider the Common Market and the industrial concentration that they see as its natural consequence as inevitable developments against which it would be vain to struggle. On this point, see Morin, Chap. 4.

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timism about the future is that it has not spilled over into attitudes toward the prospect of channeling evolution and of realizing particular goals, that is, into attitudes toward politics. The men we interviewed were unclear about the political significance of those changes that had already taken place and appeared to lack coherent strategies for bringing about those changes which they described as desirable. Often they implied that the goals they hoped to realize were immanent in the process of evolution itself. Their uncertainty and their willingness to ride passively the waves of evolution reflect, we believe, the inadaptation of the instruments of political action to the policy preferences of the elite and to the problems of contemporary French society.

The inadaptation of the political system was most sharply revealed in three areas. On political issues, on political parties, and on the organization of public authority, the contradictions that recur in these interviews reflect the inability of politics to reform its ideas and structures.

II

The men we interviewed all point to important changes in political belief since the war: the reduction of ideological tensions, the irrelevance of the categories Left and Right, an increasingly pragmatic style in politics, and the emergence of new issues. If the substance of the old politics has withered away, its categories still remain as the principal guides to political action.[6] The survival of the old political categories appears to depend on three elements: (1) an analysis of society that fails to locate the potential allies of a new politics; (2) a definition of modern political problems that obscures conflicts of interests; and (3) an acceptance of the values served by a high degree of political centralization.

A great reduction in the intensity of political emotions is the common denominator of the political changes the elite describes. Many respondents recall the old political passions with a cer-

[6] See Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, 1966), 159.

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tain nostalgia, for they attribute the waning of political intensity to essentially negative factors: first, the indivualism generated by consumer society in its passion for private appropriation and the political apathy of mass society. Television, automobiles, and leisure-time distractions have crowded public concerns out of private life, they believe. Prosperity and consumer society have drained the passion out of politics. What the elites observe is not that political opinions have changed, but, simply, that politics matters less.[7]

The second explanation points to the character of modern economic and social problems. The problems of contemporary society, they believe, are too complex and too technical to give rise to clear-cut divisions or to ideological fervor. As one mayor put it: "Is the population about to get excited about problems of the gold balance between the U.S. and France?" They attribute the waning of ideological politics to the shift from the political questions of the past to which different answers could be legitimately given, thus generating controversy and conflict, to the political problems of the present, which do not permit equally valid alternative solutions and therefore do not give rise to political divisions.

Thus the substance of the old politics has evaporated, while the categories it generated have survived and continue to guide political action. The same men who explained the irrelevance of the old political issues and the public's disaffection for appeals based on ideologies of the past proceeded to describe to us political strategies and programs built around the old categories.

A left-wing politician who claimed that "what matters most to people is their daily well-being, the beef steak question" went on to confess that though he personally favored continuing government subsidies to church schools, he dared not drop from his program the demand that subsidies be paid only to public

[7] The crisis of May-June 1968 led some respondents to suggest that the French passion for politics has not been extinguished. Such outpourings of passionate political enthusiasm are clearly not new in French history, for example, the Dreyfus case, the Popular Front, the Liberation. Each such wave receded, and once again the pattern is being repeated, but the level of political interest during non-crisis periods appears to have dropped significantly below the levels of the Third and Fourth Republic.

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schools. One right-wing deputy told of having brought the mayors and representatives of various organizations of a depressed zone of his constituency together with economists to discuss the future of the area. After a three hour discussion on the economic potential of the region, a man stood up and asked: "And now, Mr. Deputy, what about the *bouilleurs de cru?*" And the audience was more interested in that question than in all that had gone before. Intellectuals from the *Parti socialiste unifié* (PSU), a Left Socialist party, having just argued that the Left ought to accept the presidential system, invoked their belief in the inevitability of a dictatorship of the proletariat when they tried to explain how the Socialists would implement their programs if they were in power. The elite, in sum, in order to analyze its constituents' preferences and its own operating principles, continues to rely on the vocabulary and conceptions of a politics whose content the elite itself regards as outdated and irrelevant.

How has it happened that the old categories of political ideology have survived both the decline of ideological intensity and the erosion of old political issues? Why do they continue to channel strategy and programs into molds whose original content has evaporated? The old ideological framework continues to serve two functions in the political thinking and projects of the elite: it locates potential allies and opponents and defines the axes of partisan division on particular issues.

Political strategy is based on an analysis of the areas of potential support in society. Political reformers, therefore, need at the outset an analysis of society that will permit them to see new groups and interests and to identify the bases on which new alliances can be constructed. This is precisely what the political elite of Grenoble appears to lack. The great changes in French society are not reflected in the analysis of society which forms the basis of political strategy. The basic image that recurs in the answers of both left- and right-wing respondents is of a society whose principal units are the traditional classes: workers, owners, and peasants. If differentiations within classes are sometimes noted, these distinctions do not play a major part in the political calculations of any political group. Class conflict has declined, many respondents observed, but class remains the fundamental political unit. A Communist mayor explained that "so

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long as capitalism exists so will class conflict, though that does not mean that workers and *patrons* will fight every day."

To the extent that the elites do take into account the impact of change on social structures, they think primarily in terms of the contraction or expansion of the numbers within given classes. The transformation of social groups has been obscured by an analysis of change as expansion rather than as social and economic redistribution and restructuring. The respondents from agricultural organizations, for example, discussed the shrinking of the peasant class and its impact on politics, but did not go on to speculate about whether agricultural changes had destroyed the class structure of the peasantry and created agricultural groups whose interests and relations with the nation fundamentally differ from those of the "peasant class." The inability to see rural society except in traditional class terms makes it impossible to identify potential allies for political reform or potential bases for new coalitions with urban groups.

When the elite does recognize new political actors and axes of political division—cadres, students, young generations, recent residents of the city—they describe these groups as if they were superimposed onto a social map whose basic topography remains unaltered. Even political reformers tend to calculate their chances of success not by projecting the growth of the influence and weight of new groups, but by estimating, as one Grenoble reformer we interviewed did, the chances for support of a project by "the workers, peasants, and students." The search for new allies first breaks down, then, on the inability to locate significant political actors other than class.

The elites encounter a second obstacle to building new coalitions when they try to define political strategies and programs that correspond to their perceptions of the voters' new demands. The men we interviewed have definite ideas about what the voters want, but they seem unable to translate these desires into political projects or even to draw out the political implications of the raw expressions of preferences that they relayed to us. Whenever the issues they described as salient for the voters were not the traditional ones, the elites seemed uncertain about how they cut politically.

The politicians describe the declining intensity of politics as

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a phenomenon that, instead of making new alliances possible, makes it increasingly difficult to mobilize citizens at all. Those who think that the waning of ideological fervor might permit new forms of citizen participation are inclined to locate the new organizations *outside* the political arena, or at least outside the party arena. The political clubs, the neighborhood organizations (*associations des habitants de quartier*), and the syndicates were discussed as organizational forms that inherit those citizens whose dampened political passions have taken them away from the parties. No one—not even those we interviewed from the political parties—has in mind a way in which the parties could capture, organize, or profit from this shift in the quality of political loyalties and participation.

The emergence of new issues also leaves the politicians in doubt about political strategy. The elite does believe that economic questions are now replacing ideological ones in the preoccupations of the voters, but their analysis of society makes it difficult to identify the interests and alignments which could replace the alliances that coalesced around the old issues. In the past these questions used to define for voters what it meant to be of the Left or the Right and for politicians provided a map for strategy and programs. The new issues, by contrast, cannot readily be classified according to Right or Left divisions, nor can their "class-content" be easily identified. The political reactions of the voters on contemporary problems do not fall into patterns that the system is designed to receive. Will voters who care more about unemployment and wages than about nationalization vote for the Left or the Right? Can workers who think of themselves more as consumers than as proletarians be wooed into middle class parties? To these and similar questions of political strategy, the men we interviewed usually replied that the new concerns could pull voters in either direction. It was impossible to tell, they claimed, how the new issues sliced electorally. The politicians cannot gauge the political impact of the new problems; their electoral strategies consequently fall back on appeals based on those political demands and conceptions which still elicit a reliable if weary response from voters and which do, at a minimum, tap the reservoir of voters still motivated by the old ideological issues.

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In sum, then, the first reason the elite does not abandon old political categories seems to us to derive from its analysis of society. The map of France which it employs to identify potential allies and bases of support still indicates class and old ideological camps as the significant political boundaries. This map obscures the changes in topography which would permit other strategies of political action. In the absence of political criteria drawn from the conflicts and convergences of interests of modern industrial and urban groups, the elite continues to orient its political life on the basis of criteria whose social and economic foundation has crumbled.

The second reason for the elite's inability to find allies for a new politics lies in its conception of contemporary problems. The men we interviewed tend to divide political problems into two broad but distinct categories: those which are "economic" or "technical" and those which are "social" or "human." Economic problems are characterized as those problems likely to have "one right solution." They have one best solution either because they are essentially technical problems of administration, efficiency, or productivity; or because they are problems whose solution must be integrated into some larger process or whole into whose framework the partial solution can fit in only one way. Economic rationalization, the Plan, and the concentration of firms were cited as cases where the structures of a society-wide process or policy narrowly restrict the range of alternatives open for decisions which must be inserted into the general process.

Social or human problems, by contrast, they define as problems whose solution requires choices among competing values and goals. "Human" dilemmas, like the conflict between efficiency and worker-participation in factories, or selection in university admissions, or subsidies to old peasants on marginal farms are all problematic because solutions are inevitably linked to particular sets of values. The specifically human or social aspects of a problem are therefore "anti-economic," since the economic parts of a question can receive single and demonstrable answers. Since the issues at stake in social and human problems are values, technical competence and special knowledge provide no authoritative guidance, for on these questions, in principle

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at least, each man's opinion is worth another's. In the opinion of the elite, these problems are the stuff of politics, and the legitimate function of politicians and parties is to construct programs organized about different political alternatives.

What is happening in modern states, according to our respondents, is a massive transfer of problems from the social domain into the economic domain. This emptying-out of politics takes place as new problems emerge which are perceived as essentially technical. Many of the problems which once were debated in moral and political terms are now considered to have only one outcome or one solution. For example, in the past politicians argued about whether small farms and a large agricultural population ought to be maintained in order to preserve French civilization. Now the elite concludes that economic change, the entry of France into the Common Market, and the industrialization of agriculture inevitably condemn the traditional countryside. The question of rural exodus is thus transferred from the agenda of politics onto that of economics. Some social and human aspects of the problem are still seen as subject to political decision: the rate of rural exodus, assistance to migrants, welfare payments to those unable to leave. But the heart of the matter is no longer regarded by the men we interviewed as susceptible to solution by legitimate alternatives organized around different political conceptions.

The French political system has operated to produce projects organized around concepts of Left and Right politics. "Left" and "Right," however, our respondents told us, are criteria which cannot be applied to economic problems. One man active in Grenoble Left-reform politics reported that he and his friends on the municipal council found that "in eight out of ten cases our choices are really logically decided. In municipal problems often there is only one solution. There are not ten different ways to pick up garbage. There is no need for a Left and a Right on that issue." A deputy from a party allied with the Gaullists explained:

> "Right" and "Left" have less and less meaning. With the opening of the frontiers, with the character of modern economic problems, issues are posed in such a way that everyone is obliged to pursue more or less the same policies. For example, look at the Demo-

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> crats and Republicans in the United States or the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats in Germany. If the moderate Left in France came to power they would have about the same policies as the Right. All the old issues are disappearing in face of the need for productivity and efficiency. This is why I am not afraid of the radicalism of the young, for reality and experience will bring them to the realization that for most problems now there is really only one solution.

Traditional politics began with the political categories of Left and Right and then applied them to practical problems.

In contrast, a member of the Grenoble municipal reform group (*Groupe d'Action Municipal* [GAM]) described the way in which his group makes political decisions:

> The method of politics is to proceed from doctrines and to descend to practical reality. If you cannot succeed in making the two things square, then you must try to force reality into the mold of your doctrine. On the contrary, the method of syndicalism and the method of the GAM is to begin with reality. From practical problems we move up to the discovery of the problems of politics, the general problems. We are like the syndicalist who asks first, why is my check so low, and then discovers how the economy of the country has been affected by nuclear armaments.

Beginning with practical problems means, then, that for a certain part of the political road, men of all political opinions will be obliged by the objective aspects of a problem to travel together. For this stretch of the road the method of modern politics is, in the opinion of the elite, essentially a technocratic method. Moreover, on this part of the road the new method of politics will replace traditional politicians with a new political personnel. In fact, in the Grenoble region technocrats and men recruited into politics along different tracks than the traditional politicians are supplanting the notables. Many of the political reformers we interviewed had been drawn into politics precisely by their frustration at having a problem which they perceived as technical or objective handled in a "political" way. For example, the most important of the Grenoble reformers, Hubert Dubedout, was an engineer at the nuclear research center when his efforts to have the municipality assure adequate water pressure to apartments in upper stories of buildings floundered on

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the shoals of local feuds and political incompetence. He is now the mayor.

The irrelevance of the terms Left and Right is not a new idea in French politics. It has been one of the principal tenets of the corporatist school of thought, and, more generally, of French conservatism.[8] Today, however, Left and Right, reformers and traditionalists depart from classic corporatist positions on two points. First, for corporatists, agreement and the one, recognizable, right solution were based on a moral consensus. For today's political elite, the criteria which provide the basis of agreement are no longer moral, but are instead the standards of efficacy and productivity. Secondly, where the corporatists regarded society as fixed in its principal elements, the elite we interviewed consider that the structures of modern society are in a process of continuous renovation.

What remains of the corporatist ideas and has gained a general acceptance, even on the Left, is the belief that economic or objective factors, on the one hand, and political factors, on the other, inhabit distinct, mutually exclusive, and airtight compartments. In the rhetoric of the reformers, for example, this is expressed in the notion that the technical, objective aspects of an issue can and should be rigorously separated from its political aspects. Politics, in this view, lies beyond economics; it is the sphere of choices which is reached only after that set of questions in which decisions can be based purely on the objective factors present in a situation has been exhausted.

What are the implications of this way of analyzing public problems? The principal consequence, as we see it, is to exclude from politics, thus delimited, the very issues on which new coalitions of interests and political alliances would have to be built in order to reform the political system. Urban affairs, housing, employment, education, regional development—these are the issues which both reformers and traditionalists now consider as in the main technical questions. The conflicts of interest that arise over these issues are not systematically organized or even

[8] The irrelevance of the categories of Left and Right was, as Alain pointed out, an idea that itself belonged to the Right. What is striking today is the extent to which this notion has been taken over by the Left, with the important exception of the Communist party.

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picked up by political groups. Indeed, these political ideas make it difficult even for the reformers to see why such issues should not be relegated, if not to the administration, at least to administrative methods of resolution. If the reformers insist that these issues be left in politics, it is because one of their *other* goals —encouraging popular participation—requires this.

All modern political systems do in fact distinguish between those elements in public policy which are technical and those which are, properly speaking, political. What we are arguing in the French case is that the distinctions that are drawn relegate to the category of technique so many of the critical questions of modern society that the reformers are unable to perceive either their potential constituencies or likely alliances. Having abstained from political calculation and analysis for the first stretch of the road, when they reach politics even the reformers find themselves left with the old political categories. Once the Club Jean Moulin moves beyond the objective part of its enquiries, as one member put it, "then they rediscover the old political families." In sum, the answers beyond economics continue to be shaped by the categories of the old political ideologies.

III

Old political ideas reinforce and are reinforced by the second bulwark of the unreformed political system, the parties. The traditional political parties in the Isère are in an advanced state of decline. In the city of Grenoble, the Socialists (SFIO), the Democratic Center, and the Radicals each have fewer than a hundred party members. The Communist party has survived somewhat better and even claims an influx of young members. The Gaullist party—whose name has been changed to Union des démocrats pour la République (UDR)—and the Giscardiens (Groupe des républicains indépendents) have virtually no members. The two political groups whose memberships are young and expanding—the GAM and the PSU—are groups which function more as political clubs than as parties.

Reforming the French political system, as even the members of the GAM and the PSU often admit, requires not building new parties but taking over and transforming old ones. This does not

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appear to be happening. Those interested in political reform are not willing to join traditional parties, and those who are in traditional parties are usually not interested in reforming them. Both refusal to enter the parties and resistance of the parties to change are linked to a common set of factors: the ideological base of the parties, the way they are organized, and the purposes that participation in party politics is expected to serve.

Both party militants and members of the broader political elite continue to identify political parties according to categories established by traditional political ideologies, and they perceive that the general public distinguishes among parties in the same way. The fusion of party identification and the old political ideas narrows a party's potential membership and electorate to traditional allies, even when the issues on which the alliance was originally concluded have virtually disappeared. Were the Socialists, for example, to adopt a progressive agricultural program, they would still recruit very few party members from the young Catholic farmers' organization as long as, for the latter, the Socialists continue to be anti-clerical first and foremost.[9]

Ideological survivals also hamper party reform by maintaining a style of partisanship which keeps potential recruits away. The defense of ideological goals created in members of traditional political parties a sense of solidarity and an instinct for mutual self-protection that now appear sectarian and self-interested to those for whom the old goals are no longer live issues. A member of the Grenoble reform group contrasted the instrumental view he and his friends take of their association with the Socialists' attitude toward their party:

> What is the future of the GAM? Perhaps it may be useful in the future to unite with the PSU, perhaps with the Democratic Center. Any alternative that would advance us on the path of progress would be acceptable to me. We are not like the Socialists who reject any solution that would mean the end of the SFIO. Do you know that when Socialists from the provinces come to Paris they embrace on the two cheeks like brothers! For them, the party is a family, a religion.

[9] The PSU, for example, despite its refusal to take up the usual anti-clerical planks of the Left, has failed to attract significant numbers of progressive Catholics.

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Beyond specific organizational rules the reformers also fear the weight of institutional inertia and see little hope that an individual who enters a party, even with the intention of reforming it, will not be swallowed up by the system. If formal and informal party rules provide a realistic basis for this fear, its dimensions cannot be explained by them alone. The extreme pessimism of the men we interviewed about their chances of reforming the parties seems related to a particular notion of how organizations operate and adapt. The only mode of reform that they could envisage was a wholesale replacement of the old political personnel by new men. One politician whose own political career dates to the thirties explained: "The men in our old political chapels have been scarred by events—by the Occupation, the Liberation, Indochina, Algeria. There are so many scores to settle. The men who lived through these events have been permanently marked by them, and this is why our divisions endure."

Only a new generation can solve the problem of the parties, the respondents argue. "We have to bury the old men (*Il faut laisser crever les vieux*)," several said. This is a time of transition when one can only wait for the exchange of generations. In sum, what the reformers fear is that even if they *could* capture strategic positions in the party structure, these institutional levers would not enable them to exercise effective power in the organization. The emphasis on the extent to which organizations are the product of particular men discounts the potential effects of institutional innovation. The same idea leads the elite to underestimate the possibility that in the future the old unreformed party organizations may cast a new generation of political activists in the same mold as the old.

Finally, the significance of political party reform is minimized by the very aims of the reform movement. Among the various goals of a rather heterogeneous movement the desire to increase popular participation in politics is the one that receives widest consent and that best distinguishes the reformers from political traditionalists of all stripes. The exhaustion of old issues, many of our respondents said, leaves only the distinction between those who feel basic collective choices should be made by citizens and those who, on the contrary, wish to keep citizens at

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a distance from power. As articulated in reform programs, however, participation is a purpose which, though impossible to achieve within the existing institutional system, does not focus political attention on the requirements of creating a new one.

In the projects of the reformers participation is advocated as an intrinsic good, as a method for improving decisions, and as a means of uncovering the preferences of the population, thereby replacing worn-out political ideas with new ones. For those who believe that choice and politics begin "beyond technique and economics," participation by wide circles of the population is regarded as the process by which political values relevant to modern French society can be discovered. Increased participation might indeed relieve French society of some of the severe strains which, as Michel Crozier has shown, result from the dysfunctions of a highly centralized system.[10] The lack of communication between strata and the distance between central decision-makers and the situations they are attempting to regulate mean that choices are taken on the basis of inadequate information and that decision-makers, isolated in the capital, are unresponsive and inflexible. Bringing the population into the decision-making process in any way at all may provide more information, thus more rational decisions, and more cooperation, thus greater efficacy. Participation is, however, not only unlikely to generate any new criteria for politics, but is unlikely even to occur on any significant scale unless the political system has already begun to hold out new possibilities. For this change to come about, for the system to offer new alternatives, participation cannot replace political parties, for only they are capable of organizing the effort necessary for a new French politics: to seek out new coalitions of interest and to locate and articulate in coherent programs the values of modern French society.

IV

Institutions are not neutral. Political traditionalists and reformers must pursue their objectives in public institutions that weight the system in favor of particular values and purposes. To change

[10] Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago, 1964).

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the system, therefore, requires an understanding of the institutional requirements of desired political ends. Such an understanding of institutions appears problematic for the men we interviewed, who find themselves torn by contradictions between the values they espouse and their assumptions about political structures. Here, too, the divisions among the elite follow neither regular party lines nor the Left-Right split but lie rather in the attitude of the elite toward reform of the state. For one group, the essential objective is to capture the state; for the other, it is to redistribute political power, by increasing the role of local government and by opening political authority to the influence of wider circles of participants. The legacy of old ideas burdens both groups, differently, but no less heavily.

The first set of respondents seeks in institutions levers of control which would permit the population, or its representatives, to oversee the operations of the state and to influence the substance of policy decisions. In this regard the leaders we interviewed find existing arrangements woefully inadequate. Their grievances are traditional ones. The decision-makers are too remote to understand local conditions. Efficacy, efficiency, and profitability in the narrowest economic sense have become the only standards of administrative rationality. As a mayor of a small town put it, "France is dominated by the students of the ENA [National School of Administration]. They know nothing of the way things really are. . . . In their reports there are no more human elements."

If before taking a decision the government had to consult interested groups, the difficulties inherent in technocratic rationality might be alleviated. The men we interviewed consider that present institutional provisions are totally inadequate for this purpose. The CODERs (*Commissions de Développement Economique Régional*) which assemble representatives of the professional organizations, unions, interest groups, and local governments are seen as sham or co-optation.[11] As one trade-unionist put it: "The CODERs are merely another technique by which Paris extends its control over the population." Further, the diminishing power of the deputy has left a vacuum between

[11] Pierre Grémion and Jean-Pierre Worms, *Les Institutions régionales et la société locale* (Paris, 1968).

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government and electorate. The decline of Parliament in the Fifth Republic has stripped all credibility from the deputies' threats of overturning governments and has left the bureaucracy more powerful and autonomous than ever.[12]

These leaders, then, criticize the institutional system for failing to provide them with levers to exert pressure on the central decision-makers. Despite the critique, they find it difficult to specify the reforms that would permit the supervision and influence they desire. Their dilemma derives from the fact that the values they associate with increased control over the state seem incompatible with other values which they perceive as depending on the state. Equality, security, liberty, national strength and prestige, and national unity require, they believe, political structures capable of ensuring conscious, planned, rational, hence central direction. Collective tasks need coherent, comprehensive plans of action. These can be formulated and implemented only by a state whose autonomous power and independence of other social institutions removes from the path of its activities the impediments of competing powers. Decentralization or separation of powers in the capital, both of which would increase possibilities of control, would simultaneously weaken the institutional guarantees of efficiency and coherence; therefore, they are rejected.[13] On the contrary, the elite who are of this opinion accept the institutions of the Fifth Republic.

If the behavior of the state is to be controlled neither by institutional reform nor by the check of external powers, then the identity of those who exercise power becomes the crucial factor. This group of respondents continues to rely on a traditional so-

[12] Leaders differ in their evaluations of the residual utility of the deputy. Some feel the deputy is still able to procure some advantage for his district. One small-town mayor thinks the government distributes its largesse to districts represented by Gaullist deputies: "What matters to me is the economic future of this region. I don't give a damn for politics. I don't care who the deputy is or which majority it is, so long as we have a deputy in the majority who can contribute to our region." In contrast to these views, the majority hold that the role of the deputy is insignificant: The deputy is useful only to *accrocher les petites choses.*

[13] Some leaders, particularly the Marxists, believe that state control is impossible because the state is too weak. The consider that power remains too widely dispersed in the private hands of industrialists and property owners.

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lution: to get into power. If the state is bad the only remedy is replacing one set of rulers with another. Even this solution promises only limited recourse to those whose distrust of the state includes all governments, those of political allies as well as those of opponents. Such men regard the state as an inherently aggressive, expansionist organism. The state, regardless of who governs, has its own interests which do not necessarily coincide even with the political interests of those groups to which the rulers belong. No government can be trusted, not even the government of one's party. "The government is always the government and must be resisted," as one trade-unionist put it.

A state that cannot be controlled may still be courted. In the old pattern of influence politicians employed partisan and electoral levers to extract concessions from the government. Now elites think the best way to get things done is to send an intelligent, well-informed person to the administration armed with a dossier that proves the superior rationality and technical coherence of the proposal. Though the bureaucrats cannot be coerced, they can be persuaded. The force that will prevail is "the power of a good idea"; "one is only as strong as one's dossier."

The other and smaller group of respondents have fundamentally new expectations of the values that can be realized through political institutions. These men agree that institutions ought to permit oversight, but, beyond this, they demand that political structures be created which will allow decisions to be made by those directly affected. Such a change in the political system would, they argue, produce better decisions—through improved communication, information, and responsibility—and would also serve a goal they consider an intrinsic good, civic participation.

For them, the phrase "we are as strong as our dossier" is proof of the limited power of ideas and of the virtual impotence of cities, departments, individuals, and groups in face of the central bureaucracy. These respondents, too, are more precise in their grievances than in their proposals for reform. Any attempt to spell out reforms creates in them a conflict between the values associated with direct control and citizen involvement and the problems implicit in the operational requirements of these reforms.

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If, for example, local communities receive expanded powers and independent financial resources, the same problem will likely be treated in different ways in various parts of the country. Creating a variety of institutions, practices, and policies will make a single, coherent, national plan impossible. Many respondents consider such political variety a negation of equality. As one Socialist said: "A Republic is a republic of equals and legislation should be the same everywhere."

Similarly, proposals to involve the population in decision-making at the local level imply that the competence politics requires can be found in the population at large. It also presumes a willingness to accept a certain amount of error and misrule. Yet as noted above, the elite sees the political problems of modern France as highly technical and complex; it fears, therefore, that local governments, without the tutelage of the state, will create chaos.

The ambivalent attitudes of the elite are, further, evident in its ideas about which powers should be distributed to local or regional governments and which should remain at the center. The men we interviewed seem, for example, less concerned with the transfer of new powers to local authorities than with giving more money to local bodies to use within existing grants of authority. A local politician, when asked whether the city should have more authority over educational matters, echoed the old Jacobin doctrines: "Education is the affair of the state. We do not need to have more authority, but we need to have the state pay what it should. The state should take over those expenses which rightfully belong to it."

Finally, to some on the Left the demand for local control runs counter to their own analysis of society. If the crucial determinant of politics is the social and economic structure of the nation, decentralization schemes can accomplish little. The exercise of local power will be subverted as long as private economic power maintains its preponderant position in French society. Many of those reformers who seek decentralization at the same time believe that local conditions are linked to national politics in a way which renders decentralization irrelevant. As long as Paris is in the wrong hands local progress is impossible.

In sum, the political elites of the Isère find that existing politi-

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cal structures inhibit the realization of values they think important. But both for those who seek changes which do not require fundamental reforms and for those who demand more drastic structural reforms conflicts between the values of control, participation, and efficacy paralyze the elaboration of political programs.

In Grenoble and its surrounding region, more than in most French provincial centers, modern economic and social structures have replaced traditional ones and local politics has been transformed by new ideas and a new political personnel. The political attitudes of the men we interviewed in the Isère may, therefore, be significantly different than the attitudes of a representative sample of French provincial elites, and the observations about the obstacles to reform that we have drawn from these interviews cannot be simply generalized to the rest of France. In an important way, however, the case of the Isère is exemplary. Even in this region and for those men least committed to the old politics, political activity continues to move along tracks laid down by old issues. Social and economic modernization have not dragged political reform in their wake; despite lags and contradictions, no fundamental changes seem imminent. This case suggests, therefore, that if fundamental political reform is to occur in France, deliberate political innovation will be required.

Such innovation would have to attack two key related features of the political system, the deficiencies in civic education and centralization. These two factors are, in the opinion of many respondents, responsible for the persistence of old political patterns. Many of the men interviewed argued that as long as Frenchmen receive no education in public affairs, basic changes in political practices and institutions cannot be effected. Indeed, many respondents explained their reluctance to accept a transfer of power from the center to local and regional governments by the political incapacity of the citizenry.

In yet another way the question of civic education is linked to centralization. Political institutions play a critical role in shaping the ideas, practices, and expectations of politicians and citizens alike. The remedy of introducing civics courses in schools can contribute little toward encouraging responsible participation as long as the political experiences that institutions

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make available to citizens continue to provide a very different kind of civic education. In France whatever changes there have been in politics over the last two decades have on balance probably decreased the number of experiences in collective action available in the system. One respondent, the mayor of a small town, described the consequences of the institutional atrophy of the parties for political education and argued for giving a high priority to organizational reforms:

> Yes, despite the possibilities available to present our case directly to the administration, we still need parties and politics. First, to increase our effectiveness. Second, so that we could analyze and discuss problems together. In the MLP [a Left-Christian resistance movement] we used to be able to debate and analyze issues. Now I have to rely on the political commentary I read in newspapers. I wish I had a group with which I could talk politics, for now I have to think things out alone, and the tendency is to look at things from a purely local perspective. We need political parties if we are to break out of our isolation. We accomplish something here; in Grenoble they accomplish something; but we need some system to connect these developments into national politics.
>
> Finally from the point of view of our youth, it is crucial that party organizations be rebuilt. Whereas our generation inherited the church and the [Communist] party—structures that gave us a collective education—our youth find nothing.

The events of May-June 1968 have indeed generated great interest in reforming public organizations in order to increase the opportunities for popular participation in politics. The education act of 1968 and the bills under discussion for regional authorities and for industry have all assigned an important place to such provisions. In the University, mixed student-faculty committees; in regional public authorities, the proposed replacement of appointed delegates with elected representatives; and in factories, suggestions for profit-sharing and for improved information on the firm's operations are intended to create channels through which citizens may take a direct part in the affairs of their society. Even if such reforms are eventually enacted, the prospects of their success do not appear high if the channels of participation are implanted into institutions that remain otherwise unchanged. As long as the universities, for example, remain

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non-competitive, closed institutions, dependent on the central bureaucracy for funds and rules, as long as authority within the universities remains fragmented and weak, hence irresponsible, those who do take advantage of new opportunities for participation may find themselves more frustrated than ever. In sum, the search for new forms of participation takes place within the very structures that have inhibited political change in the past, and thus changes in the French political system since May 1968 once again reproduce the contradictions that we have analyzed above in the political ideas of the elite.

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Swedish Politics in the Late Nineteen-Sixties: Dynamic Stability

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When the Swedish Parliament, the *Riksdag*, opened its new session in January 1969, with traditional pomp and ceremony and in the presence of King Gustav VI Adolph and Prime Minister Tage Erlander, among its deputies were a number of new faces, some half of whom, symptomatically, were under age forty. A few other young people paraded outside, their banners referring to the colorful ceremony as an "upper-class farce." It looked as though new forces were ruffling the usually calm and outwardly untroubled waters of Swedish politics. The new members had been elected to the *Riksdag's* Second Chamber[1] the preceding September 15, sometimes referred to by headlines as Sweden's "Day of Fate" because of the importance of the elections.

Other factors beside good weather combined to bring to the polls the highest percentage of voters (88.7) ever to cast their ballots. World tensions, the new place of youth in political life, and, most

[1] Every four years elections by direct popular vote have been held for the Second Chamber (*Andra kammaren*) since the formation of the bicameral *Riksdag* in 1866. Elections for the First Chamber (*Första kammaren*) have been carried on indirectly by country councils (*Landsting*) or in the cities of Stockholm, Göteborg (Gothenberg), and Malmö by the city councils (*stadsfullmäktige*). Elections for these assemblies have taken place every four years, not coinciding with the national elections. With terms extending for eight years, the First Chamber deputies are elected by the assemblies, one-eighth each autumn. In 1968 the number of Second Chamber deputies was 233, and of the First, 151. Beginning in 1970 the unicameral body of 350 deputies will substitute for it. Local and national elections will be held the same year.

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Figures for Lower Chamber and Communal Elections, 1964-68

Party	Election Year	Vote	Seats	Gain or Loss in Seats	Per cent
Conservative	1968 (Parliament Vote)	670,532	32	−1	13.9
Party	1966 (Communal Vote)	646,831	—		14.7
	1964 (Parliament Vote)	582,609	33		13.7
Center	1968 (Parliament Vote)	779,818	39	+3	16.1
Party	1966 (Communal Vote)	602,380	—		13.7
	1964 (Parliament Vote)	570,017	36		13.4
Liberal	1968 (Parliament Vote)	724,859	34	−9	15.0
Party	1966 (Communal Vote)	736,782	—		16.8
	1964 (Parliament Vote)	723,986	43		17.1
Social	1968 (Parliament Vote)	2,420,242	125	+12	50.1
Democratic	1966 (Communal Vote)	1,858,506	—		42.3
Party	1964 (Parliament Vote)	2,006,923	113		47.3
Communist	1968 (Parliament Vote)	145,172	3	−5	3.0
Left	1966 (Communal Vote)	283,402	—		6.5
Party	1964 (Parliament Vote)	221,746	8		5.2
Christian	1968 (Parliament Vote)	72,411	—		1.5
Democratic	1966 (Communal Vote)	78,957	—		1.8
Party	1964 (Parliament Vote)	75,389	—		1.8

of all, domestic issues combined to bring about a surprising and, for Sweden, dramatic election result. Although Vietnam was not without impact on Swedish thinking, the Czech crisis, coming only five weeks before the elections, helped change what might have been their outcome, just as the Soviet takeover in Czechoslovakia twenty years earlier had left its mark on Swedish politics. But domestic issues weighed most heavily of all in 1968.

Except for a brief one hundred days, the Social Democratic party had dominated the government since 1932 and Erlander had been prime minister for twenty-two years. Only twice before, in 1948 and 1958, had the Social Democrats been so seriously challenged. For a number of years since World War II, unable to muster a *Riksdag* majority, they had headed minority governments. Since the last elections to the Second Chamber in 1964 and the provincial and municipal elections of 1966 their position had been especially shaky. In 1968 the opposition parties saw the chance for a change. So high did their hopes of unseating the govern-

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ment run that they even sent investigators to Norway and Denmark to see how those countries had made the transition from Socialist to non-Socialist governments. But Swedish opposition hopes were destined to be blasted when September of 1968 came, as will be seen later.

I

Sweden has known progress and stability during its years of Social Democratic leadership. Indeed, in 1968 the Social Democrats hoped that their record in this regard would bring them renewed victory. That stability, however, must be understood in the light of geographic, social, and historic factors. Well protected from invasion by its somewhat isolated geographical position, Sweden has practically never been invaded since the Stone Age, and has rarely been occupied by foreign powers. Isolation has also helped make Sweden's population homogeneous in race, language, religion, and nationality, has bred in the Swedes a deep self-reliance, and has taught them the arts of cooperation and compromise which became the hallmarks of their economic and political life.

One hundred years ago the Swedish economy was still chiefly agricultural, and nearly three-quarters of the people worked the land. The industrial revolution began about 1870 and advanced rapidly, but suffered some setback in the great depression. The nineteen-sixties, however, found less than a tenth of the people employed in agriculture, and their number continues to decrease as they move into jobs in the cities. But modern farming methods so increase productivity of the land that, together with some imports, the country can feed the people plentifully.

In the late nineteen-sixties Sweden has had a highly specialized and efficient industrial establishment and a large export trade. Its gross national product of $2,505 per capita is exceeded only by the United States, with $3,477. In Sweden full employment has been virtually attained, with unemployment amounting to less than two per cent of the labor force. The country's extraordinary social welfare system has created favorable conditions for the people, and its administration has strengthened the foundations of government by discussion and compromise.

Yet the Swedish economy is not without its difficulties. Its heavy dependence on exports gives it a high degree of vulnerability.

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Although wages have increased by 250 per cent since 1930, gaps in income and wealth have widened during the nineteen-fifties and sixties. The people, while protected against domestic insecurity, insist on greater equality than the widening of the gap permits.

The highly stratified nature of Swedish society has undergone considerable change. Until the industrial revolution the people were sharply divided into four estates: nobles, clergy, burghers, and farmers. As such they were represented in the *Riksdag* until its structure was changed in 1866 by the adoption of a bicameral body. With industrial development came replacement of the four estates by a society consisting largely of farm workers and blue-collar laborers; independent farmers and white-collar salaried employes; and a small upper crust of industrialists and businessmen, members of the professions, and higher government servants.

Migration from the countryside followed industrialization and became more rapid as industrialization increased. Urbanization, more efficient industry, and prosperity caused growth in such services as transportation and merchandizing, which in turn needed more white-collar employes. In less than two decades, from 1950 to 1966, these more than doubled while the industrial force had grown but slightly. All this brought about a change in political parties, especially in their strategies.

II

The Social Democratic or Democratic Labor party (*Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti*) is the largest and oldest of the five political parties which have occupied the political arena for many years. With the exception of the Social Democrats, all parties have their roots in earlier political formations. Most of their labels were inherited from pre-World War II days, but the contents of the political bottles have been considerably changed. Opposed to the Social Democrats are three parties, the Center (*Centerpartiet*), formerly called the Farmers' or Agrarian party (*Bondeförbundet*), the Liberal or People's party (*Folkpartiet*), and the Conservative or party of the Right (*Högerpartiet*), which changed its name in late 1968 to the Moderate Union (*Moderata samlingspartiet*). The Communists, now called the Communist Left party (*Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna*), form no part of any opposition because they consider themselves a

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party of the workers along with the Social Democrats, whom they usually back in the *Riksdag*.

The Center, Liberals, and Conservatives are generally called the bourgeois opposition in Sweden, without any derogatory connotation, to distinguish them from the Social Democrats and the Communists. They are also sometimes referred to as the non-Socialist opposition. Such a distinction, however, fails to note that Sweden is more truly a social welfare than a complete Socialist state, and that approximately ninety per cent of its industry is privately owned. The bourgeois opposition parties are now all united in backing the idea of the social welfare state; otherwise they are far from united and so cannot be called "*the* opposition."

The bourgeois opposition has an especial place in Sweden. In speeches and political campaigns they criticize the government vehemently, but once they take their seats in the *Riksdag* they become active forces in the actual legislative process. By taking part in decisions made by the majority party, they share in its responsibility for carrying out those decisions. The opposition is represented on various government committees and investigating commissions in relation to its parliamentary strength.

The Social Democratic party came into existence as the result of the rapid growth of the industrial revolution in Sweden during the latter nineteenth century and the concomitant rise of the Socialist movement throughout much of Europe. Never advocating violent revolution, it suffered no such suppression in its formative years as did Socialist parties in various European countries. Although they have always been called a Socialist party, the Social Democrats have gradually modified their original orthodox Marxist line.

The Swedish tendency to compromise and the high quality of the party leaders helped lead it along paths of moderation. Few parties in any country have been more fortunate in their leaders. The Social Democrats have had only three: Hjalmar Branting, first elected to the *Riksdag* in 1896 and three times prime minister before his death in 1925; Per Albin Hansson, prime minister for most of the years between 1932 and his death in 1946; and Tage Erlander, who took over after Hansson's death and who is still prime minister in mid-1969.

Even before the attainment of parliamentary government in

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1917 and of complete suffrage the next year, the Social Democrats, who had begun life in 1889 as a small doctrinaire party, had already become the largest political party because they represented the growing number of industrial workers who were gradually becoming enfranchised. When the industrial laborers and farmers had been hard hit by high unemployment in the crisis of the nineteen-thirties, they turned to the Social Democrats and Agrarians to help them. So in 1932 the Social Democrats secured a *Riksdag* majority. Since then neither they nor their prime ministers have been displaced as leaders of the government.

It is impossible to discuss Swedish politics and the role of the Social Democratic party without understanding the importance of the social welfare state to which all political parties have contributed in varying degrees but of which the Social Democrats have been the chief architects. The foundations of that state were laid in 1913 with the introduction of limited pensions for certain groups of old people. Although progress came slowly, by the end of World War II the idea of social security for all people, regardless of income, had taken firm root. By 1950 the structure of the welfare state had been built and in 1955 it was practically completed by the adoption of compulsory health insurance.

The extensive list of benefits is no longer questioned in any of its important aspects by any political party. On the question of old-age pensions, however, from 1956 until 1960 political differences became so serious as to cause the fall of the government. In 1946 a small basic pension was provided for everyone age sixty-seven and over, regardless of income. With inflation and rising prices in the mid-nineteen-fifties, it appeared necessary to increase the amount. There were differences within and among the parties. Some objected to the high cost of possible across-the-board raises, some did not want any pension related to past earnings, which they thought of as discriminatory; still others wanted no pension at all. The possibilities became the subject of a referendum, although referenda, of consultative value only, are rarely used in Sweden. In 1957 the split over what would be a fair scheme caused the resignation of a two-party coalition government of Social Democrats and Agrarians which had lasted since 1951; the formulation of a Social Democratic minority government; the dissolution of the Second Chamber;

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and in 1958 the calling of a special election. But an exact division of the members of the Second Chamber prevented any decision until one member of the Liberal party broke party discipline—which is strict in Sweden—and abstained from the vote. Only then was it possible to enact the supplementary pension legislation.

In the 1940 elections the Social Democrats reaped their first great rewards for their advocacy of social legislation by reaching what was to be an all-time high in their vote, with 53.8 per cent of the total. After presiding over a wartime coalition cabinet of all parties except the Communist, the Social Democrats were free to pursue their goals. They were helped immeasurably by the close-knit network of local trade-unions at the grass roots level which are closely affiliated with the party. By the mid-nineteen-fifties the social welfare system was all but completely established and the Social Democrats, having discarded most of their Marxist remnants, turned their interest to full employment and greater equality of income.

The longer the party has been in office, the more pragmatic has become its approach. Realizing that the welfare state would not be secure without a stable financial base, the Social Democrats have increasingly tried to stimulate industrial production and have insisted on the need for more taxes, especially indirect. In 1960 they even pushed through a sales tax after a battle royal in the *Riksdag*. Together with complete nationalization the idea of complete disarmament has gone out of the window and the party has helped put national security above partisan politics.

Although recently wooing the middle class with vigor and determination, the Social Democrats have always been a party primarily of the workers, over seventy per cent of whom vote for it. Membership in the party is individual but its principal strength comes from its affiliation with the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions. Over two-thirds of the more than 850,000 party members are collectively affiliated through their unions. Each local union decides whether or not to join the Social Democrats. Those which do join are required only to send a certain fixed portion of their membership dues to the party.

The Social Democrats have constantly refused to cooperate or compromise with the Communist party which was formed in 1921 as an offshoot of the severed Socialist left wing. Financially inde-

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pendent of the Third International from their earliest days, the Swedish Communists have always gone their own way in domestic affairs. In foreign affairs they were inclined to follow the U.S.S.R. in Stalinist and later days, but eventually they became more independent. They finally changed their leader and name in the hope of attracting other leftist sympathizers than Communists alone.

The Communists have always been a tiny group. Once, in the heat of wartime enthusiasm for the Russian cause in 1944, they received a fraction over a tenth of the total vote, but four years later the first Communist coup in Czechoslovakia boomeranged against the Swedish Communists so that they lost almost half their adherents.

What success the Communists have had has been chiefly among industrial workers of southern Sweden and in the poor, sparsely populated region of Norbotten, far to the Arctic north, a land of thin, stunted trees, reindeer, midnight sun, and unemployment, where, with the exception of a rich supply of iron ore, there is a serious lack of industry. Although the Communists have had their least success in other rural areas, they have nevertheless won more rural votes than one might have expected.

The Communist party has occasionally proved more important in the *Riksdag* than its small numbers would indicate. In the years 1945-51 and 1961-64 it held the balance in the Second Chamber between the Social Democrats and the bourgeois opposition; in 1965-66 the Communists held the balance when the two chambers voted together on financial matters. In 1960 the Communists helped the Social Democratic government secure its legislation by abstaining from the final vote on the bitterly contested issue of the sales tax.

Of the three bourgeois parties the Center occupies the most strategic position. Founded in 1913 as the Farmers' or Agrarian party, for no other purpose than to promote the interests of the agricultural population, the Agrarians always occupied a middle-of-the-road position from which they could turn to the right or the left as necessity dictated. The depression of the nineteen-thirties combined with the migration of thousands of farmers to the cities revealed common interests between workers of the land and those in the factories, led to Agrarian support of the social welfare as-

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pects of Social Democratic programs, and ultimately brought about coalition governments between Agrarians and Social Democrats during 1936-39 and 1951-57.

Although considerable segments of the Agrarian-Center backbone have always been formed by farmers and farm workers, the party position has changed with the increasing urbanization in which former farmers are now small businessmen and employes in the cities. They still, however, have an emotional connection with the land and with farmer interests. Few are wealthy, and the party probably has the smallest per capita income of all, including the Communists. In an attempt to attract the small city employer and white-collar employe as well as to continue with its farm appeal, the party changed its name in 1958 to the Center party. Since then it has found much in common with the present position of the middle-of-the-road Liberals. Although not Socialists, Center members are willing to go far in backing the welfare programs of the Social Democratic party. The Center compensates for its small size by being well organized; it makes use of the ideas and activities of the farm organizations, most of whose leaders belong to the Center party.

Closest to it in ideology is the Liberal party, with a long and outstanding history. Formed in 1900, it espoused the general goals of classical liberalism and recognized the need for social and parliamentary reform. When it was formed only a fraction of the population had the vote[2] and the king had practically a free choice in appointments. Both Liberals and Social Democrats pushed the demand to widen the electorate and to inaugurate a system of parliamentary government and at the same time urged the adoption of thoroughgoing social reform. So popular was the demand for both, and particularly for enlargement of the suffrage, that the Liberals had become the largest party in the *Riksdag* by 1911. But after both had been attained by 1920 the Liberals

[2] The exercise of the franchise depended on the amount of taxes paid, allowing a wealthy person more votes. A 1909 law provided that no man was to be allowed to cast more than forty votes, no matter what his taxes. In 1918 all adult men and women were given the right to vote in both local and national elections the year after they became twenty years of age. Nils Andrén, *Modern Swedish Government* (Stockholm, 2d ed., 1968), 58, 212, 221.

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lost their trump cards and soon became so badly embroiled in the prohibition argument that their party split.

Reunited in 1934 and still firmly rooted in the Liberal traditions of individual and political liberty, the party developed a "social liberalism" which continued to emphasize toleration and freedom of thought while allowing for a certain amount of state intervention in an otherwise free market. Representing all social classes and a wide spectrum of interests, the Liberals included nonconformists in religion and the arts as well as urban merchants and small farmers. After World War II the amount of party support increased sharply; like other parties it foundered during the controversy over supplementary pension legislation in 1958, but recovered somewhat in the early nineteen-sixties.

Third of the bourgeois parties is the Conservative, formed in 1904 to bring together groups desiring to defend property interests and the status quo. Their early strength decreased after the extension of the franchise and the rise of the Agrarian party, and led to a deep cleavage with the Liberals as well as Agrarians. Defending church and family against the inroads of modern life, the Conservatives long regarded the extension of the social welfare state as an unbearable tax burden and threat to individual liberties. They advocated other unpopular causes such as strong defense in periods when disarmament was the popular cry. Beginning in 1920 they lost votes steadily for over twenty years. When they grudgingly accepted the idea of the welfare state but urged it to move more slowly their vote began to pick up. Their voice was the strongest in the substantial opposition to the supplementary old-age pension and so the 1958 elections made them the most powerful of the three bourgeois parties. Within two years their vote had dropped and in two years more they had become the smallest of the three parties. The Conservatives have attracted almost a third of their members from the top social levels, about half from the middle classes, and perhaps fifteen per cent from the workers. With the exception of a temporary increase in support during the local elections of 1966, the party has not attracted new voters; their program apparently has failed to keep sufficiently abreast of the times.

Of equal political importance with the parties are the powerful privately formed organizations. These great organizations,

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which constitute a kind of "extra-constitutional power balance system,"[3] are in some ways a part of the political process, with membership overlapping that of the political parties and with pressures criss-crossing between the two. Although no one is forced to join an organization, industrial, professional, and civil service workers, farmers, employers, consumers, students, and even housewives have their respective unions or associations. In addition to the many based on social and economic groupings, special interest groups such as those representing church or temperance associations have far from negligible political activities.

Interest organizations of all types are formed into national associations or federations which hold their strings of power so tightly as to have acquired effective monopolies in their special fields. The most powerful politically are the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (*Landsorganisationen i Sverige)*, usually referred to by the initials LO, and the Swedish Employers' Confederation *(Svenska Arbetsgivareföringen)*, usually called SAF.[4] Meeting in the seaside resort of Saltsjöbaden in 1938, they came to an agreement which has laid the basis for subsequent industrial peace, usually said to embody "the spirit of Saltsjöbaden." There have been practically no strikes of importance since 1947 and the trade unions do not object to the introduction of labor-saving devices in the factories. Workers displaced by machinery know they will ei-

[3] Andrén, 22.

[4] As of December 31, 1967, LO had 1,607,077 members; SAF coordinated 25,831 industrial firms; 504,861 clerical and other white-collar employes were represented by the Central Organization for Salaried Employees (*Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation*-TCO); the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (*Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation*-SACO) had 98,720 members with academic degrees. *Statistik årsbok för Sverige* (Stockholm, 1968). The Civil Service National Federation (*Statstjänstemännens Riksförbund*-SR) represents over 20,000 government employes. Andrén, 21. Next in strength to the LO are the farmers organizations, the Federation of Swedish Farmers' Associations (*Sveriges Lantbrukförbund*-SL), a producers' organization which buys, processes, and distributes farm produce; and the Swedish Farmers' Union (*Riksförbundet Landsbygdens Folk*-RLF), which tries to raise the standard of living and the influence of small farmers. Farm cooperatives are organized separately. Other important organizations include eight national temperance associations, among the most interesting of which is the Motor Drivers' Temperance Association. Together the temperance societies represent over 400,000 members, of which some 36,000 are Protestants not belonging to the state Lutheran Church, and over 30,000 Roman Catholics. Andrén, 22.

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ther find other work immediately or be given special training (throughout which they are paid higher than formerly to compensate for their dislocation) and placed in another type of job.

Private organizations provide a means by which the interests of different groups within society are accommodated and offer ways other than through the ballot for a citizen to make his influence felt. They have drawbacks, however, as well as advantages for the process of government and especially for the sound growth of political parties. There are organization spokesmen in the *Riksdag* and on government commissions. If the chief organizational groups work out an agreement on a certain proposal, the legislative action of the *Riksdag* becomes mere ratification of decisions already made outside. Some important problems, concerning wages and salaries, for example, are worked out by negotiations between organized interest groups and government. Often called "*Harpsund* democracy," from the name of the prime minister's summer home where meetings are frequently held, direct bargaining between organizations and government may mean that political parties, particularly those of the opposition, are entirely by-passed and thus weakened.

III

Emerging from World War II with industrial plant unharmed and its standard of living growing appreciably higher, Sweden was able to devote the next decade to pushing its living standards still higher and at the same time to complete the structure of its social welfare state. By the mid-nineteen-fifties, a "cradle to the grave" policy of social security and welfare had become an actuality, making Sweden probably the most complete welfare state of Western Europe. At the same time the Social Democrats devoted much of their effort to banishing the spectre of unemployment. As a result of prosperity, high employment, the excellent system of continuously retraining displaced workers and placing them in other jobs, and cooperation between trade unions and employers, the goal had been practically achieved by the early nineteen-sixties.

While disagreeing in varying degrees with aspects of the welfare state, all political parties had accepted its basic philosophy by 1960; from then on their political campaigns complained less

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of its costs than of its shortcomings in administration and accomplishment. Of course some grumbling about taxes was inevitable, particularly as they have risen to 36.6 per cent of the gross national product, one of the highest totals in Europe. But with wage levels also among the highest in Europe, most people seem to feel like the many who told the authors, "We get our tax money's worth in educational and social services."

No political party claims that the welfare state has sapped the Swedish desire to work; the system, with its concomitant rising prices, may even have increased it. Like the rest of the world, the Swedes are affected by the revolution of rising expectations. Despite their high standard of living and large degree of social security, they want even more of the world's amenities, and are willing to work to get them. Many people "moonlight" after their regular work hours in order to keep up with the rising cost of living and to save money to buy a second car, television, or refrigerator, as is indicated by their increasing savings-bank deposits and purchases of various kinds of private insurance.

This is not to say that the Swedes are entirely content and that their discontent does not find expression in political channels. Everywhere the power of government is growing as society and its needs become more complex, but in a social welfare state like Sweden the state is involved in an even larger part of an individual's life than in most non-Socialist countries. So the citizen is apt to run head-on into state administrative machinery. The government machine sometimes moves so slowly that it has created what the opposition, especially the Liberals, call the "queue society," which has left many individuals frustrated or bitterly opposed to the government. The shortage of hospital nurses and attendants, and sometimes doctors, is so great that, except in emergencies, a long wait is needed for hospital care unless a private doctor or someone else with influence can find accommodations. Similar shortages are found in elementary school and higher educational facilities and in the child care centers which have become increasingly needed as women have become part of the labor force and the old family pattern has given way.

The serious housing lack has been the greatest butt of political criticism. Although Sweden suffered no war damage and has

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one of the highest rates of completed dwellings per inhabitant in the world, it also has one of the severest housing shortages. In addition to the normal but not unduly high growth of population, rapid urbanization has brought about phenomenal demands for city apartments while houses lie abandoned in sparsely populated areas. A wait of ten years for an apartment is frequent and this causes young people to postpone marriage or to live in crowded quarters with one set of parents. Even in Sweden a black market has arisen. Basic rent control has been in force since 1942. Thus people living in older buildings in town centers have low rents in rent-controlled apartments, while those in the newer suburbs have high rents and often commute long distances to work. These have been the problems preoccupying the political parties in the nineteen-sixties.

All political parties agree on the policy of neutrality or non-alliance but have sometimes disagreed on its interpretation. Not embodied in any written document but based on the country's location and on the Swedish history of peace since 1815, the doctrine became firmly anchored in World War II, but was subject to great strain during that war, and to considerable difficulty in the postwar tensions between the United States and the U.S.S.R. To Sweden neutrality means that it is unwilling to enter into any alliance in peacetime which might endanger its neutrality in war and so will not join with any great power for fear of becoming embroiled in a conflict. Sweden is therefore unwilling to take part in any "regional arrangement" in which the United States or the U.S.S.R. plays a leading part, such as NATO or the Warsaw Pact, but takes part in the Nordic Alliance, and in international organizations such as the Council of Europe and the United Nations. Sweden is so deeply committed to the latter that Swedish armed forces form part of UN peacekeeping activities, such as those on Cyprus and the Gaza strip.

Neutrality does not mean, furthermore, that Sweden must maintain a neutrality of opinion or that its government is unwilling to take sides in controversial issues. For instance, Sweden has retained its diplomatic recognition of Spain and Portugal, but withdrew its ambassador to Greece after the military coup there on April 21, 1967. Even high government officials express their views on international matters and may strongly condemn

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actions of other countries. The government has clearly indicated that even though Sweden is a small country, heavily dependent on world-wide trade, shipping, and investment, its neutrality policy is more deeply rooted than dependence on these matters alone.

Formerly the various political parties disagreed violently over disarmament and national defense, but today all are agreed that neutrality does not keep their country from arming itself in a policy of "total defense" against aggression. Aiming to make invasion so costly and time-consuming as to deter any possible invader, Sweden has universal military service and, besides army and navy, has one of the most powerful air forces in relation to its population of any country in the world. In preparation against possible invasion Sweden has made many of its back country roads into potential air strips, stationing hangars and planes deep in the surrounding forests. It has constructed a new military plane, the Vigen, which in addition to great speed has the ability to rise almost straight and sheer from the ground, making it suitable for use on the back country air strips.

New Swedish military developments have already raised questions as to the country's neutrality, but such questions have not been confined within party lines. Sweden refuses to sell its arms and planes to any country engaged in what it deems to be aggressive actions, as for instance the United States in Vietnam. This type of decision has given rise to a problem of domestic politics. Can Sweden afford to produce Vigen and other planes for little more than its own defense?

IV

By the time of the national elections of 1964 the bourgeois parties were seriously discussing possible ways of reaching agreement among themselves to overcome Social Democratic strength. Never between the end of World War II and 1964 had they won less than 45.5 per cent of the vote for the Second Chamber and in 1956 and 1958 they had emerged with absolute majorities. Yet their influence had never been proportionate to their numerical strength.

In 1964 when their combined votes continued to rise higher

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than those of the Social Democrats, the forces of the bourgeois opposition still remained so scattered that together they secured one less deputy than the Social Democratic party, which thus continued to form a minority government. If it had not been for the formation of two new parties from among the bourgeois ranks, they might have emerged victorious. Against the wishes of their national party organizations, a new party, the Bourgeois Unity Movement (*Medborgerlig Samling*) was formed in southeastern Sweden with the avowed purpose of taking a step toward bourgeois unification. Connected with but not part of the movement was the Christian Democratic Union (*Kristen Demokratisk Samling*), aiming to break down the increasing secularization of Swedish society. The Bourgeois Unity group won three seats, but the Democratic Union's 75,000 votes were so scattered that none of its candidates was elected. Although these splinter groups continued in reduced numbers in later elections, they have served more as a means of subtracting from the strength of the existing bourgeois parties than as a means of their unification.

Other reasons than bourgeois lack of unity helped bring about the 1964 results. The political strength of youth was already showing itself. Several parties acted accordingly. Soon after the elections the Liberal leader resigned after twenty-three years in office and his successor, Sven Wedén, was chosen for both youth and ability. The Conservatives also tried to make their image more youthful and they, too, appointed a young leader. Born in 1925, Yngve Holmberg became the youngest of the party chiefs. After a disaster in the 1962 local elections the Communists chose a new leader, forty-seven year-old Carl-Henrik Hermansson, at their Fortieth Party Congress in 1964. A former Stalinist and advocate of close Russian collaboration, Hermansson came to believe in the complete independence of Swedish communism. He was later to be among the strongest critics of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. His choice as leader was not unconnected with his appealing personality, his ability as a speaker and debater, and his considerable television charm.

The Center and Social Democratic parties preferred not to change horses in mid-stream. Gunnar Hedlund, the Center lead-

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er, was an experienced politician by the time of the 1964 elections. He had been party leader since 1948 and had served in the cabinet of the Social Democratic-Agrarian Coalition from 1951 to 1957. In no small way was he responsible for the party's change of name and he has stressed the Center position as one with definite boundaries between it and the Conservatives on the one side and the Social Democrats on the other.

Tage Erlander, prime minister since 1946, has been Social Democratic leader through fair weather and foul. Born in 1901, he joined the Social Democratic party while at the University of Lund in 1928, and immediately began to take part in student political debates. Erlander rose rapidly in party circles. At thirty-two he was elected to the Second Chamber; in five years more he was appointed undersecretary of the ministry of social affairs. After serving as minister without portfolio in the last year of the wartime coalition, Erlander became minister of education in the first postwar Social Democratic government, and was in that post when called to become prime minister. Since then he has contributed greatly to Social Democratic successes. A master of economic and social facts, unemployment figures, and the like, Erlander is tolerant, shrewd, and firm, and maintains a sense of humor. Tall, with a strong face and erect figure, his physical appearance enhances the impression that he exercises considerable command of his party.

In 1966 local elections were held which had resounding national effects. Provincial and municipal assemblies have always been closely tied to the *Riksdag* because of their power to elect representatives to the First Chamber and their usefulness as training grounds for those elected to either Chamber. Although local problems have a place in communal elections, the issues of the contest are primarily national.

In no communal election has the connection with national politics been more strikingly illustrated than in the elections of 1966 when drama was introduced into the calm and balanced position of the parties. The Social Democrats who had had a high of 50.2 per cent of the vote in the local elections in 1962, zoomed down to 42.3 per cent, their smallest share since 1934. The Communists took up the slack and dramatically moved

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ahead, capturing most of the votes lost by the other party of the workers, while the Center and Conservatives edged ahead and the Liberals more than held their own. Another surprising feature of the elections was that the Social Democratic loss was heaviest in the urban areas. In Stockholm and Göteborg, Socialist strongholds and the two largest cities, the city councils were captured by the bourgeois parties. So great was the Social Democratic disarray after the debacle that even the prime minister talked of resigning. There was discussion of a dissolution of the *Riksdag* and of new elections to make the legislative body more representative of changed public opinion.

The reasons for Social Democratic pessimism were well founded. A considerable number of the many absentees from the polls were Social Democrats. The party had always appealed more to younger than older voters, but this time it appeared that many of the Social Democratic young were too bored with the lack of dramatic issues and too doubtful about the possibility of change to bother to vote.

Other reasons for the downward cascade of the Social Democrats lay in the business slump in West Germany and Britain, both important for Swedish export trade. The Social Democrats, long advocates of full employment, were blamed for the resultant unemployment, even though small in amount. A number of voters, spurred by high prices and the difficulties of the "queue society" had gone over to the bourgeois parties which they believed would continue the welfare state but provide a new look for its administration. The choice of young new leaders by both the Conservatives and Liberals had given them a forward look which apparently had appealed to the young. The Communists gained favor because of unemployment and because their leader possessed charm and television appeal.

There was one important indirect effect of the 1966 elections. Tired of the long control of the Social Democrats in the First Chamber, the bourgeois parties used their newly strengthened position to rid the country of its cumbersome two-chambered *Riksdag*. The idea of a unicameral legislative body had been pushed, although not too whole-heartedly, since 1954, when a commission was appointed to examine possible constitutional reform. By 1967 even the down-hearted Social Democrats agreed,

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and the plan of a unicameral *Riksdag* of 350 seats was adopted, opposed only by the Communists.[5]

V

Recovering from their dismay at the 1966 results, the Social Democrats immediately calked the seams of their ship, put in new planks, and sailed closer to the wind. Tightening their already excellent organization, composed of professionals rather than the amateurs of their opponents, the Social Democrats began their 1968 campaign earlier than the other parties. Aiming to keep their old adherents and at the same time attract more of the young voters, they rode the campaign horses in two directions. The party agreed to the appointment of young ministers, including Krister Wickman, who was made minister of economics in late 1966, but nevertheless kept elder statesmen such as Gunnar Sträng, who had been minister of finance since 1955. Above all, the stalwart and ever-popular Prime Minister Erlander was persuaded to reconsider his plan to retire and to stay at least through the elections.

Most important among the younger ministers who came into prominence was the dynamic Olof Palme. Born in 1927 to an upper-middle-class Stockholm family, Palme spent a year hitchhiking in the United States and another year at an American Midwest college before returning to Sweden to take a law degree. His political interests were apparent even in his university days, during which time he was an active debater and president of the Association of Students. Beginning his actual political career as secretary to Prime Minister Erlander, Palme thus started a long, close relationship to the older man. Elected to the *Riksdag* at the age of thirty-one, Palme held various cabinet posts including that of minister of communications before 1964, when he was promoted to the important position of minister of education. A combination of realistic politician and

[5] The 350 seats will be divided into two groups, one consisting of 310 places distributed between constituencies and parties in an arrangement not too different from that of the Second Chamber; the remaining 40 "national" seats are to be chosen similarly to the First Chamber. Voting will take place in accordance with an amended system of proportional representation designed as a further safeguard against possible proliferation of small parties.

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intellectual visionary, Palme has been regarded by conservatives and, it was rumored before the last elections, even by the head of the trade union confederation as an emotional *enfant terrible*. But no one has ever denied his ability. He has been the darling of the young, to whom both his ideas and appearance have had great appeal.

Particularly after 1966 the government began to take practical action to show what it could do. It was made clear that investment in housing, for instance, was reaching new records in the number of new housing units finished or planned for early completion. For further consideration of strategy an extraordinary party Congress was held in October 1967. It was careful not to antagonize private industry unduly but nevertheless promised a new industrial policy vaguely indicating more state money for investments and more state influence over industry.

In foreign affairs the Congress took a line which would appeal to flaming youth. The Congress promised to lessen increasing defense costs, demanded that the United States stop the bombing in North Vietnam, and made contributions of a token nature to the Vietcong, the National Liberation Front, and to other causes apt to appeal to the left-wing idealism of the young, such as the anti-junta Greek movement spearheaded in Sweden by Andreas Papandreou.

In opposition to the American role in Vietnam, Olof Palme was particularly vocal throughout the campaign. Exercising the right of government members to express themselves openly about matters even remotely affecting their neutrality, Palme agreed to appear at a rally held less than eight months before the elections. As he later stated to the authors, Palme thought he was to attend a youth demonstration against American action and did not realize until he arrived that the North Vietnamese ambassador to Moscow would appear on the same platform. Feeling it would be discourteous to the ambassador to withdraw, Palme delivered a speech violently opposing American intervention in Vietnam.[6] He was strongly opposed by many of his countrymen, and Conservative party leader Holmberg demanded his resignation from the Cabinet. But the more realistic among his opponents believed that even Prime Minister

[6] Mimeographed translation of the speech by Mr. Palme at the Vietnam demonstration, Feb. 21, 1968.

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Erlander was in favor of Palme's course as a means of attracting youth and of recapturing those who had slipped away from the Social Democratic fold in 1966.

As part of their campaign the Social Democrats carried on a two-year dialogue with the people. Making no grandiose promises, they talked to all classes about the problems of their daily life. In meetings and television appearances they discussed such questions as the effects of the wide dispersion of industry on population shifts and technological unemployment, which has been created by industrial automation. They proposed to make the state an increasingly efficient instrument of security in the labor market to carry out new programs to remedy unemployment, including programs for the handicapped.

The party left no stone unturned in its campaigning. When the trade unions were brought into the battle they gave increased financial support and put people into the campaign trenches as organizers and speakers. Thousands of party workers or members of local units of the unions knocked on doors, and task forces called on such special target groups as pensioners (who had increased in number) and first voters. Prime Minister Erlander personally took telephone calls from all over Sweden to answer questions concerning party programs. On election day party and union cohorts, remembering the 1966 abstentions, drove cars full of people of any and all political complexions to the polling places.

As the Social Democratic campaign went into high speed after the 1967 party Congress, the opposition parties, who had moved slowly during the preceding year, became daring enough to discuss traditionally Social Democratic fields, such as unemployment. They promised to stimulate the economy sufficiently to reach the goal of full employment more surely than their Social Democratic opponents and the Conservatives proposed a new system of unemployment compensation.

Remembering that in 1966 the bourgeois opposition had polled 51.2 per cent of the vote[7] and realizing that the Social Democrats would need only two per cent more to enable them to stay in office, all parties stepped up their campaigns. They plastered the cities

[7] Excluding the Communists, but including the two bourgeois splinter parties.

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with tidily arranged campaign posters, all of the same size, and took to the hustings, while their leaders barnstormed the country.

Realizing that the generation gap within each party was greater than the differences among parties, all directed their fire heavily at youth. At the same time they attempted not to alienate their elder reliables, and worked overtime to capture the all-important floating vote. The Center had both poorer members and larger and better organized youth groups than the other parties (except for the strong Social Democratic youth organization). So they tried to appeal to their poor and youthful left-wing sympathizers. Even the Conservatives under their young leader Holmberg vainly tried to capture a large number of the young. The Liberals undertook a jazz-type campaign which made the otherwise quiet city streets resound to the sounds of swing music from trucks filled with guitar-strumming young people.

Continuing to minimize their differences, the bourgeois opposition showed little evidence of much in common except desire for change. Failing entirely to produce clear-cut alternatives to the Social Democrats, all three parties had recourse to the theme of the popular song "anything you can do, we can do better." Except for Conservative insistence on changing certain tax and social welfare notes, they showed no inclination to change the Social Democratic tune any more than they did at any preceding time in the nineteen-sixties. All three reacted fervently against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, but none was clear as to what Sweden should do about it. All agreed on maintaining Swedish neutrality, but each accused the others of departure from it in relation to their attitudes not only toward Czechoslovakia but toward NATO. Liberal leaders were blamed for their earlier interest in NATO and EEC. Nor were the parties able to agree on a possible joint leader. The most likely candidate was Gunnar Hedlund of the Center, but decision was postponed until after the election.

None of the parties neglected press and television, but it is impossible to assess the effects of the TV campaigns from 1960 through 1966, much less 1968, because television has not reduced Swedish newspaper circulation, which is phenomenally high by any standards. Nor has TV cut into political or other advertising which is confined to the press and forbidden on both radio and TV. The principal effect appears to have been indirect, because those

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who look at the political programs also read more newspapers. Television has served merely to produce a framework for subsequent reading and discussion.

VI

Few if any people foresaw the possibility of so large a Social Democratic victory as that of 1968. On election night Social Democratic headquarters were filled with young people joyously watching the returns roll in, singing the *Internationale* and their own Social Democratic song, as they crowded around their sixty-seven year-old leader. It was Erlander's finest hour. After all his years as prime minister, he and his program had been vindicated and the young people in great numbers had come into the party again.

When the final count was announced several days later it was learned that the Social Democrats, with just over half (50.1 per cent) of the total vote had gained twelve seats in the Second Chamber. For the first time since before World War II (unless the wartime coalition of all parties except the Communist is counted), the Social Democrats had an absolute majority in the *Riksdag*, although they had long since had one in the First Chamber. The sudden invasion of Czechoslovakia brought the Social Democrats a number of disenchanted Communists so that the Social Democratic gain approximately equalled the Communist loss, but the party's chief gains came at the expense of the insecure floating vote, found especially among the Liberals. The Social Democratic campaign to increase their numbers of youthful and white-collar voters had paid off. Even the young had wanted a steady and experienced leader.

Also gaining chiefly at Liberal expense was the Center party, which had followed a similar leftward line to that of the Social Democrats and which also had an older and popular leader. They emerged with 39 instead of the 36 seats they had achieved in 1964. The number of Liberal deputies descended calamitously from 43 to 34, in no small measure because their campaign had been too vague. It is possible also that the more leftward-oriented youth did not like the American type of jazz appeal and resented what they considered a Western outlook on the part of some Liberal leaders. The Conservatives fared somewhat better. With a

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loss of only one seat they were left with 32, partly because of the new image which the party had created of itself. High employment, the prosperity of the welfare state, and, above all, the Czech crisis took their toll of the Communists who kept only 3 of their former 8 seats.

In a polarized world torn by fear and dissension the Swedish people, realizing how well-off they were, had opted against the change advocated by the opposition parties. Disunity coupled with poor organization and ineptness in playing their very real cards contributed to the defeat of those parties, except the Center. Because of the working of the multiparty system, a middle party, able to swing one way or another, always holds the strategic position and leads the tendency to compromise. Thus the Center achieved the same advantage it had in the nineteen-thirties. Its 1968 cooperation with the Liberals, at best of only a general nature, merely served to capture the Liberal middle-of-the-road votes.

The change in Social Democratic leadership in 1969 may well influence its position in the 1970 elections. If by some fluke Gunnar Sträng is made prime minister at the September 1969 party congress, party policy will follow careful economic and financial lines. The most likely candidate, however, is Olof Palme, generally referred to as Erlander's "crown prince," who has been informally agreed on by party leaders. Although his appointment would still be regarded by many as a reward to the young, a large number of whom are oriented toward the left in domestic as well as international affairs, and a few of whom are converts from communism, Palme has modified his "left-wing" image during the months before the congress. His speeches indicate that he still is a realistic politician dependent for votes on others besides "left-wing" youth.

Unfortunately the 1970 elections will come before a two-party system could possibly be adopted by a group of three disagreeing parties who compete with each other and the Social Democrats for the marginal voters. At best, more elections and in all probability more defeats for the bourgeois parties may have to intervene before they would consider abandoning their differences sufficiently to unite. The most that can be expected for the present is closer cooperation between the Center and the Liberals unless the Conservatives have a complete change of heart. Some observers be-

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lieve, furthermore, that the cleavages among the three have become greater than they were several years ago as the divisions of modern life have grown, even in a country of political consensus.

Pessimists believe that the long-time domination of the Social Democrats combined with bourgeois differences may sound the death-knell of the Swedish multiparty system. They foresee a one-party state or one in which the opposition parties are reduced to impotence.[8] Such fears neglect the vitality of Swedish democracy and fail to take into account that one-party systems result from extreme polarization. Sweden has never had a history of political extremes. Then, too, the bourgeois opposition has been an important part of the machinery of legislation. But only in union will lie their strength to forge ahead. Only in union could the continuously delicate balance of the parties be altered one way or the other. In any case, the strength and energy of Swedish democracy did not end with the elections of 1968.

[8] See Gunnar Heckscher, *Tryggfolkstyret!* (Stockholm, 1963), 12 ff., quoted by Nils Stjernquist, "Sweden: Stability or Deadlock," in Robert A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Opposition in Western Democracies* (New Haven, 1966), 144.

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World War I as Entrepreneurial Opportunity: Willard Straight and the American International Corporation*

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In November 1915, fifteen months after the outbreak of war in Europe, a group of New York bankers announced the formation of a new company, the American International Corporation. This was no ordinary venture by any standards. The firm was capitalized at fifty million dollars, and among its directors (representing the major stockholders) were leading officers of the nation's largest banking and industrial interests.[1] The president was Charles A. Stone of Boston's Stone & Webster Engineering Company, builder of large-scale electrical utility and traction complexes. Willard Straight, formerly an American diplomat in Asia and since 1909 an officer of J. P. Morgan & Company, was vice-president. Other directors of the AIC included Percy Rockefeller of Standard Oil, J. Ogden Armour of the giant meatpacking firm, and Cyrus McCormick of the farm machinery company; also, Hill of the Great Northern Railroad, Lovett of the Union Pacific, Coffin of General Electric, Ryan of the copper industry, Grace of the export and shipping complex, and Vail of the telephone industry.[2]

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[1] New York *Times*, Nov. 23, 24, 1915.

[2] *Ibid.*; Louis D. Froelick, "Have We the Price of Admission? . . . Problems of Trade Abroad," *Everybody's Magazine*, XXXIV (March 1916), 280.

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The AIC's founding and the corporate purposes articulated by its officers reflected the revolutionary change in America's international economic position which had resulted from the European war. The AIC was hailed as "by far the most ambitious attempt that has ever been made to put the United States among the ranking nations in world commerce and finance." Its officers hoped "to carry American capital into foreign fields, and to open the markets of the world to American mining and electrical machinery, harvesters, clothing, and foodstuffs." They candidly admitted that AIC was "an outgrowth . . . of the European conflict, which means the withdrawal of capital that has been supplied [overseas] by Great Britain, Germany, and France." The AIC would seek to obtain concessions in the underdeveloped countries, "to spend large sums in development works, and to finance these in the United States." The principal organizer of AIC, Frank Vanderlip of the National City Bank, predicted that the corporation would "accomplish in foreign fields what our domestic banks do for American industries"—an ambitious goal indeed, since AIC was founded shortly after the high tide of industrial mergers and corporate reorganization in the domestic economy.[3]

This essay seeks to demonstrate that the AIC's founding was no isolated event, but rather had substantial recent precedent and was also causally related to the pattern of post-1920 American finance. For, on the one hand, the AIC venture was part of a historical continuum which can be traced back at least to 1900: it was an extension of a large strategy for the expansion of American investment overseas. (Indeed, AIC's vice-president, Willard Straight, had been one of the principal architects of this expansionist strategy; and the bankers associated with him in AIC had long been engaged in seeking new institutional arrangements for expansionist goals.) On the other hand, the AIC was representative of the entirely new context of world economic development created by the European war. It was only one of many initiatives taken both by the American government and by private business, especially by Wall Street's banking elite, to seize war-born opportunities and assert more aggressively American financial interest in the international market.

Thus Part I of this essay will consider the pre-1914 efforts of

[3] New York *Times*, Nov. 23, 24, 1915.

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Willard Straight and the American banking elite to develop a major potential overseas market (in Asia) for U. S. capital and export goods. Part II is an analysis of the basic economic and institutional changes that occurred in the United States after the outbreak of war in Europe. In Parts III and IV the founding and early development of AIC are considered as indicative of how business interests responded to the World War as entrepreneurial opportunity.

I

Willard Straight's career in diplomacy and banking prior to 1914 provides abundant evidence of how the goals and strategy of business expansion during the era of Dollar Diplomacy (under Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and W. H. Taft) provided the historical underpinnings of the AIC and other post-1914 American responses to the war.[4]

During 1901-04, following his graduation from Cornell University, Straight held a minor post in the Chinese Customs Service. In those years he learned the Chinese language and formed many enduring friendships with European diplomats and businessmen, as well as with influential Chinese officials. He served in Manchuria and Korea as a newspaper correspondent during the Russo-Japanese War. Then, after briefly holding consular positions in Seoul and Havana, in 1906 Straight was named U. S. Consul General in Mukden, Manchuria.[5]

By this time Straight had established himself as one of the State Department's most knowledgeable China hands. Moreover, like many of the second-echelon American diplomats then serving in the Far East and Latin America, Straight believed that business and politics were "in reality but different expressions of interests which are fundamentally the same," and that these interests should be

[4] The standard account is Charles Vevier, *The United States and China, 1906-1913: A Study of Finance and Diplomacy* (New Brunswick, 1955), which treats Straight's role in American diplomacy and banking in Asia. A persuasive new interpretation of American business expansionism and its many variants is provided by William Appleman Williams in *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (rev. ed.; New York, 1962).

[5] Vevier, *U. S. and China*, 19 ff.; Herbert Croly, *Willard Straight* (New York, 1924), Chaps. 3-7. At Seoul Straight had met Edward Harriman, who was formulating plans to extend his transportation interests into the Far East.

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pursued on a global scale.[6] Straight despaired that American policy in Asia was so naive and unassertive, when contrasted with the *realpolitik* principles on which policies of rival powers were based. He therefore attempted to give the Open Door policy concrete meaning and content by seeking to combine governmental and business interests in Asia. He advocated defining an American sphere of influence on the mainland, and he insisted that American capital, and not merely commercial interests, should demand equality of access to China and Manchuria.[7]

As consul general at Mukden Straight vigorously supported an extension of American commercial activity and boldly asserted American political interests, sometimes exceeding his instructions from Washington.[8] But his most important activity in this regard was a correspondence that he maintained (apparently with State Department approval) with the financier and railway magnate Edward Harriman, in which Straight kept Harriman informed of new investment opportunities in Manchuria. In 1908 the State Department ordered Straight home to Washington, authorizing him to undertake formal conversations with Harriman regarding an expanded American investment role in Asia. Straight's like-minded colleagues in the diplomatic corps greeted this order as "precisely the movement for which we have been praying."[9] For it signified

[6] "Address to . . . Associated Chambers of Commerce of China" (MS.), Willard Straight Papers, Regional History Collection, Cornell University Library (hereafter, S. P.). See also Williams, 75-76. What Paul A. Varg says of the American diplomat W. W. Rockhill, at the turn of the century, might as easily be applied to Straight: that he was "one of a small group including men of such catholic tastes as Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Adams, and Alfred Thayer Mahan, who . . . viewed the world as a community of nations wherein the United States must play the role of a full-grown citizen." Varg, *Open Door Diplomat: The Life of W. W. Rockhill* (Urbana, 1952), 1. Rockhill, however, took a more limited view of the Open Door than did Straight. See Raymond A. Esthus, *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan* (Seattle, 1966), 232.

[7] Esthus, *Roosevelt and Japan*, Chap. 14, indicates how Straight sought to reinterpret the Open Door, which was originally a policy aimed at equality of commercial opportunity, to embrace equal access for American capital. Akira Iriye, *Across the Pacific* (New York, 1967), 103ff., 121 ff., argues that Straight's concern for commercial and strategic interests was a gloss for basically "moralistic" motives. On his own evidence, I think, one can argue more persuasively that moralistic concerns were subordinate to Straight's "harder" objectives. See also Croly, 169 ff.

[8] Esthus, *Roosevelt and Japan*, 236-37.

[9] Wm. Phillips to Straight, Sept. 9, 1908, S. P. The origins of the Consortium

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that the government, after years of prodding by Straight and other China hands, was ready at last to encourage U. S. business penetration of the Asian market on a large scale.[10]

With Straight's aid, Harriman in 1908 joined forces with Jacob Schiff of Kuhn, Loeb & Company to promote a plan for railroad finance and construction in Manchuria. But the next year news reached Washington that a banking group composed of British, French, and German interests had been formed to finance major railway construction in China. The State Department then abandoned, in effect, Straight's strategy of promoting a unilateral American investment drive, formally asserting instead a U. S. interest in participating cooperatively in the proposed international loans. The department urged J. P. Morgan & Company (which held a long-dormant concession interest from China) to join with other banks in the projected loans. Thus, in mid-1909, was formed the "American Group," consisting of Harriman, Morgan, the National City Bank of New York, and Kuhn, Loeb & Company.[11]

Straight now left the diplomatic corps and became the American Group's negotiator with the Chinese government and the European banking group. In that role he helped to write the Four-Power Consortium Agreement of 1910, which joined the American Group with the British, French, and German banks in providing a fifty million-dollar currency-reform loan to China—designed as prelude to further Consortium pooling of investment opportunities in Asia.[12] In Straight's view the Four-Power Consortium would become a potent international counterweight to the designs of both Japan and Russia in Manchuria; but the auspicious beginning was soon to be frustrated by external events. First China erupted in revolution in 1911; soon afterward Russia and Japan formed an entente and successfully demanded admission to the Consortium, resulting in its enlargement to a Six-Power group.[13] These developments weakened

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are concisely presented in Charles Vevier, "The Open Door. . . 1906-1913," *Pacific Historical Review*, XXIV (1955), 49-62.

[10] See Esthus, "The Changing Concept of the Open Door, 1899-1910," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLVI (1959), 435-54, especially 440.

[11] Vevier, *U. S. and China*, 105-06. Harriman died in 1909, and thereafter the initiative was Straight's.

[12] *Ibid.*, 178 ff.; Croly, 352-53, 401-04; also see *Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1910* (Washington, 1915), 269-91.

[13] Varg, *Open Door Diplomt*, 110-13; Edward H. Zabriskie, *American-*

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the enthusiasm of the American Group bankers and threatened to end American participation.[14]

The final blow to the American Group's role in the Consortium was struck in 1913 by Woodrow Wilson. During the 1912 presidential campaign Wilson had levelled sharp criticism against Taft's Dollar Diplomacy. Willard Straight—who had now become an officer of J. P. Morgan & Company—believed that if elected Wilson would prove "a pretty safe man."[15] But Wilson disappointed this expectation. Shortly after succeeding to the presidency he denounced the Consortium plan as a threat to China's national integrity, and he withdrew the American government's support. So ended, it appeared, an ambitious U. S. venture in business expansionism.[16]

Historians have customarily treated the drive for overseas investment markets in terms of distinct periods, viewing Wilson's action in 1913 as marking the decisive termination of the phase of Dollar Diplomacy; the next phase is commonly viewed as beginning only with the aggressive program of foreign investment *after* World War I.[17] Insofar as scholars have given attention to high finance during the war years they have been mainly concerned with bankers' loans to the Allies during 1914-17—loans which, some

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Russian Rivalry in the Far East (Philadelphia, 1946), 147 ff., 176 ff; Croly, 332. What proved to be a bad miscalculation by Straight was revealed in a letter of early 1910: "Both the Japanese and Russians ought to be so well tied up at the end of the [Consortium] discussion that they would have much difficulty in wriggling into the doorway again, for long at any rate. . . ." Letter to J.O.P. Bland, Jan. 10, 1910, copy, S.P.

[14] Vevier, *U. S. and China*, 192 ff.; Straight to Frank McKnight, Aug. 1, Nov. 16, 22, 1912, S.P.

[15] Straight to E. S. Morgan, Oct. 17, 1912, S.P.

[16] Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917* (New York, 1954), 82-83; Straight to Charles Whigham, March 13, 1913, S.P.

[17] The principal exception is W. A. Williams, whose *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* treats American business expansionism as continuous, from the late nineteenth century to recent times. See also Walter La Feber, *The New Empire . . . 1860-1898* (Ithaca, 1963), and David E. Novack and Matthew Simon, "Commercial Responses to the American Export Invasion, 1871-1914," *Explorations in Entrepreneurial History: Second Series*, III (1966), 121-47. Other discussions of the China market include Thomas J. McCormick, *China Market . . . 1893-1901* (Chicago, 1967); Varg, "The Myth of the China Market, 1890-1914," *American Historical Review*, LXXIII (1968), 742-58; and Charles S. Campbell Jr., *Special Business Interests and the Open Door Policy* (New Haven, 1951), 10-24.

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argue, undermined Wilson's neutrality policy and brought the United States into the war.[18] But for Willard Straight and other leading financiers the European war simply provided a new, more promising context for the pursuit of strategies developed during the Consortium episode. In light of Willard Straight's activities during the war years (considered at length below) it seems more appropriate to interpret the bankers' loans and credits to the Allies during 1914-17—and also such organizational innovations as AIC—as parts of a much larger, conscious wartime effort by an American business elite to attain hegemony for the United States in world markets.

Moreover, the Consortium experiment conditioned the attitudes of men such as Straight and his associates when they formulated their responses to the European war. The Consortium episode had made Straight a truly cosmopolitan type in high banking circles, with a wide range of contacts among the financiers and government officials of Europe.[19] President Wilson's repudiation of the American Group, and the general failure to appreciate its role as "trustees for American trade," had caused Straight to be disillusioned with what he had formerly regarded as an indispensable element of any business-expansion drive: cooperation between bankers and the State Department.[20] In a memorandum written for Morgan in 1914 Straight proposed that the firm continue to participate in international arrangements for loans to China. But he said also that the firm should work independently of the U. S. government, to avoid damaging identification with any one administration or political party.[21] This viewpoint was to become an important factor shaping

[18] For example, the standard study of *America's Stake in International Investments*, by Cleona Lewis (Washington, 1938), gives little attention to banker initiatives during the European war period.

[19] By dint of partnerships in London and Paris, of course, the Morgan firm itself was cosmopolitan. But Straight's many friendships among bankers with experience and special interest in the underdeveloped world was unusual in the American banking community.

[20] Straight to Charles Whigham, Sept. 2, 1913, S.P.

[21] MS. memorandum, Feb. 17, 1914, S.P. To the French representative in the Consortium Straight declared that Wilson viewed diplomacy as merely a channel for exchanging niceties, and that the American people lived in "sublime ignorance" of the realities of international relations. Straight to Georges Casenave, April 30, 1913, S.P. Compare Straight's defense of Dollar Diplomacy, reported in New York *Times*, Nov. 13, 1915.

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Straight's future efforts on behalf of American business interests overseas.

II

The immediate effect of the European war on the U. S. economy was disruptive in the extreme. When the war began in August 1914 a sweeping revision of American banking and currency was being inaugurated under the Federal Reserve System, and a new antitrust policy was being initiated under the Clayton Act.[22] Anticipating devaluation of the dollar, and desperate to liquidate capital, European owners of American securities dumped their holdings, forcing the American stock markets to suspend trading. The export trade was also sharply reduced, intensifying an already perilous international credit crisis and putting pressure on U. S. gold reserves. The Federal Reserve Board, which began operating in August 1914, established a special gold reserve fund, anticipating the need to ship $500 million of specie to foreign creditors for settlement of short-term debts. Meanwhile, export earnings declined drastically, with cotton exports nearly at a standstill; and the federal government set up a special cotton loan fund to tide the Southern economy through the crisis.[23] Not until January 1915 did the effect of rising European demand for foodstuffs and war materiel, supplied by American farms and factories, relieve these crisis conditions and restore a mood of confidence in the American business community.[24]

Both the government and private American business interests were forced to make dramatic adjustments to the wartime economic situation. While the government anxiously attempted to cope with the trade deficit of late 1914, the Wilson administration needed to develop a policy respecting loans and credits to the belligerent powers. The State Department ruled in August that "loans by American bankers to any foreign nation which is at war are in-

[22] *First Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board for the Period Ending December 31, 1914* (Washington, 1915), 6-7. The best detailed survey of the economy in 1914-16 is still Alexander D. Noyes, *The War Period of American Finance, 1908-1925* (New York, 1926).

[23] Joseph V. Fuller, "Genesis of the Munitions Traffic," *Journal of Modern History*, VI (1934), 280-90.

[24] *Second Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board . . . 1915* (Washington, 1916), 182-85.

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consistent with the true spirit of neutrality." But by October it had become obvious that domestic economic recovery depended upon revival of the export trade; and, further, that exports to the belligerents would require extending massive credits to foreign purchasers. Wilson therefore reversed himself, in effect authorizing American loans and credits to Europe. Within a month loans to the belligerents had begun.[25]

With the way now open to the growth of American exports, and with Allied war-purchase orders quickly mounting, both the National City Bank and J. P. Morgan & Company—the latter, apparently, upon an initiative by Willard Straight—proposed to the British government terms for service as Britain's purchasing agent in the United States. Morgan obtained the British contract in January 1915, and five months later the firm was named as the purchasing agent for France as well.[26] Details of Morgan's activities as Allied purchasing agent were made public by the Nye Committee thirty years ago, and since then historians have stressed that close ties existed between the American banking community and the Allied governments. But the full depth of this involvement went well beyond the significance of bankers' profits from Allied war credits. For in fact J. P. Morgan & Company played a major role in implementing a twofold British strategy: (1) to control the flow of American trade without antagonizing U. S. exporters, and (2) to prevent materiel from going to Germany and her allies. In January 1915 this strategy called for Morgan to obtain a corner on U. S. copper supplies. Through dummy purchasers Morgan secretly expended nearly ten million dollars in this covert operation.[27] Preventing copper from going to any American exporters who might ship the metal to Germany was part of a larger British design to control the international copper trade; thus, the Morgan operation

[25] Richard W. Van Alstyne, "Private American Loans to the Allies, 1914-1916," *Pacific Historical Review*, II (1933), 180-83; Paul Birdsall, "Neutrality and Economic Pressures, 1914-1917," *Science and Society*, III (1939), 17 ff.; Charles C. Tansill, *America Goes to War* (Boston, 1938), 75-78. Tansill notes that the State Department first informed Wall Street of the reversal of policy through Willard Straight.

[26] Tansill, 80-84. Straight recalls that he originated the joint-purchasing agency proposal, in his diary, 1916, MS. pp. 1-2, S.P.

[27] "Diary of a Trip to London and Paris, . . . March 26, 1915," MS. p. 1, S.P. Marion C. Siney, *The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914-1916* (Ann Arbor, 1957), documents the diplomacy of the blockade.

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complemented formal embargo agreements with the Dutch and Scandinavian governments.[28] Morgan's success in copper purchasing during January-March 1915 became as well the precedent for similar British action—to support the American price, to control inventories, and to head off political criticism from Congress and from producer and exporter interests—when in mid-1915 the British undertook a comparable program for covert purchasing of American cotton.[29]

Morgan's copper dealings became the occasion for an important visit to Europe by Willard Straight in March 1915. When the British requested an accounting of Morgan preparatory to turning over the copper records to their Treasury auditors, the Morgan partners feared a damaging breach of secrecy. The firm thus assigned Straight to carry the necessary documentation to London and to plead with British officials there for absolute secrecy.[30]

The mission to London, and a related visit to France, was a crucial personal experience for Straight. While in London he obtained information respecting the state of Allied financial interests in Asia; he helped to coordinate the London and Paris activities of the Morgan firm; and he consulted with old China hands, British financial and war-purchase officials, businessmen, and politicians concerning the probable impact of the war on social relationships, both within the capitalist countries and in the underdeveloped world.[31] Straight also engaged in some quasi-official diplomacy at

[28] Fuller, "Munitions Traffic," 290-92; Siney, *passim*; Van Alstyne, "The Policy of the United States Regarding the Declaration of London . . .," *Journal of Modern History*, VII (1935), 343-47. In January 1915 the British offered to buy outright the entire output of U. S. copper producers, but were refused. In March, however, the copper producers finally accepted stringent British trade restrictions on their exports. Ethel C. Phillips, "American Participation in Belligerent Commercial Controls, 1914-17," *American Journal of International Law*, XXVII (1933), 690-91; Edwin J. Clapp, *Economic Aspects of the War* (New Haven, 1915), 192 ff.

[29] On the cotton-purchase episode, see Arthur S. Link, "The Cotton Crisis, the South, and Anglo-American Diplomacy, 1914-15," *Studies in Southern History* (Chapel Hill, 1957), 122-38.

[30] "Diary of a Trip to London and Paris . . . ," 1-2.

[31] *Ibid.*, *passim*. Straight conferred with Basil Blackett of the British Treasury on postwar finance; and with various British and French bankers, author Norman Angell, officials in the Foreign Office, members of the proto-imperialist Round Table Group (whose reactionary views surprised Straight), and U. S. embassy staff members in Paris.

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the request of Colonel Edward M. House, who was then in Europe to explore the possibility of U. S. mediation in the war.[32] Most important, Straight learned in London that British Treasury officials were already working on broad planning for postwar trade and tariff policy—including a possible entente on economic matters with the United States. Obviously the talk in British intellectual and government circles of the necessity (or inevitability) of revised government-business relationships in the postwar world reawakened Straight's old concerns, dating from Consortium days, respecting the large strategic implications of international business ventures.[33]

Shortly after his return to the United States Straight resigned from the Morgan firm. The impact of his recent conversations in Europe was obvious in his own explanation of this decision: he now found too confining the narrow concepts of entrepreneurial responsibility that seemed to prevail in the Morgan house. He "felt the importance of building for the future," Straight's intimate biographer asserts: "He had plans for helping China, for the better establishment of trade relations with South America, for a labor policy, . . . for international cooperation with backward countries, . . . for more enlightenment at home and for higher commercial morality abroad." These same concerns were already being expressed in other ways: in Straight's admiration of Theodore Roosevelt's ideas concerning the need to accommodate public policy to the structure of advanced capitalism, in Straight's close friendship with such exponents of a new political economy as Herbert Croly, and in his financial support of the recently founded journal, the *New Republic*.[34]

When Straight left Morgan in the summer of 1915 he decided to study law. He also became involved in the "preparedness move-

[32] House asked Straight to assure French officials that Wilson sympathized with the Allies and "wished to assist in bringing peace if he could do so in the Allied interests." "Diary of a Trip to London and Paris . . . ," 15.

[33] Thus his various talks touched on Mexican investment opportunities, the possibility of expanded Anglo-American financial cooperation after the war, the prospect of an international shift to welfare-oriented capitalism, and the like.

[34] Croly, 462, 472-75. The *New Republic* began publication in November 1914; but arrangements had been completed for its organization by March. Straight to J.O.P. Bland, March 24, 1914, S.P.

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ment" for rearmament and military training in the United States, as he now favored American intervention on the Allied side.[35] In early October 1915 Straight was invited by Frank Vanderlip, president of the National City Bank, to become associated with the projected American International Corporation. Vanderlip's decision to tap Straight was natural enough, since the National City Bank had been a member of the American Group in Consortium days. Besides, Straight was probably the best informed man on Wall Street on the subject of Asian finance and politics, and the AIC was being planned on grand lines, to promote American trade and investment throughout the world. The AIC, Straight wrote, was "an organization of exactly the character which I had always hoped would be formed in this country."[36]

III

By the time the AIC was founded in November 1915 vast war-induced changes were already taking place in the American economy and in government-business relations. First of all, the war measures taken against neutral trade by Great Britain and her allies had fundamentally reoriented American foreign commerce. Exports had increased from a $2.1-$2.6 billion annual level during 1911-14, to nearly $3 billion in 1915—and standing orders already foreshadowed the dramatic rise to $5.7 billion in 1916. Although most of the increase in total exports represented Allied war purchases, exports to the Latin American countries and to Asia were also rising quickly, as the United States began to supply countries formerly dependent on Europe for their imports.[37] The war-related indus-

[35] Straight headed a New York National Defense group organized in October 1915, and he was a proponent of voluntary military training. See P. J. McCook, "W.D.S. and the Mayor's Committee on National Defense," MS., S.P. Straight declared (letter to Croly, March 1, 1915, S.P.) that he detested the Germans and admired all that the British were doing. This was a sharp departure from the view he held in 1914, that Britain's motives were commercial and her diplomacy hypocritical. Straight to J.O.P. Bland, Sept. 18, 1914, *ibid.*

[36] Straight to Bland, Jan. 14, 1916, S.P.; also, Straight to H. P. Davison, Nov. 1, 1915, *ibid.*

[37] U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the U.S. . . . to 1957* (Washington, 1960), Series U-1 to 14, U-61 to 72, U-116 to 133; *Third Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board . . . 1916* (Washington, 1917), 248; Fuller, "Munitions Traffic," 286 ff.

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tries underwent a boom, unemployment shrank, and a rise in domestic prices reflected the stimulus of export demand. Equally important, the great American export interests were organizing in trade associations to satisfy the British that U. S. products would not be sold to Germany, and thereby to protect American raw-material supplies. The cotton and woolen manufacturers thus committed themselves, through their Textile Alliance, to an agreement in 1915 with the British Board of Trade; later the flax, jute, and oil processors joined the Textile Alliance agreement. The rubber manufacturers concluded a similar formal understanding with the British government in January 1915, and the copper producers followed suit in March. Withal, the major shift of 1917-18 toward industry-wide cooperation in trade associations was well under way even by mid-1915.[38]

Secondly, the transformation of America's international credit position was also in progress. Heavy sales by foreign holders of American securities were followed by the extension of war-purchase credits to the Allies in 1914-15. As American exports to Europe surged in the first quarter of 1915, it became evident that to sustain the export flow a much larger program of loans and credits to the Allied powers would be required. An Anglo-French commission seeking such loans arrived in New York in September to meet with a syndicate of bankers headed by J. P. Morgan & Company. The commission requested a one billion-dollar loan; and the first American effort to satisfy the Allies' import needs through loans on this scale met with success in October, when a $500 million loan was over-subscribed in the United States. The U. S. government expedited both the rise in export trade and the financing effort. The Federal Reserve Board agreed to discount export acceptances, and in late 1915 it also approved the impending Allied war loan. The State Department permitted the trade-association agreements with Great Britain, and at the same time secretly cooperated in a British plan for support of American cotton prices through covert purchasing, as mentioned earlier.[39]

[38] Phillips, "Belligerent Commercial Controls," 679-91. For the wartime role of trade associations, see an important recent study by Paul A. C. Koistinen, "The 'Industrial-Military Complex' in Historical Perspective: World War I," *Business History Review*, XLI (1967), 378-403.

[39] Van Alstyne, American Loans," 182-89; Tansill, 104 ff.; Link, "Cotton

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The importance of new institutional arrangements such as trade-association cooperation and syndication of foreign loans, and the reversal of the U. S. international credit position, were fully appreciated by American business spokesmen. On the eve of the big Allied loan of October 1915 the Investment Bankers' Association of America unanimously adopted a resolution declaring its support of the project, "solely as a matter of business." The nation, the association declared, "should not lose the opportunity now offered to become a creditor instead of a debtor nation, and thus broaden the scope of our financial usefulness and interests the world over."[40] Addressing the same group, a government official emphasized that "the undeveloped countries of South America, of Africa, of Australia, and of the Far East are ardently seeking capital with which not only to develop, but with which to keep the very wheels of commerce moving."[41] By late 1915 the State Department had taken initiatives in Mexico, looking toward American bankers' involvement in governmental finance there. In the private banking community the awareness of new investment possibilities was reflected in greatly accelerated activities of the National City Bank in Latin America and in management of British and French interests in Mexico by the Morgan firm. Initiatives were taken, also, to acquire dormant concessions in Asia and elsewhere from European bankers who had temporarily abandoned overseas projects.[42] As European capital was withdrawn from Russia, Latin America, and Asia—and as American exporters began to expand their business in markets formerly served mainly by European nations—the entre-

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Crisis," 136-38; Siney, 56-59; Fuller, "Munitions Traffic," 291. Straight later said candidly of the Allied loan: "We made it because it was essential to finance our export trade." Letter to E. S. Morgan, Jan. 4, 1916, S.P.

[40] Quoted in New York *Times*, Sept. 22, 1915. See also Van Alstyne, "American Loans," 186 ff.

[41] E. E. Pratt, quoted in New York *Times*, Sept. 22, 1915. See also Herbert Feis, *The Diplomacy of the Dollar, 1919-1932* (New York, 1966), 3.

[42] Letters of Straight (all in S.P.) to H. Fletcher, March 10, 1916, on Morgan handling of Anglo-French interests in Mexico; to E. S. Morgan, Sept. 1, 1914, on South American investment; to P. S. Reinsch, Feb. 25, June 30, 1914, on prospects of American cooperation in Chinese loans; to J. A. Thomas, March 24, 1914 and April 9, 1915, on Asian investment; also, R. F. Smith, "Formation and Development of the International Bankers Committee on Mexico," *Journal of Economic History*, XXIII (1963), 574-76; and New York *Times*, Nov. 23, 1915, on the National City Bank.

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preneurial opportunity provided by the war began to take specific form.

The founding of AIC was an explicit response to this opportunity. Thus, only a few weeks before he announced the AIC project, Vanderlip declared: "We have an opportunity now to become the wellspring of capital for the world. Anxious hands are reaching toward us from every quarter." A press article on AIC in December 1915 stated that "the best of properties in Asia and South America have been liquidated, by those Europeans who, before the war, greatly profited by their ownership. In the control of these properties an immense opportunity exists for the new American enterprise."[43]

Such rhetoric expressed an assertive view of America's world role that was entirely consistent with Willard Straight's ideas. Before joining AIC as a vice-president in November 1915 Straight had already made public his harsh opinions of President Wilson's renunciation of Dollar Diplomacy. It was "the duty of a Government in relation to trade and finance," Straight declared, to support the nation's investment bankers in drives for foreign markets.[44] As president of the American Asiatic Association and as a frequent lecturer before businessmen's groups, Straight repeatedly urged such views on the public. He pleaded for a new realism that would accept advanced capitalism, including corporate combination, as a modern necessity. It was in this vein that Straight now spoke of wartime business opportunities and domestic imperatives. Shortly after accepting the AIC vice-presidency he warned that when the war ended the European countries would launch a powerful drive to recapture old markets. "In the face of this," he declared, "the United States must hold its own, organize itself too, and we should be doing it now."[45] For Willard Straight, then, the European war merely intensified a long-standing need for reconsideration of basic economic policies in the United States. This was an extension of Straight's devotion to Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism: in 1914 he had written to Roosevelt that a new "Americanism" was

[43] New York *Times*, Sept. 16, Dec. 12, 1915, Sec. IV.

[44] New York *Times*, Nov. 13, 1915.

[45] See MS. addresses: "China's Loan Negotiations," Nov. 14, 1912; "The Politics of Chinese Finance," May 2, 1913; "Wanted: An American Policy," n.d., "Philanthropy or Social Leadership," n.d. (probaby 1915), all in S.P.

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required—business morality had changed, and the policy of trust-busting had become an anachronism. The nation was "tired of uplift" and now was prepared to accept governmental partnership with business for the release of private energies, in lieu of paternalism.[46]

When the AIC plan was announced and Straight linked its aims with doctrines of advanced capitalism there was isolated criticism on familiar lines. An official of the Commission on Industrial Relations denounced AIC as the organ of a "new imperialism," designed to conduct an industrial raid on the world economy. For AIC to succeed, he charged, would require "an aggressive foreign policy intended to protect every American dollar with a battleship and a regiment of soldiers."[47] But the attack did not trouble AIC's officers as they prepared in early 1916 to give concrete form to their articulated goals.

As part of the preliminary planning for AIC Willard Straight was sent to Europe, this time to pursue for AIC the large aim of putting American trade "on a firm footing."[48] Immediately upon arriving in London in March 1916 Straight opened talks with bankers and government officials that indicated the wide scope of AIC aims and interests. With Belgian, French, and British officials, Straight discussed the possibilities of American loans for Belgian reconstruction after the war; and with the chairman of the London City & Midland Bank, he considered the possibility of a syndicate for financing French and Belgian reconstruction. In conversations with Sir Walter Townley, an old China hand and now an officer of the British Foreign Trade Bureau, Straight discussed "a chain of interests in South America in which there were one or two German links, which he should like to have made American." He also conferred with one of the largest British construction firms, inquiring whether AIC might acquire "lame ducks"—railroads and other projects in Africa and Latin America on which work was halted because the war had caused withdrawal of European capital.

In these talks Straight carefully distinguished "short-haul"

[46] Straight to Roosevelt, May 26, 1914; Straight to Croly, March 1, 1915, *ibid.*

[47] Basil M. Manly, quoted in New York *Times*, Jan. 31, 1916. The AIC refused to reply.

[48] All the following quotations, respecting Straight's mission to Europe, March 11-May 1916, are from Straight's MS. diary of the trip, typescript, in S.P.

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opportunities from those which could be woven into a longer-range AIC strategy. Among the short-haul business propositions that he worked out in Europe was a plan to put AIC funds into an existing project for construction of a sewage system in Petrograd. He also tried to obtain from J. P. Morgan's houses in London and Paris their approval for giving AIC their "overflow" business in Allied war purchasing. Straight also discussed with British Treasury officers a plan that he had developed, calling for mobilization of British-held securities in Latin American railroads which would be used as collateral for loans—something the Allied governments were already doing in their war-financing effort.[49] But Straight wanted something more than mere collateral; he hoped to purchase part of the British securities, "making us [AIC] the partners of British interests in these enterprises." In Paris Straight tried to negotiate with French government officials a similar plan, to link further loans to an agreement that would extend American interests in Brazilian railways.[50]

These negotiations verged over into Straight's larger, "long-haul" design, which sought to establish a new basis for cooperation between American financial interests and those of the Allied nations. Straight's design was comparable to the strategy of Consortium days. Its fundamental presupposition was that U. S. interests must actively seek out overseas investment markets. Although a unilateral pursuit of American trade and financial expansion was not precluded, cooperation with counterpart European interests should also be undertaken when expedient. Unlike the Consortium scheme, however, this plan would be pursued through private bankers' negotiations, without unnecessary reliance on governmental support. Straight nonetheless kept his government informed: he advised the American ambassador in London

[49] The French and British governments both undertook systematic purchasing, for cash or on credit, of American securities held by their nationals. The securities so acquired were then used as collateral on war purchases and loans in the United States. Lewis, *America's Stake*, 117-21. In addition the Allied governments apparently worked through existing organizations (the British Association of Foreign Bondholders, and the French Office National des Valeurs Mobilizées) that handled their nationals' interest in governmental and corporate securities held abroad. See Straight's MS. diary for 1916, p. 42, S.P.

[50] *Ibid.*, 17, also see 7, 51; Straight to Sir Gilbert Parker, Nov. 10, 1916, and to E. S. Morgan, June 1, 1916, S.P.

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of his purposes and explained the basic strategy to Colonel House. "The Corporation," he told House,

> does not wish our friends on this side to think that we are attempting to pick things off the bargain counter. We believe it will be very much sounder policy if we can work out some scheme under which by furnishing capital now required we may be able to buy ourselves, so to speak, into a partnership with British and French interests in various parts of the world.[51]

Straight was predisposed, of course, to pursue this kind of large strategy; it was consistent with his own ideas and activities since 1901. But his diary indicates that events in Europe lent a new sense of urgency to his dual quest for American commercial reorganization and for cooperative arrangements with European interests. His trip, which commenced in March, coincided with a period of intensive discussion of the postwar economy in belligerent capitals. In Germany plans had already begun for a *Mittel Europa* scheme, projecting economic integration of the Central Powers, a united tariff and trading-interest front in postwar commerce, and closer cooperation in overseas investment. It was largely in response to current rumors of *Mittel Europa* planning that officials of Allied nations had begun to focus attention on potential postwar commercial rivalries. The Italian and French governments in September 1915 had held discussions of a possible economic union. Then an Allied economic conference had been called for June 1916 to consider long-range commercial issues as well as wartime economic policy.[52] Learning of this conference and its purposes, Straight moved quickly in London to assert his views respecting the outcome. In talks with Harcourt, president of the board of public works, he declared that "unless some arrangement were made between the U. S. and G. B. particularly, and the Allied Entente in general, the U. S. . . . might be thrown into Germany's arms." He stiffened his position in correspondence with Sir Gilbert Parker of the British Treasury, warning that if the British wished to borrow

[51] Straight to House, March 17, 1916, S.P.

[52] Etienne Clémental, *La France et la Politique Economique Interalliée*, ed. James T. Shotwell (Paris, n.d.), 67 ff.; Siney, 174 ff. See also E. B. Dubern, "Les Projets d'Union Economique entre les Alliés dans l'hiver 1915-1916," *Revue des sciences politiques*, XXXV (1916), 363-76, especially 367-71; and Alexander Noyes, *Financial Chapters of the War* (New York, 1916), 217 ff.

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again in the United States, no economic agreements should be formulated that did not include terms favorable to American commerce.[53]

Straight's grave concern about a Franco-British economic entente proved premature, for the June 1916 inter-Allied conference took no specific steps toward postwar cooperation; instead, it served only to improve Allied coordination of purchasing and resource allocation. But no doubt Straight returned to New York in June with an urgent message for his colleagues: that the British and French were already engaged in preliminary "postwar" planning. Equally important, he was impressed with the degree of cooperation that had been achieved between the Allied governments and private business interests. He also admired the purposefulness which marked European discussions of postwar commercial rivalries. "As one studies this situation," he wrote in his diary,

> it becomes more and more apparent that while we are at home just trying to catch up to the foreign trade policies which prevailed [in Europe] before the war, these people here are evolving entirely new methods, correlating their industrial and financial and commercial energies both for the prosecution of the war and for the trading competition which will follow.[54]

IV

What Straight did and what impressed him in Europe during the spring of 1916 would be purely of biographical interest to us now —except that the subsequent development of AIC, the rhetoric of the banking newspapers and journals, and indeed the policy of the U. S. government after 1916 all suggest that Willard Straight's perception of war-related opportunity was widely shared in the United States. A conscious reorientation of the American position in the world economy was beginning; and Straight's vision of an economic system that went beyond finance capitalism and corporate concentration—a vision that called for large-scale, banker-led organization for the export of American capital and goods—was taking tangible form in AIC and in other firms.

[53] Straight to Parker, June 15, 1916, S.P.
[54] MS. diary of the 1916 trip, 33, S.P.

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Throughout 1916 AIC pursued a strategy that its president, Charles A. Stone, described in these terms:

> A definite policy has been persistently followed, always having in view the co-ordinated development of an export and import trade, the use of American materials and manufactures abroad, the employment of American capital and engineers in constructive foreign enterprises, and finally, the enlargement of a system of ocean transportation under the United States flag.[55]

The first move was the purchase of seven ships owned by the Pacific Mail Steamship Company. These were the last remaining vessels of PMS' fleet, the rest having been sold to British interests. In May 1916 AIC also bought a large block of shares in United Fruit, and completed the purchase of one-fourth to one-third the stock of the International Merchantile Marine Company. These operations gave AIC what reportedly was control of the world's largest single private shipping interest. AIC also moved into integrated investment and purchase operations in Latin America, organizing a subsidiary (the Latin-American Corporation, capitalized at one million dollars and wholly owned by AIC) that would underwrite municipal bond issues and undertake "cooperation with American engineering and construction firms." At the same time AIC bought a large block of stock in the Allied Machinery Company, organized in 1912 to export machine tools; and it contracted to build water-supply systems in Uruguay by marketing Uruguayan bonds in the American market, with expenditures on machinery to be made in the United States. By mid-1916 AIC had also opened negotiations with the Chinese government for the financing and construction of a five million-dollar canal project. According to newspaper accounts, AIC would provide engineering supervision and machinery for the facilities to be constructed. The firm's activities in shipping were augmented in July by formation of a new subsidiary, the American International Terminals Company, and in December by acquisition of a controlling interest in the New York Shipbuilding Corporation.[56]

One direct result of Straight's 1916 mission to Europe was pur-

[55] Quoted in New York *Times*, Dec. 7, 1916.

[56] *Ibid.*, Dec. 14, 1915; *Second Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board*, 364; New York *Times*, March 5, Sec. V, April 1, 25, 27, May 6, June 1, 2, July 7, 10, Dec. 5, 1916.

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suit of plans for investment and construction in Russia; and in August 1916 AIC dispatched a party to negotiate with the Czarist government, a mission described by the press as "its most ambitious step toward the capture of foreign markets for American manufacturers." Overseas financing was pushed ahead in Latin America, as well, and in October AIC arranged a five million-dollar bond-issue underwriting for the City of Bogotá, for public works. AIC bought outright the firm of Carter, Macy & Company, an importer of tea from China, Japan, India, and Ceylon—a move which, together with the loans to China and the acquisition of Pacific Steamship's fleet, signalled AIC's determination to expand its business in Asia. Also completed in 1916 was the formation of the Rosin and Turpentine Export Company of Georgia; according to AIC's announcement, it was organized to stop cutthroat competition among exporters of these products. AIC also participated in two ventures that tied the firm closely to the U. S. Rubber Corporation: it helped underwrite a $60 million bond issue by U. S. Rubber, and it cooperated with the firm in a project to finance development of American-owned rubber plantations, which might assure adequate supplies for the domestic industry after the war.[57]

Clearly the first year's activities of AIC were consistent with the large strategy articulated by Willard Straight: shipping, shipbuilding, and industrial interests were concentrated under AIC's aegis; the company moved into the markets of the underdeveloped world; and in both China and Colombia contracts to finance public works were tied to purchase agreements, by which American industry supplied equipment and engineering. One key element of Willard Straight's vision was missing, however. Apart from his own discussions in London and Paris there was no overt move by AIC toward systematic collaboration with European capitalists. AIC was operating unilaterally, contrary to Straight's ambition to build an Anglo-Franco-American understanding; and so apparently he was unable to persuade Vanderlip, Stone, or other leaders of the AIC to work in that direction.[58]

Straight resigned from AIC when the United States entered the

[57] *Ibid.*, July 8, Aug. 31, Oct. 5, Dec. 7, 1916, Jan. 13, 19, 1917; see also Straight to E. S. Morgan, Aug. 17, 1916, S.P.

[58] Straight to his wife, March 10, 1918, and to H. P. Davison, June 30, 1918, S.P.

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war in April 1917, and he obtained a commission in the army. In service Straight masterminded the War Risk Insurance Bureau's operations overseas. Later he was sent to Army War College classes in France. He became a liaison officer, and immediately after the armistice he was asked by Colonel House to become a member of the U. S. peace mission.[59] Straight never returned from France: he was struck down by influenza and died on December 1, 1918. His life did not end as one man's quixotic journey through Asia and the Western world's financial capitals: Straight's long campaign for a new "realism" in American foreign economic policy, and his efforts to reshape finance capitalism to relate investment banking directly to export interests, were largely realized. By the end of the World War both U. S. policy and the American bankers' responses to war-induced opportunity had come close to Willard Straight's prescriptions.

AIC itself continued on a course of development marked by unilateral initiatives, and its wartime activities concentrated more heavily upon domestic investment than had been the case before April 1917. During 1917-18 its largest single project was a contract with the Emergency Fleet Corporation to build fifty merchant vessels at the Hog Island, Pennsylvania, shipyards; the government provided the capital, with AIC delivering a mortgage on the shipyards property as security. AIC's development of subsidiaries also went forward rapidly; by April 1918 the firm wholly controlled the Allied Machinery Company of France, the American International Steel Corporation, the American International Shipbuilding Corporation, the Symington Forge Corporation, and the Allied Machinery Company. It also bought out the export-import firm G. Amsinck & Company, and further extended its stock acquisitions in industrial and shipping firms that owned merchant vessels. Although Latin American and Russian investment schemes were continued, the nation's war effort concentrated AIC's capital and energy mainly at home.[60] During the immediate postwar period, however, AIC once again became a leader in foreign investment. Ironically, Willard Straight did not live to negotiate one of AIC's most ambitious undertakings, the Grand Canal Project for

[59] Croly, Chap. 15, *passim*.

[60] New York *Times*, Sept. 14, Oct. 27, Nov. 17, 1917, April 4, 1918; Lewis, 180-81.

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China, which it initially financed unilaterally. In addition, AIC emerged as a major force in postwar Latin American finance, undertaking construction projects in Bolivia and Colombia, and pioneering the sale of foreign securities in the U. S. capital market.[61]

An even greater irony of Straight's death was the revival during 1918 of the China Consortium project on precisely the lines Straight had discussed with British spokesmen in 1916—with the Germans excluded from the reorganized international group. Moreover, as Straight had predicted, the Wilson administration reversed course and endorsed participation in the Consortium by an American Group.[62] The State Department's friendliness to the revived Consortium effort was only one segment of a larger policy that bore the earmarks of Dollar Diplomacy and the principles espoused in Asia by Straight: the American consular and diplomatic corps cooperated with private business interests to develop joint arrangements with the British for Latin American investment and development; and U. S. interventions in the Western Hemisphere were matched by a new assertive attitude in Asia.[63]

Congressional policy respecting foreign trade also underwent dramatic changes. In 1918 the Webb-Pomerene Act exempted associations engaged in the export trade from certain antitrust law provisions. Moreover, the Edge Act of 1919 permitted federal chartering of banks engaged in the financing of exports, in effect encouraging "investment trusts with the broad purpose of supporting America's export trade."[64] Throughout 1917-18 the United States also cooperated closely with the Allied nations for joint allocation of raw materials, industrial goods, and foodstuffs. But inter-Allied

[61] *Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1919* (hereafter, *F.R.*) (Washington, 1934), I, 615 ff. See also Lewis, 372-73.

[62] *F.R., 1919*, I, 420 ff., 438, *passim;* see also Harold M. Vinacke, "Woodrow Wilson's Far Eastern Policy," *Wilson's Foreign Policy in Perspective*, ed. Edward H. Buehrig (Bloomington, 1957), 76-79. In June 1916 Straight had discussed with British officials how the Germans might best be excluded from the Consortium in China after the war. MS. diary of 1916 trip, 90, S.P.

[63] See, for example, the strong support given the AIC in its dealings with the Chinese government, *F.R., 1919*, I, 622-23; and, more generally, Feis, Chap. 2. Also, *F.R., 1919*, I, 163 ff., 167, 193-218, *passim*, on negotiations for concessions, loans, and international investment schemes in Latin America.

[64] Lewis, 186, 195-97; Williams, 79-80; "Combination for Export Trade Legalized," in *Banking: Journal of the American Bankers Association*, XI (July 1918), 5-8; *Banker's Magazine*, CI (Sept. 1920), 354; see also Gabriel Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism . . . 1900-1916* (Glencoe, 1963), 275-76.

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economic coordination did not blossom into an entente for orderly postwar reconstruction or for systematic pooling of markets for capital and export goods, as Willard Straight had hoped.[65] The British did attempt to initiate such arrangements, asserting that the Allied governments were "under a moral obligation. . . to carry on during the period of reconstruction that cooperation in the economic sphere which is being developed as the result of war conditions." But their overtures were promptly rejected. "This Government," the State Department declared, "will not agree to any programme that even looks like inter-Allied control of our economic resources after peace."[66]

The various departures from earlier American trade policy, like the formation of AIC, were not undertaken covertly or without substantial public attention. It was a common theme in public discussion of postwar commerce that "the American banker and American salesmen must go abroad hand in hand." Dollar diplomacy now won many new friends. "The securing of . . . an international open door for investments" was demanded; and men from the academic community and government, as well as from business, called for "extended, international co-operation for the placing of capital in China" and other nations of the underdeveloped world.[67] AIC spokesmen contributed to the new mood, as when its president asserted that "new markets are opening" and that recovery from the war "spells opportunity for the United States." In June 1919 the AIC's directors reaffirmed their intent "to aid in maintaining and increasing transportation of American merchandise in American owned ships," rather than permit a lapsing into dependence on foreign shipping.[68] Similarly, the president of New York's Bank of Commerce declared that to reconstruct the European economy, "a pool of Europe's needs should be met by a pool of America's re-

[65] See the various volumes on American and inter-Allied wartime organization in the Carnegie Endowment's *Economic and Social History of the World War*, ed. James T. Shotwell (Washington, 1924).

[66] *F.R., 1919*, Suppl. I: *The World War* (Washington, 1933), 612, 616. See also Clémentel, 279, 305-09.

[67] H. Wood, "Planning the Future America," *The Annals*, LXXII (1917), 22; H. Overstreet "Foreign Investment Relations," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, VII, Part II (1917), 644; S. K. Hornbeck, "Trade, Concessions, Investments, Conflict, and Policy in the Far East," *ibid.*, 620.

[68] New York *Times*, June 7, 1919, March 23, 1920.

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sources . . . through a great, centralized credit organization." Putting the matter more simply, another commentator wrote: "They all want money over there, and they will pay for it, too." In mid-1920 the president of the Bank of America declared that the nation's "great ambition" was "to retain the trade of the world, which has fallen into our laps whilst our main competitors of the past were at war." America's "social welfare," he wrote, depended upon an effective response. In the rhetoric of foreign-trade promotion, there were echoes as well of a theme common in public debates since the eighteen-seventies, that "the productive possibility of the United States today is undoubtedly very substantially in excess of its power of consumption. Either we shall find markets abroad for the surplus we are capable of producing or we shall cease to produce it."[69]

What was most important about these and similar declarations favoring a more assertive American market-expansion policy was that they reflected a strategy adopted by American bankers during the European war years, even before American intervention in the conflict. They were not, as is so often assumed by scholars, uniquely a result of *postwar* conditions and perspectives.[70] Men in the investment banking community had perceived of the war as the occasion for bold new initiatives. Some, like Willard Straight and the founders of AIC, anticipated an aggressive postwar drive by the Allied powers for the recapture of old markets in the "Third World"; and they took concrete measures, as in the organization of AIC, to steal a march on rival nations. Furthermore, some of the leading personnel in this development—Straight, Frank Vanderlip and others in the National City Bank, the partners of Kuhn, Loeb & Company—had been associates in a leading prewar venture in in-

[69] James S. Alexander, "Meeting the Credit Needs of Europe," *Banker's Magazine*, XCIX (Aug. 1919), 196, 198; Alfred O. Corbin, "Investment of American Capital Abroad," *ibid.* (July 1919), 55; Frank B. Anderson, "Financing Foreign Trade Through Foreign Trade Corporations," *ibid.*, C (June 1920), 856; O. K. Davis, "The Banker's Interest in Foreign Trade: What America's Export Business Means to the Country's Financial Interests," *ibid.* (March 1920), 381-82.

[70] See public statements cited earlier, notes 40-43; and also French Strother, "Our New Gold Goes Adventuring," *World's Work*, XXXI (Feb. 1916), 389 ff. On the parallel wartime pressure from business leaders to effect a basic reorientation of public policy toward domestic corporations, see Robert F. Himmelberg, "The War Industries Board and the Antitrust Question in November, 1918," *Journal of American History*, LII (1965), 59-74; and James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900-1918* (Boston, 1968), 214 ff.

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vestment-market expansion, the Consortium scheme. Their role in the expansionist drive of the war period represented an adaptation of older goals and strategies to warborn opportunity. American hegemony in the postwar world economy came, then, not solely as the result of war-induced, autonomous economic change during the great conflict. It was in part an extension of aspirations and plans that dated from the days of the Open Door and Dollar Diplomacy. Important as shifts in diplomatic policy and changes in Congress' attitude toward foreign-trade organization may have been, for an elite group of U. S. bankers the wartime policy changes at home were but one element of a much larger entrepreneurial opportunity.

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Book Reviews

The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx *by Shlomo Avineri. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968.—viii, 269 pp. $8.50.*

In the last chapter of his book, Dr. Avineri suggests that Marx needs rescuing "from the hands of his disciples." This work of "rescue" has been going on for some time, and has consisted largely of reinterpreting Marx's thought in the light of some of his early writings, not published at all, or not in full, until long after his death and some years after the death of Lenin. Marx is rescued above all from Lenin and from Engels, even though one of the works on which the rescuers draw heavily, *The German Ideology*, first published in full in 1932, was written by Engels as well as by Marx. The rescuers sometimes resuscitate a young Marx, whom they oppose to an older Marx who abandoned some of the most exciting and imaginative of the insights of his youth. Dr. Avineri rejects, I think rightly, this contrasting of the young to the older Marx. Marx, he argues, kept hold all his life of certain ideas which meant much less to Engels than to him, and virtually nothing to Lenin. Engels and Lenin are both, in Dr. Avineri's eyes, vulgarizers of Marx; they failed to understand the more subtle and profound aspects of his thought. The sense or senses in which man, for Marx, is *essentially* a social being, and is self-creative and alienated, and the sense in which social processes are dialectical, were never really understood by his German or his Russian disciples who achieved or undertook so much in his name.

It could be argued that they were not really understood by Marx either; that he never took the full measure of them, never saw clearly their possibilities and limitations. Still, they were his ideas, or his adaptations of ideas taken from Hegel. He was a great thinker, whose contribution to our understanding of man and society has yet to be assessed at its true worth. Dr. Avineri's claim for him is essentially just, and his book dispels illusions still widely held. It is an important book, much easier to read than most books about Marx's social and political thought; it is fresh, shrewd, and generous. It is perhaps too generous; Marx was perhaps a more confused thinker than Dr. Avineri makes him out to be. A really probing criticism of some of the ideas

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and arguments "central" to his social thought might show that he was. This sort of criticism Dr. Avineri does not attempt. Sometimes, when he rejects what he takes to be a "misinterpretation" of Marx, he thinks it enough to quote passages which contradict it. He takes it for granted that Marx did not contradict himself, and yet fails to explain how the passages he quotes to refute the "misinterpretation" can be reconciled with passages which appear to support it. Engels had opportunities to discuss Marx's ideas with Marx, as we none of us, alas, have today, and many of the "distortions" of these ideas were published by Engels with Marx's approval. Dr. Avineri, though he writes well, sticks perhaps too closely to Marx's own formulations of his ideas. If he had tried to reformulate them, he might have had more doubts about their clarity or adequacy. But then he would also have exposed himself to criticism for misinterpreting Marx!

JOHN PLAMENATZ
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Public Administration and Democracy: Essays Honoring Paul H. Appleby *edited by Roscoe C. Martin. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1965.—vii, 355 pp. $7.95.*

Paul Appleby would have been pleased with this memorial volume of essays by fifteen of his friends and colleagues. For he was a philosopher, and the dominant tone of the essays is philosophical. In a lifetime of action—as newspaperman, as public servant (capped by service as undersecretary of agriculture, assistant director of the U. S. Bureau of the Budget, and director of the Budget of the State of New York), and as dean of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University—he never permitted the details and pressures of daily demands to obscure the larger issues of political life, and he somehow found time in his busiest years to set down his reflections and concerns in a series of books and articles that any academic might be proud of. Indeed, he was still grappling with those issues at his death, as two selections by the editor from his unpublished manuscripts clearly demonstrate. Roscoe Martin, the editor, and the authors of the papers have served Appleby well.

Most of the papers are addressed to the dilemma that most agitated Appleby: the apparent clash between the conditions of democratic government and the requirements of large-scale organization, between the ideals of freedom and plenty for all and the constraints of order, hierarchy, and rationality in decision-making. Dwight Waldo, in a

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paper employing a line of reasoning parallel to C. P. Snow's *Two Cultures*, argues that the two goals are reconcilable, and perhaps even inseparable; the impression of incompatibility he blames on the bridgeable chasm between the humanistic culture of the men of letters and the rationalistic administrative subculture. He wants the two to come together, for the betterment of both. But in another paper, Victor A. Thompson contends, in effect, that the administrative subculture is hopelessly outdated, clinging to organization by hierarchy (which he calls the product of an agrarian, status-dominated society) when the industrial system has made this form of organization obsolete. He ends by calling for the formulation of a new, appropriate administrative doctrine. John M. Gaus' essay lends support to Thompson; Gaus feels that Appleby's defense of bigness and hierarchy may have neglected the need to involve more citizens more directly and deeply in government—not merely in politics, but in administration as well. Otherwise, he fears, private concerns will eclipse and obscure public interests. Rowland Egger and Stephen K. Bailey share his uneasiness about prevailing doctrine that the public interest is nothing more than the sum of politically effective private interests, and Emmette S. Redford maintains that one distinctive function of public government is to represent the public interest in the decision-making processes of those private governments called business. So these essays come to grips with the political theory of public administration, which is only proper for a book dedicated to Appleby.

Even when they deal with more circumscribed subjects, the authors never lose sight of the larger theme. Jesse Burkhead's treatment of budgeting, for example, tries to balance the rationality of performance measurement with the political realities and advantages of "muddling through." Similarly, in discussing central economic planning (Bertram M. Gross), reorganization (Frederick M. Mosher), and intergovernmental relations (Guthrie S. Birkhead), it is with the relationship of these processes to democracy that the writers are concerned and not exclusively with the narrow technical aspects of their subjects. In the hands of Arthur W. Macmahon, the problem of structuring advisory committees so that they are truly representative of the interests involved, sufficiently informed to be relevant and helpful to those they advise, and sufficiently spontaneous to be inventive and bold, becomes a microcosm of the perplexities of balancing diverse values everywhere in government. Only in the section on international public administration—perhaps inevitably, since it is still an exotic field—did attention wander from the relationship of the topics to democracy and fix on the problems and promises of the subdiscipline itself. Yet even these discussions

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(by Lynton K. Caldwell, Donald C. Stone, and Herbert Emmerich) contribute much to the book.

Appleby would not have agreed with everything in the book, and would have been disappointed if Martin had chosen contributors who would only concur with or eulogize him. But he would have enjoyed and appreciated it. So will many others.

HERBERT KAUFMAN
Yale University

Revolutionary Change *by Chalmers Johnson. Boston, Little Brown, 1966.—172 pp. $2.75.*

Professor Johnson has provided us with a valuable contribution to the literature on revolution. Circumventing the traditionally narrow perspective of works on revolution (the constructions of typologies of historically discrete political acts) the author has attempted to design a "theoretical formulation of necessary and sufficient causes of revolution." Revolution is to be viewed as only one form of social change. The potential for such violent change is inherent in all societies. Yet, if properly understood, it is not beyond man's capacity to avoid. And, if the ideal of a world system were to be realized, the need for such understanding would assume greater urgency. All wars would then be internal or intrasystemic (that is, revolutionary).

To explore the nature of revolutionary change Professor Johnson employs a conceptual framework of society that gives insight into the conditions of stability as well as instability in the social order. It is a model constructed by synthesizing the "value" and "coercion" theories of society. Basically we are presented a model depicting society in a state of "homeostatic equilibrium." With it the author introduces a four-fold typology of the sources of change impinging on the social system: "endogenous and exogenous value-changing forces, and endogenous and exogenous environment-changing forces." If the system becomes disequilibrated (that is, if its homeostatic capacity fails to cope with the "value-environment dissynchronization" induced by one of these forms of change) the threat of revolution appears.

But a disequilibrated system is not by itself a sufficient cause of revolution. The act of revolution is immediately preceded by an incident or "accelerator" which occurs in a system experiencing "power deflation" and "loss of authority." That is to say, the occupants of positions of formal authority have failed to develop policies for resynchronizing society's value and social structures. Therefore, integra-

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tion of the changing system depends increasingly upon the deployment of force. Sustained recourse to coercion undermines the legitimacy of the authorities. Under such conditions any incident or "accelerator" (like an army mutiny) which suggests that the elite might be deprived of its weapons of coercion can become the catalyst for revolution.

Within this framework revolution is perceived as a very peculiar form of intrasystemic change. As stated by Professor Johnson, it is "the purposive implementation of a strategy of violence in order to effect a change in social structure." Revolutionaries intentionally utilize violence to restore equilibrium to a dysfunctional social system. Their ideology as an "alternative paradigm of values" becomes salient only under disequilibrated conditions.

Undoubtedly some will be skeptical of this approach, and that should be the case. Professor Johnson has asked that his model be judged on its "merits" and not taken simply as a "heuristic device." If so, one must ask whether his model approximates the empirical relationships of revolutionary conditions. How convincing, for example, are the symptoms of disequilibrium posited by the author? Can "suicide rates," "military participation ratios," "crime rates," and heightened ideological activity provide an adequate measurement of the potential for revolution. Or must we, unfortunately, await the act of revolution to state confidently that the prerequisite conditions for revolution had been present. Moreover, has the author effectively overcome the weaknesses endemic to functional explanations? It is not entirely clear whether the reader is confronted by a theory of the causes of revolution, or whether revolution is essentially a "functional requisite" determined tautologically from the "systems model."

DONALD J. MCCORMACK
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The Uses of Comparative Sociology *by Stanislav Andreski. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1965.—x, 383 pp. $6.50.*

Unless comparative sociology designates any occasional writing on "an aspect of social life" that draws examples from more than one society, this book is about neither comparative sociology nor its uses. What it is about is less easy to say. A paragraph at the end entitled "Notes" has a page to itself, and there we learn that some of the chapters previously

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appeared as journal articles. One or two seem to be otherwise unpublished book reviews, and several were apparently originally drafted as either parts of or as commentaries on an earlier book by Professor Andreski, to which there are numerous references. It is good to bring fugitive papers together. But a reader's indulgence for their inevitably loose organization is the more readily obtained if he is not led to believe at the outset that the papers were drafted as the chapters of a book (pp. ix-x).

The first of the three parts of the collection (Professor Andreski calls them "Books"), "Philosophical and Methodological Foundations," contains a variety of well-phrased, unobjectionable Pronouncements-on-Method, arbitrarily divided into six chapters. The commentaries have a certain orthodox quality to them: they attack quantification, Talcott Parsons, and functional analysis, and espouse relevance, plain writing, and Max Weber. But they are not without their better moments: a passage from *The Human Group* serves to illustrate ponderous prose. Too elliptical for the new student and too often too vacuous for the old—"Only by asking why, and trying to give concrete answers, will the sociologist avoid the pitfalls of sterility and verbalism" (p. 37)—these Method-papers will not, I suspect, readily find an appreciative audience.

The second and third parts are entitled, respectively, "Problems in Substantive Theory" and "Case Studies," but I can discern no difference between the twelve papers in Book Two and the six in Book Three, save that the latter appear somewhat more focused. Book Two is divided in turn into four sections (I, "Violence and Society"; II, "Types of Polity"; III, "Mind and Society"; IV, "Class Structure and Economic Progress"), and each of these contains two, three, or four brief chapters. But at that point organization ceases, and we are treated to memoranda that for the most part have no evident thesis, present no systematic comparisons, and come to a stop when Professor Andreski apparently tires of the topic. Book Three has two subheads, "Racial Conflict" and "Antecedents and Prospects of Totalitarianism," with three papers apiece. Like the earlier dozen, they exhibit a conspicuous lack of concern for the central preoccupations of Book One—systematic theory, rigorous description, and defensible explanation.

What has gone wrong? Professor Andreski is obviously a learned man, and there is much of value scattered through these pages. But this miscellany is, fundamentally, a bad book.

TERENCE K. HOPKINS
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The Upper House in Revolutionary America, 1763-1788 *by Jackson Turner Main. Madison, Milwaukee, and London, University of Wisconsin Press, 1967.—xii, 311 pp. $7.50.*

This volume compares the composition and function of the pre-Revolutionary councils with those of the post-Revolutionary senates. Based upon the first detailed, systematic, and comprehensive prosopographical analysis of those bodies, the author's findings about the changing composition of the upper houses are especially useful because they provide firm evidence for a proposition historians of the Revolution have long thought to be true: that the social base of the state senates was much broader than that of the colonial councils. While over sixty per cent of the councilors were wealthy (that is, owned property valued at at least £5,000) and almost all the rest were "well-to-do" (owned property valued at £2,000 or more), only about a fourth of the senators were wealthy and nearly a fourth were men of only moderate wealth (owned property of less than £2,000 in value). Moreover, whereas the councilors had a distinctly Eastern, urban, commercial, professional, and Anglican cast and were remarkable for their members' education, travel, and connections with old, established families, the senates were far more Western and rural in character and contained many more non-Aglicans and self-made men.

Directly related, of course, to the large increase in the number of members of the upper houses after 1776, this "democratization of the upper houses" was chiefly responsible, the author argues, for a major change in the function of those bodies. The primary function of the councils was the "defense of royal authority" and their status varied from colony to colony according to the extent to which their members were drawn from the colonial elite, but prevailing theory held that they occupied a place in the colonial constitutions similar to that held by the House of Lords in Great Britain as the spokesmen of the aristocratic element in the social order. According to the author, the old elites had this analogy in mind when they fashioned the senates, devising various expedients such as indirect election, high property qualifications for members, and long terms of office to insure that the upper houses would represent " 'property' or 'aristocracy.' " But these expedients worked only in Maryland and, to a lesser extent, in South Carolina and Virginia. Instead of unitary agencies of the "aristocracy" the senates became in most states "almost indistinguishable from the . . . lower houses" in terms of function, serving primarily as revisory bodies and justifying themselves largely simply "as instruments of better government." No less than the lower houses, they "became the arenas for

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disputes between incipient parties" representing divergent sectional, occupational, religious, and class interests. There were significant variations from state to state, but the primary division, the author suggests, was between, on the one hand, a "popular party" whose members supported "measures favorable to westerners, lower-income groups, and small farmers," tended to be "provincial rather than national in . . . outlook," and were "usually anti-Loyalist and anti-aristocratic" and, on the other hand, an "aristocratic party" whose members stood for precisely the opposite.

Most of the problems in this study derive from the author's failure to go beyond or alter the traditional intellectual framework—a failure which is the more unfortunate because one of the places where the framework seems to be most in need of alteration is at precisely the point at which the author might have confronted it: in its assumption that upper-class political leaders wanted to build an "aristocratic" element into their various polities after 1776. The author uses the concept *aristocracy* in the parochial way American historians have conventionally employed it, to mean simply the very wealthy. But there is much evidence to indicate that colonial Americans often—and a systematic study might even reveal usually—used the concept to mean not only the wealthy or even the top of the status hierarchy but a group (usually hereditary) with a recognized legal status and exclusive legal privileges that marked them off from the rest of society. Given the absence of any such group in America and the expressed aversion to any such aristocracy by many of the very political leaders who by the author's definition would be designated aristocrats, it may be doubted whether even those American political leaders drawn from established colonial elites ever conceived of the senates as the instruments of aristocracy or even as the special guardians of the interests of the very wealthy. Although we cannot be sure until the extensive theoretical discussion of the function of the upper house has been exhaustively analyzed, there is considerable evidence to indicate that it was the stability, independence, and wisdom of the House of Lords rather than its aristocratic character that the constitution makers of the Revolution were trying to duplicate in the senates.

Much less tentatively, it can also be objected that the author's narrow conception of representation—his assumption that representatives in order to be representative must "accurately reflect" the social, economic, religious, and sectional composition of their constituency, that wealthy urban Easterners cannot by definition be sympathetic to "the needs of ordinary farmers and westerners"—is, as Lee Benson so forcefully argued in relation to Charles A. Beard's study of the Constitution,

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a logical fallacy. The whole history of representative government in America and elsewhere makes it clear, as Benson remarked, that "men who belong to one class or group may [and, one can add, very often do] represent men who belong to classes or groups other than their own."

JACK P. GREENE
The Johns Hopkins University

The Changing Political Thought of John Adams *by John R. Howe Jr. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—xv, 259 pp. $6.50.*

John Adams has been a puzzlement to historians and political theorists from his own day to ours. "Justly so," one can imagine the Demiurgic old statesman retorting. His own ambition to "find the key" to the universe, to the moral and intellectual foundations of man, had been vast, ardent, and bafflingly unsuccessful. Far more than a laborer in the gnarled vineyards of "Politics" (which he had hailed early in his quest as "the divine science"), John Adams burned impatiently to know *all*, and to lead a legendary "children" to the mount of safety through his superior wisdom. But he often arrived at the forbidding wall of doubt, and he frequently gave way to the passionate expressions of immediate vision. The cumulative effect of his learned, involved, and penetrating reflections on the nature of man, the laws of society, and forms of government is undeniably monumental—and paradoxically "monumental" as is an endless web of tangled filaments. This man cannot yield his secrets conveniently. In a despairing cry, he once defined "philosophy" as follows: "What is philosophy but the study of the World and its cause? Man is a riddle to himself. The World is a riddle to him. He puzzles to find a Key and this puzzle is called Philosophy." He who would interpret John Adams to the world must wrestle in the snake-pit of a brilliant mind unsure of the directions of the compass.

Mr. Howe is relatively untroubled by these dimensions of John Adams' total personality as a problem for intellectual and political characterization. Perhaps happily so, for he has managed to adduce interesting and not over-exposed materials by the master. In a commendable effort to write lucidly of John Adams' "changing political development" (at least one of these words strikes me as redundant), he has introduced a surface order that will serve those who have *some* but no profound desire to come to terms with the American intellectual

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maverick among the founding fathers. He sees John Adams, accurately enough, as a statesman whose pride and acute sensitivity to criticism drove him into a virtually lifelong quarrel with his countrymen for their presumed "rejection" of his leadership. Yet he makes clear that this weakness did not prevent Adams from making a tremendous contribution to realistic analysis of the difficulties inherent in a romantic and unqualified version of popular democracy. He finds Adams rebelling against too much (British) authority in the revolutionary seventeen-seventies and rebelling against too much popular excess from the seventeen-nineties on—not surprisingly, since much previous scholarship has managed to establish these points. The poignancy of Adams' recognition that his counsel and warnings ran against the popular tide in the last decade of the century and in the twenty-six years which the Lord granted him to live in the nineteenth century, is not exploited for its human drama; but it is perceived by the author and forms a submerged content to the overt analysis.

Yet one must confess considerable disappointment with two fundamental aspects of Mr. Howe's study. His explicit intention, as formulated in his introduction, is to attempt "to view Adams' political thought not essentially as a product of his reading and reflection, but of the immediate experiences through which he passed—as an effort to come to grips with both the specific historical events in which he shared and the changing circumstances of his own life." It is also his judgment that this approach should make "the development of his political thinking . . . considerably more clear" (p. xv). Admittedly John Adams, with his thin skin, would not be a subject whose political thought (or any other thought) would be *merely* a product of his reading and reflection. Perhaps no man's thought is! But this discovery by no means frees the author to neglect the responsibility to state precisely and to appraise the content of that considerable body of thought. Nor does it free him of the obligation to discuss Adams' reading, to the extent of its ascertainable influence on his thought. Mr. Howe side-steps this first-order task, providing very summary accounts of judgments about important writings such as *The Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law*, the *Thoughts on Government*, the massive three-volume *Defence of the Constitutions of the United States*, and the continuation of that work in the *Discourses of Davila*—not to mention Adams' later and more topical writings, in the years of his retirement. Moreover, we have from Mr. Howe only perfunctory examinations of the important Massachusetts Constitution of 1780—a fundamental document which Lyman Butterfield, the editor of *The Adams Family Papers*, has assessed as John Adams' "chief monument as a political thinker"; and the

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same is true about the author's neglect of the valuable *Legal Papers of John Adams*, which go so far to illuminate the evolution of his early views of *morale-politique*.

The second major disappointment has to do with the other axis of the author's study—that which promises "to come to grips with both the specific historical events in which he shared and the changing circumstances of his own life." For example, the absence of concrete context for Adams' succession of battles and feuds is remarkable. One would never suspect that a flaming hatred of Benjamin Franklin and the Franklin "circle" of enlightened *philosophes* in Paris, with their enthusiastically liberal Unitarian admirers in England, had provoked the learned American Minister to the Court of St. James' to justify his widely different ideas by forging a defiant political masterpiece, the *Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States*. The thin line of Mr. Howe's account of Adams' political development, therefore, fails to illuminate Adams as an intellectual beyond what was previously known, and defeats the intent to achieve a texture of specific historicity and context that would provide another kind of value to a study in political thought.

In an imperious gesture, John Adams once taunted his friend and political rival, Jefferson, by writing: "Whether you or I were right Posterity must judge." It is time that "posterity" accepted the challenge—even though the challenge may prove to be the American scholar's Mt. Everest!

ADRIENNE KOCH
University of Maryland

An Encore for Reform: The Old Progressives and the New Deal *by Otis L. Graham Jr. New York, Oxford University Press, 1967.—viii, 256 pp. $6.00.*

In this attractively written and extensively researched book, Professor Graham analyzes the relationship between Progressivism and the New Deal by examining the views of 168 Progressives who lived through at least Franklin D. Roosevelt's first term as president. He divides his "old Progressives" into opponents of the New Deal, supporters of the Roosevelt reforms, critics of the New Deal from the Left, and those who retreated from reform to private concerns, and he describes and analyzes the ideas and characteristics of each group. Although aware that there were elements of continuity between the two reform movements, Graham emphasizes the discontinuities and seeks to challenge "the im-

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pression left by the standard treatments of modern reform ... that New Dealers were latter-day Progressives" (p. 220).

Of Graham's 168 "old Progressives," derived from an original list of four hundred Progressives of all types that the author had compiled, sixty opposed the New Deal, forty supported it, five thought that it did not go far enough, ten were concerned only with private matters, ten could not be classified, and Graham could not find enough data to categorize the remaining forty-three. The opponents of the New Deal, who dominate the book, were drawn principally from the fields of politics and journalism-editing. They complained that the New Deal was uninterested in moral reform and boss rule, that it was "coercive," and that it promoted a variety of special interests in contradistinction to the alleged Progressive concern for the general interest. Among the Progressive supporters of the New Deal, settlement and social workers and municipal reformers were most conspicuous.

Although Graham is to be congratulated for his treatment of an important subject in a more systematic and thorough manner than has previously been attempted, and although he is correct in pointing to certain essential differences between Progressivism and the New Deal, his analysis of the Progressive opposition to the New Deal is weak at several points. His sample, to begin with, does not include such Progressives as Charles Beard, Grace Abbott, Frank Walsh, John A. Ryan, Frances Perkins, and Robert F. Wagner who supported the New Deal and whose addition to the author's list would have altered the totals of friends and foes of the Roosevelt reforms. The list of opponents includes men like Chase Osborn, William Borah, Hiram Johnson, and Gifford Pinchot who supported a substantial proportion of the New Deal programs but who are classified as against the New Deal because their final response to it was negative or because they voted for Landon (himself an old Bull Mooser), the chief criterion used by Graham to determine opposition to the New Deal. Graham concedes that Progressive opponents of the New Deal did not attack its relief policies, its public works program, social security, or the TVA, which means that the opposition accepted some of the principal components of the New Deal.

Graham is inclined to accept the word of Progressive foes of the New Deal that their reform views had not changed since 1917 and that they were criticizing the New Deal from the standpoint of Progressive principles and goals. Despite their protestations, however, the "Progressive survivors" did not always follow Progressive guidelines in criticizing the New Deal. They thus opposed the NIRA even though as Progressives many of them had favored planning by business with

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government aid, the essence of the NIRA; they strongly opposed Roosevelt's court reform plan although Progressives had raised questions concerning judicial review itself; they complained that the New Deal was responsible for class legislation, but they had generally accepted the legislation for farmers and laborers of the Wilson administration; and they charged that Franklin D. Roosevelt was seeking power for personal reasons but chose to evaluate Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson as selfless leaders whose concern was the national interest. The possibility that many of the Progressive foes of the New Deal had become disillusioned with government and reform between 1917 and 1933 or that, as politicians and journalists, they were reflecting constituencies that had bid farewell to reform in the nineteen-twenties deserves more consideration than Graham gives this point.

Graham's data indicate that politics and personal wealth may have been more consequential than Progressive ideology in determining Progressive opposition to the New Deal, although the author is inclined to minimize this point. His statistics demonstrate that the wealthier a former Progressive was at the time of the New Deal the more likely he was to oppose it. Allegiance to the Republican party also seems to have been important in determining opposition to the New Deal: of thirty-seven Republicans about whom the author could find evidence, thirty-one opposed the New Deal. This contrasted with a fifteen-fourteen division against the New Deal among Democrats and a ten-four split in favor of the New Deal among political independents. If a vote for Landon is to be accepted as a test of opposition to the New Deal, perhaps one should eliminate from Graham's list of Progressives all those Republicans in 1916 who voted for Hughes.

It has become customary for reviewers to complain about the conversion of footnotes into rear notes. In the present work the footnotes are included within the body of the text itself, a practice that is also to be deplored and that mars the reading of an interesting and informative book.

SIDNEY FINE
University of Michigan

The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945 *by George B. Tindall. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1967.—xv, 807 pp. $12.50.*

With this volume George Tindall brings to remarkable fruition a dozen years of prodigious labor and gives us the long-awaited tenth volume of

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the *History of the South* series. It is a book in which the author, the director of the Louisiana State University Press, and the editors of the ten-volume series should take much pride. One is immediately struck by its length, scope, and immense scholarship. In 731 pages of text Tindall's twenty chapters encompass, intelligently order, and gracefully describe the full panorama of Southern development in the years between Wilson's inauguration and Franklin Roosevelt's death. The elaborate documentation and the thirty-six page bibliographical essay richly display the raw material out of which the study was fashioned and temptingly invite innumerable new monographs.

Comprehensive, authoritative, and lucid, *The Emergence of the New South* is in a class by itself. No other work on the twentieth-century South approaches it in design and detail. Apart from a few unsatisfactory textbook attempts, Southern history in this period has been largely unstructured, as students and teachers of the subject are painfully aware. In fact, the most important works on the region during Tindall's period—the ones most frequently recommended and cited by historians—are studies by non-historians: Key on politics; Hoover and Ratchford on economics; Myrdal on race relations; Rubin, Jacobs, and others on literature and culture. While these authors are conscious of historical perspective, their works—with the literary studies excepted from some of the generalizations—are essentially analytical, problem-oriented, and focused on the present, often with prescriptions for the future. Now, in Tindall's volume, the great themes of modern Southern history are treated developmentally, with their dynamic and subtle interconnections deftly drawn. Students of the period will of course continue to profit from the more analytical works of the social scientists and literary critics, but Tindall puts us in his debt by making it possible to see the evolution of the historical process more easily and more clearly than ever before.

Change is the staple of historical writing, and the years 1913-45 had a larger measure than most of the periods covered by previous volumes in the series. The theme of "emergence," suggested by the title and announced in the preface, is skillfully pursued but nowhere artificially forced. One sees the South moving, unevenly but with increasingly less chance of turning back, toward a realistic confrontation with its racial, social, economic, political, and cultural heritage of inadequacy and pain; and the record of achievement Tindall describes is solid and impressive. At the same time, however, his exhaustive research and sensitivity to complexity and ambivalence in the Southern experience produce equally authoritative portraits of backwardness, violence, uncertainty, false pride, complacency, and romantic myths that persisted

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throughout the period. At the end of the Second World War, as H. C. Nixon had predicted in 1944, the South faced the future with a legacy of "more social change" but also with "more unfinished business than any other part of the country." With a rich mixture of broad vision and defensive reactions, the South from 1913 to 1945 is rendered immensely easier to understand by Professor Tindall's pioneer work.

PAUL M. GASTON
University of Virginia

Claus Spreckels: The Sugar King in Hawaii *by Jacob Adler. Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1966.—xii, 339 pp. $8.00.*

The modern history of Hawaii has been characterized by a complicated series of disagreements which relate primarily to issues of land. In fact, the more publicized questions—racial profiles and antagonisms, mainland-island differences, civil-military disagreements, and rural-urban problems—more often than not have their roots in the land problem. That questions concerning land usually become questions for political consideration should be of no surprise to the student of politics. In view of this, the carefully researched study of Claus Spreckels' impact on Hawaii's economics and politics is a valuable addition to the literature on nineteenth-century Hawaii. Indeed, the study implicitly helps to explain much about Hawaii in the nineteen-sixties.

Professor Adler is concerned mainly with Spreckels and his achievements during the reign of King David Kalakaua (1874-91) and Queen Liluokalani (1891-93). In one sense the book focuses only on the rise and fall of Spreckels and his involvement in building a sugar empire, the financing of the Kingdom of Hawaii's monetary system, and political revolution and attempts at counterrevolution. That limited story is itself exciting from a number of standpoints, the most immediate being the rascality and vision of Spreckels and the simplicity of Hawaii's native rulers. But Adler, unlike so many commentators, does not stop there, for he understands very well that without Spreckels and men like him the kinds of economic and political changes that convulsed Hawaii in the nineteenth century would have been very different in quality and quantity. This, then, is a picture of a contributor to and maker of change in Hawaii. More generally, perhaps, it is a picture of a regime overwhelmed by ideas nurtured in a different setting; in that sense Adler's study has far broader usefulness for the social scientist, for it relates to problems of economic development and political change in much of the world today.

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The "robber-baron" theme is best ignored when we consider the importance of Spreckels. Adler demonstrates quite conclusively that most of Spreckels' manipulations had an enormous and positive impact on Hawaii's economy and were in many ways responsible for bringing Hawaii into economic intercourse with the United States. That the native Hawaiians, in contrast to the diverse other peoples who have inhabited the islands, were unable to gain a proportionate share of the wealth generated by such entrepreneurship is more a testimony to their values and lack of political sophistication than to attempts by outsiders to exclude them from such a share. Certainly such attempts were made, but the results were singularly unsuccessful with all groups save the Hawaiians.

Hawaii's recent democratic revolution has changed substantially the profile of Hawaiian politics, but some of the nineteenth-century scenery remains. The important position which Spreckels developed for sugar and critical questions concerning land and the Hawaiians remain as factors, but the combination of broad vision and political power, represented by men like Spreckels, has not been repeated.

The volume is handsomely bound and cleverly illustrated. The photographs in general are interesting, the one of Princess Ruth being especially delightful.

ALLAN A. SPITZ
Washington State University

China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A. *by John K. Fairbank. Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967.—xi, 145 pp. $3.95.*

China: The Other Communism *by K. S. Karol, translated from the French by Tom Baistow, photographs by Marc Riboud. New York, Hill and Wang, 1967.—vi, 474 pp. $7.95.*

The Red Guard: A Report on Mao's Revolution *by Hans Granquist, translated by Erik J. Friis. New York, Washington, and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.—ix, 159 pp. $5.95.*

The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath *by Alexander L. George. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1967.—xii, 255 pp. $6.95.*

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The Chinese People's Liberation Army *by Samuel B. Griffith II. New York, Toronto, and London, McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1967.—xii, 398 pp. $10.95.*

The five books under review are of uneven quality. The first three are for the general public, while the last two deal specifically with Communist China's armed forces. Griffith's study is the most solid piece of work based on thorough research; Granquist contributes the least of all.

The first of the eleven articles contained in Professor Fairbank's book is entitled "A Nation Imprisoned by Her History," which suggests that China's present cannot be understood except in terms of her past. Indeed, this seems to be the consistent approach of the dean of the China specialists in America. Partly because of the Cultural Revolution, however, the distinguished historian now admits that "history alone cannot give us a complete picture, much less a future projection." With regard to "the uses of China specialists," the professor from Harvard concedes modestly that "expert" can still be useful, but "only on special aspects of the problem." For a scholar who has devoted more than half of his life to Chinese studies, this is a significant statement. There is a tendency in this country to look upon a China specialist on a particular subject as if an authority on China as a whole, and Mao's behavior since 1949 has surprised many specialists and "China watchers."

Professor Fairbank has done a great service to the general public by writing for the layman. His book is a collection of articles published in popular magazines before September 1966. It deals with three themes: China's evolution in light of her past, Taiwan, and American policy. It is a refreshing departure from those literary activities that another Harvard professor once called "professors writing for other professors in periodicals which other professors edit."

While it is certainly better to have seen something of Communist China than to have seen nothing at all, short-time visitors are no special authorities. After all, how much can a foreigner know of American politics and history after a hurried visit to the United States? Swedish journalist Granquist, author of *The Red Guard,* illustrates this point. Without sufficient background and training, a trip to mainland China often produces only a superficial picture. The title of Mr. Granquist's book is misleading. There is very little information about the Red Guards, except for one chapter which is based on reports of a Hong Kong correspondent in Shanghai. However, there is a great deal of

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misinformation concerning "Mao's [Cultural] Revolution," referred to in the subtitle of the book.

The most interesting part of Mr. Karol's work is not his trip to China, but how he got there through Chou En-lai. Born in Poland, he was driven to the Soviet Union by the fortunes of war in 1939. Seven years later he returned to Poland, felt ill at ease, and finally settled down in France as a journalist. His book is useful for laymen who want to know a European intellectual's impression of Communist China, an intellectual who has had experience in various Communist systems and who continues to hope that communism will gradually become rational and international once more.

Dr. George's study is based on his interviews with some 300 Chinese prisoners in Korea in 1951. He focuses on the data obtained from 61 privates and 23 cadre members, most of whom held positions of company commanders, platoon, or squad leaders. From these interviews he has reconstructed in detail the kind of egalitarian ethos, social organization, morale-building system, and political apparatus found in the Chinese Communist army. The book ends with a brief account of developments in the People's Liberation Army since the Korean War. While the data are not really representative of the PLA as a whole, they yield considerable information concerning the PLA's performance in the early stage of the Korean War.

General Griffith's analysis of the PLA's history, structure, and integration into Chinese society will remain a standard work for a long time to come. The chapter on the Korean War is one of the best ever written on the subject. His assessment of Chinese military capabilities is that the progress of the nuclear program on the mainland is not representative of Peking's military developments and that the PLA force structure will possibly remain imbalanced for a decade. The epilogue, hastily written in mid-January 1967, however, fails to grasp the true significance of the role of the army in the Cultural Revolution.

It may be said that these books represent different approaches to Chinese studies: historical, travel, interviews, and analytical research. In political science, scholars tend to polarize traditional versus behaviorist. In a sense, a China specialist must essentially be a behaviorist, although he may not use the same terminology as his colleagues. It should be stressed that no single approach can claim to have the only key to the subject. One complements the other, and each contributes its share to the understanding of the China puzzle.

CHÜN-TU HSÜEH
University of Maryland

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Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism *by Maurice Meisner. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967.—xvii, 326 pp. $4.95.*

China After Mao *by A. Doak Barnett. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967.—287 pp. $6.00.*

In the twentieth century Marxism has shown remarkable capacity to adapt to nationalistic currents in agrarian environments and thus provide the rationalization and strategy for extraordinarily powerful revolutionary movements. China is probably the prime example of this, and the first stage of the process of adaptation in that country is superbly illuminated by Professor Meisner's excellent and engrossing study of China's pioneer Marxist, Li Ta-chao.

In Meisner's book, Li emerges as an optimistic activist whose enthusiastic response to the Russian Revolution made him, in a sense, a Marxist before he really understood Marxism. But his study of Marxist theory only deepened that original commitment. On the one hand, he found elements of Marxism congenial to world views that he had already worked out. On the other hand, he reinterpreted Marxism in light of his own ideas and of Chinese conditions. Meisner focuses on this reinterpretation, not on Li as a political activist.

Li minimized the deterministic features of Marxism in order to emphasize the role of political activism. He saw the class struggle not only as a product of specific economic development, but as an expression of the human spirit striving for liberation, and in that world-wide struggle he attributed to the Chinese nation a decisive role. Although Li paid little attention to the organizational aspects of Leninism, he assigned to the intellectuals the role of awakening and releasing the forces of revolution inherent in the masses. And, to Li, these were peasant masses; despite his work in the labor movement, and his rather conventional statements of the early nineteen-twenties, Li looked to the peasantry as the force of revolution. Li forged the first link in the bond between Marxism and Chinese nationalism, and in this, as well as in his peasant orientation and his faith in the power of the human will to shape historical reality, Li exemplified attitudes that later emerged in Maoist thought and strategy.

Meisner also offers useful insights into the thinking of Li's contemporaries, such as Ch'en Tu-hsiu, and into the movements in which Li participated, such as the May Fourth movement and the Kuomintang-Communist alliance. This is an important book.

Professor Barnett's little volume discusses in broad terms recent phe-

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nomena in Communist China, and what they augur for the future. Despite the title, Barnett does not venture far into the sticky realm of prophecy, but concentrates on problems and trends of the present which will shape the post-Mao era. He suggests that the failure to superannuate the top elite has created a gap of generations in the leadership, so that a large proportion of leaders will pass from the scene almost simultaneously. While nobody can foresee the full impact of this change, trends already observable indicate that conflicting institutional interests will grow in importance; geographical origins of the leaders will shift; and policy and ideological differences may become sharper, with the main lines drawn between radical ideologues and conservative pragmatists. In short, China is going to change, and while the author does not presume to say precisely what will emerge, he has clearly sketched some of the forces that will in one form or another appear in the China of tomorrow.

Barnett's book is an outgrowth of lectures given at Princeton in October 1966, and retains some of the virtues as well as the shortcomings of the original lecture form. While the book will interest all in the China field, its chief value is for non-specialists, precisely the audience it was intended for. Slightly over half of the book consists of three translated documents which are important in Barnett's analysis and which illustrate Mao's prescriptions for the future.

JAMES E. SHERIDAN
Northwestern University

Kashmir: A Study of India-Pakistan Relations *by Sisir Gupta. London, New York, and Bombay, Asia Publishing House for the Indian Council on World Affairs, 1967.—xi, 511 pp. $12.50.*

This is the product of several years of hard labor by one of India's most able young scholars, an expert on Pakistan and the Kashmir dispute. In its comprehensive organization and detailed interpretation, the book is unique in the literature of this most intractable of twentieth-century disputes.

The scholarly study of bitter international disputes by nationals of the countries involved is obviously difficult. But the Kashmir dispute is even more complicated; its origins lie in British colonial policy and the whole movement that led to Pakistan, its early transition from hard bargaining to guerrilla warfare lies shrouded in state secrets and

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self-seeking "leaks," its elaboration by late 1948 involved the British, the Indians, the Pakistanis, the Kashmiri government, and the United Nations, and by 1954 the United States, the Soviet Union, and other interested parties were involved. Twenty years after India and Pakistan became independent and a war evolved over Kashmir, both countries still cling to old policies though they lead to heavy arms expenditures and bad blood between neighbors. In all of this development, accident, chance circumstance, and bad luck contributed to the impasse; the personalities of Nehru and Jinnah must be weighed; the absence of key government documents carefully considered. Sisir Gupta has made as much of the public record as can be made, and he is unsympathetic to Pakistan's actions, claims, and tactics.

The book is altogether too detailed to review in such short compass, but two general observations might be made. The first is that the historian is apt to find a pattern in the past that was not in the minds of the policy-makers of the period. Throughout the narrative on the origins of the dispute, Gupta finds plans, organization, and subtlety in Pakistan's attempted seizure of Kashmir. To read the documents of the day, however, is to see a government established in only seventy-two days, completely insecure and disorganized, with its cities in flames and its leaders cut off from their subordinates by disrupted communications and communal violence. Is it plausible that a government unsure of its own survival would organize, equip, and stimulate a war with a vastly superior country under such conditions?

A second observation is that a historian's bias is to see a continuing process where perhaps only episodic sequences were in the minds of responsible officials. Thus, several Pakistani governments came very close to concluding a settlement with India that might have settled Kashmir while reducing Pakistan's foreign policy autonomy, but they were displaced and policy underwent a complete shift. The government of Pakistan, like most governments, was filled with competing factions that disagreed on national priorities and the proper stance to take with India over Kashmir. To impute to this changing, segmental process the attributes of constancy and coherence over time seems to me to miss much of the richness of political complexity.

These qualifications should not blur the main thrust of this review which is that this is a detailed, scholarly, and valuable study. It is the nature of the subject that presents so many problems, most of which the author has manfully and imaginatively handled. Nonetheless, the Kashmir dispute will probably never have a definitive analysis.

WAYNE WILCOX
Columbia University

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The Army of the Republic: The Place of the Military in the Political Evolution of France, 1871-1914 *by David B. Ralston. Cambridge, Mass., and London, The M.I.T. Press, 1967.—xiii, 395 pp. $12.50.*

Professor Ralston's monograph is another in the series of published doctoral dissertations that have emerged from Shepard Clough's Columbia seminar on Western Europe during the past thirty years. Like most of its predecessors, its scholarly quality is high; the research has been careful and thorough, the literary style is lucid and graceful.

Ralston's theme is the relationship between France's republican regime and its caste of professional army officers before the First World War. Some observers doubted at first that the experiment could work; some historians have believed that there was never a real reconciliation right down to 1914. Ralston argues that they managed nevertheless "to live together . . . and to evolve a satisfactory, but thoroughly pragmatic, relationship." Both the politicians and the soldiers, he believes, should share the credit for this *modus vivendi*, but the soldiers earn his particular praise. Even during the difficult decade after the Dreyfus affair the officer corps remained "disciplined and subservient." "Attacked in their most vital institutional interests and treated as suspects by the government, the soldiers never wavered or gave the civil authorities . . . any real grounds for doubting . . . their devotion to the nation." By 1911, therefore, the government abandoned its persistent effort to hedge the army about with legal controls, and gave the soldiers virtually complete autonomy within the military sphere.

The only real flaw in Ralston's book, in my judgment, lies in the subject itself. Many of the most interesting aspects of civil-military relations under the Third Republic have already been skillfully analyzed by such scholars as Girardet, Challener, Contamine, and Monteilhet. Ralston has synthesized their findings and has filled in some gaps (notably with respect to parliament's attempts to legislate on military matters); but his monograph is not one of those that will compel specialists on modern France to rethink their conceptions of the Third Republic. It is an excellent first book that leads one to hope for a much more significant successor.

GORDON WRIGHT
U.S. Embassy, Paris

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Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, 1807-1815 *by Peter Paret. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—vii, 309. $8.50.*

If it were not for the conventionality in title-giving—"So-and-so and the . . ."—the true heading of this work would have been "The Era of Prussian Reform," or truer still "Yorck's Place in the Development of Infantry Tactics, with Emphasis on Light Infantry." The biographical part amounts to perhaps one-fifth of the whole and could not bring much that is new in detail since Droysen's biography of 1851-52; where there is controversy, the author is inclined to be sympathetic in the interpretation of his hero's doings and character. A suggestion in this context: Is it not possible or even likely that the grand English name assumed by the Pomeranian family of modest background was due to the presence of the numerous Scottish families living since centuries in the Baltic regions of Prussia, enough of them to fill two volumes of a genealogist writing in Scotland at the turn of the century? But this fifth suffices to illuminate what has always seemed so contradictory in Yorck, the authoritarian personality—"Scharf wie gehacktes Eisen," as German students were told—who in spite of himself realized and saw through a seemingly uncongenial task put before him, the working out of the tactics and discipline of formations which were designed to fight *en débandage*, the *Jäger*, at a time when the Old Prussians, from the narrow-minded king down, were highly unwilling to set them free, even if on the battlefield only. The very irregularity of Yorck's earlier life, non-noble birth, dismissal from the service in Frederick's time for insubordination, overseas service, helped greatly to prepare him to evolve and reduce to a *règlement* unconventionality in fighting, ordered from above.

As to the history of tactics, here grouped around a remarkable personality which adds greatly to readability, the reviewer knows no better recent contribution. For its purposes, the author has probed deeply as well as meticulously, as the matter at hand would demand, into the literature that is relevant (and far from easy to obtain), well noting the slant that a good deal of it has received *in majorem gloriam Borussiae*. He pays considerable and careful attention to what is so highly relevant in the study of tactics, musketry, and other equipment, targetting, and the like, thus achieving a synthesis of the minutiae and the overarching idea.

The reviewer's doubt, arising perhaps from over four years' service under *le roi de Prusse*, would arise on a different fundamentality in the Prussian scheme of things military—the factor of economy. With her always slender war potential—"to hunger oneself great"—were not her

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military reformers of 1807 and after forced to insist on the utmost economy in the use of manpower, and was not this regard a fundamental factor in the development of tactics, including the open order and dispersed firing? Does not, in tactics as in strategy, in addition to the always mentioned offensive and defensive, the "evasive" also prevail, the purposive avoidance of deaths and other losses? In this regard, the author would seem to have missed the cue word that Scharnhorst, the greatest and most sympathetic of all reformers, has provided (as on page 250).

Not a few American scholars in recent years have turned their attention to figures and figurations of Prusso-German military history, long reserved to introspective German and an occasional French treatment. Harold J. Gordon, Gordon Craig, W. Shanahan, A. E. Zimmer (with a life of de Kalb) might be mentioned, all of whom applied exceeding scholastic care to their chosen subjects, so much so that the first two have even been translated by the Germans who have praised them greatly, even if finding, as in Craig's case, a considerable amount of inaccuracy. Professor Paret's book can safely be added to this honorable transatlantic gallery.

ALFRED VAGTS
Sherman, Conn.

Die Arbeiterbewegung in der nationalen Bewegung: Die Deutsche Sozialdemokratie vor, während und nach der Reichsgründung *by Werner Conze and Dieter Groh. Stuttgart, Ernst Klett, 1966. —133 pp. 13, 80 DM.*

An examination of the attitude of the German working class toward national unification during the middle decades of the nineteenth century is not a new undertaking, certainly not as new as the authors of this book imply. Any reader of Franz Mehring's history of the Socialist movement, which was written long before the First World War, will question the implication. Nor is that the only work dealing with the relationship between nationalism and socialism. The sneering remark of Wilhelm II about *vaterlandslose Gesellen* was never taken seriously by those who refused to identify love of country with super-patriotism. For it is clear that from its beginnings organized labor favored the unification of Germany, maintaining that only in a politically integrated nation could the economic problems of the proletariat be solved. Marx, Engels, Lassalle, Liebknecht, Boebel, Schweitzer, all were in agreement on this point. Only when unification assumed the form of a

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semi-authoritarian imperial regime did the Socialists turn from it. Even then what they opposed in the established order was not unity as such, but the specific political form which it assumed after 1866. While they preached the solidarity of the international labor movement, they envisioned that solidarity within the framework of a system of national states striving to realize the ideal of social justice. In condemning the empire they were not rejecting the concept of nationhood. They were opposing the classes and interests which had come to dominate Germany as a result of Bismarckian statecraft.

While this book is not altogether original, it does provide a balanced and scholarly analysis of the role of labor in the movement for political unification. The first chapter or two dealing with problems of terminology and methodology will not be to everyone's taste. Some will find this section arid and faintly pedantic. Yet once the narrative proper gets underway, the reader's interest is bound to quicken. He will find in it not only an intelligent synthesis of a large body of historical literature, but substantial original research on many points. Here and there the authors push a pet thesis a little too hard. Perhaps they exaggerate the importance of the workers in the revival of national sentiment after 1858. Perhaps they overemphasize the differences between the Marxians and the Lassalleans during the years of the North German Confederation. They suffer also from a tendency to systematize and regularize ideas which are neither systematic nor regular. Evidence consisting of offhand remarks or casual speculations is at times forced to buttress an argument whose weight it cannot comfortably support. The book is on the whole, however, a judicious appraisal of a problem which has in the past been frequently distorted for reasons of partisan advantage. Today no one can any longer derive political benefit from charges of Socialist conspiracy against throne and altar. A more objective view of the part played by labor in the movement for national unification has become possible. Werner Conze and Dieter Groh have made a useful contribution to the attainment of that view.

THEODORE S. HAMEROW
University of Wisconsin

Public Opinion and Canadian Identity *by Mildred A. Schwartz. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1967. —xvii, 263 pp. $7.50.*

Can Canadians identify with Canada? Can Canadians identify themselves as Canadians? The author demonstrates that both identities are dif-

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ficult to acquire in a country not entirely free from a heritage of colonialism.

Canada is a country sharply divided along regional, class, ethnic, and religious lines. Whatever their backgrounds—and Canada is a class-ethnic mosaic of multiple communities—almost all Canadians live within one hundred miles of the garrulous neighbor to the south. Given the country's cultural heterogeneity and affinities for *pop Americana*, we should not be too surprised if the country's citizens lack massive and deep identification with Canada.

Without a clear-cut identification with Canada, many of Canada's twenty-two million people find it difficult to identify themselves as Canadians. Or if some people do identify themselves as Canadians, they differ in their choices on what kind of Canadian they are. For example, French-Canadians generally say they are French, while a sizeable portion of the Scotch, Welsh, and English communities consider themselves British subjects; many Western Canadians betray an American identity as they adopt the "continental we" to refer to "our president."

Schwartz indicates that Canadians have been unable to acquire a shared definition of who they are in part because they lack a sense of national unity, an absence based on sharp attitudinal differences on every important foreign, domestic, and symbolic issue. On foreign policy and through the use of a secondary analysis of survey materials, the author demonstrates that English and French minorities—Canada's "founding" and hence "charter groups"—have differed on matters such as military loyalty to the British crown, especially during the First and Second World Wars. More recently, the country's four major parties have suggested quite different approaches to the problem of growing U.S. ownership and control of Canadian industries. Domestically, the country has been divided for almost four decades on what organized labor should be allowed to do in the political realm. Symbolically, the citizens cannot agree on the country's flag.

Although the author ably presents statistics that demonstrate the breadth of attitudinal differences in Canada, she fails to analyze many of the structural sources of these complex and often overlapping divisions. John Porter's classic, *The Vertical Mosaic*, has demonstrated that a small British elite, almost incestuous in its creation and continuation of interlocking directorates blanketing national economy, politics, the mass media, organized religion, and higher education, have produced self-serving institutions whose high-handed and at times arrogant behavior has contributed to the creation of populist and labor movements with a history of violence equal to our own, a

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French-Canadian minority with demands of greater independence from British-Canadian control, and universities with thousands of graduates driven southward to escape suffocating Tory traditionalism.

When the author states in her introductory remarks (p. 3) that "Canada, settled by migrants from developed countries, never had to contend with large-scale illiteracy or stultifying traditionalism," she is wrong. First, until the First World War most Canadian settlers were either partially or totally illiterate farmers. Second, Canadians have experienced British-Canadian upper-class monopoly of powerful positions in almost every major institution. The deprivation has taken a number of forms, including higher education for the affluent few, and hence blocked mobility for the talented many in an occupational world until quite recently characterized by rampant nepotism at the top and crude capitalistic practices at the bottom. In this context, semi-educated masses have moved at the lower and middle echelons of institutions dominated largely by foreign imports (and their descendents) from Britain and the United States. The result has been almost continuous conflict between the haves and the have-nots found at various levels within the vertical mosaic.

In a country with multiple divisive relations, Canadians have *failed* to acquire and to share the same standards even when they have identified with Canada and have viewed themselves as Canadians.

JOHN C. LEGGETT
Simon Fraser University

The Brazilian Revolution of 1930 and the Aftermath *by Jordan M. Young. New Brunswick, N. J., Rutgers University Press, 1966.—156 pp. $6.00.*

Professor Jordan Young, who teaches history and political science at Pace College and New York University, has written a most valuable book about contemporary Brazil. Although it centers on the Revolution of 1930, it provides much background to that event and a considerable discussion of the changes which the Revolution brought in Brazilian affairs.

There is no question that the Revolution of 1930 was the most important single event in twentieth-century Brazilian history. It brought to power Getulio Vargas, who dominated the country's political life for the next quarter of a century, and whose memory still tends to divide Brazilian political activists into well-defined Vargas and anti-Vargas camps.

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The most important original material in this book is its discussion of the events leading up to the 1930 Revolution, and the actual process by which Getulio Vargas was brought to power. It is based in large part on the widely scattered, highly useful, and as yet largely untapped personal papers and memoirs of some of the chief participants in these events. Young not only has had unequalled access to this kind of raw material for history, but has also had the opportunity to talk over at length the preparations for and actual progress of the Revolution by those who participated in it.

The author concentrates particularly on the negotiations among the old-line politicians of the states of Minas Geraes and Rio Grande do Sul. He makes eminently clear that although there existed a great deal of latent discontent with the political, social, and economic system existing in 1930, the Revolution was principally the result of a falling out of these old-line politicians, who until then had been united in support of the system.

Young traces the extreme reluctance with which Getulio Vargas, the chief beneficiary of the Revolution, actually undertook to carry it out. Vargas played a many-sided game during the early months of 1930. He assured President Washington Luiz, whose minister of finance he had once been, that he accepted the results of the May 1930 election, in which Vargas had been counted out by the government. At the same time he encouraged his supporters, including his personal and political friend Osvaldo Aranha and Goes Monteiro, at that time a lieutenant-colonel and the main military conspirator in Vargas' entourage, to go ahead with plans for an uprising. However, only a few weeks before the outbreak of the rebellion did Vargas firmly commit himself to the movement.

Even Professor Young's extensive researches do not enable him to reach a definitive conclusion concerning one of the major incidents of the actual military conflict between Getulio Vargas' rebel forces and the government army. The question at issue is whether a major battle was actually fought between the two military forces at Itarare, on the border of the states of Parana and Sao Paulo. General Goes Monteiro, whom Young questioned at length on the subject of this battle, insisted that it took place; other witnesses who were in a position to know maintained with equal insistence that there never was any major clash between the southern rebels and the Federal Army.

One aspect of the actual events of the Revolution which the reviewer would like to have seen more fully discussed is the role played in the Revolution by the Tenentes, the group of young military men who dominated the uprising in the northern part of the country, and who

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tended to dominate the revolutionary government during the first two years thereafter. Their participation in the 1930 movement was of major importance and their political failure after the Revolution goes far to explain the shape of Brazilian government in the three decades which followed. Unfortunately, Professor Young's book does not cast much light on this aspect of the subject.

A figure whom the author does highlight is General Pedro Aurelio Goes Monteiro. He was the organizer of the military forces of Vargas in Rio Grande do Sul, and he played an important role in governmental affairs until his death in the late nineteen-fifties. Professor Young does a service in centering much attention on a figure whose importance is probably underrated by most of those who write about the last four decades of Brazilian history.

The last half of Young's book deals with the results which flowed from Vargas' seizure of power. He stresses Vargas' flexibility of political principles and ideas, and notes the interest of Vargas in promoting the country's economic development and his success in developing a wide following among the nation's urban workers through his patronization of extensive social legislation.

Perhaps Young lays most emphasis on the importance of the Vargas epoch in the geographical transfer of power from the states of Sao Paulo and Minas Geraes, and particularly Sao Paulo, to leaders coming from the southernmost state, Rio Grande do Sul. He notes the propensity of Vargas to rely particularly on fellow "gauchos" once he had come to power, and the strong resentment which people from Sao Paulo generally had against Vargas, whom they could never pardon for having displaced them from control over the country as a whole.

Not everyone will agree with all of the interpretations and emphases which Jordan Young gives to events which have occurred in Brazil since 1930. But anyone who wants to have a clearer understanding of the deep political, social, and economic change through which the largest of the Latin American countries—and the only one which seems likely in the foreseeable future to rival the United States in wealth, influence, and power—will gain much from reading Mr. Young's new book.

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER
Rutgers, The State University

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Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy *by Thomas E. Skidmore. New York, Oxford University Press, 1967. —xviii, 446 pp. $8.75.*

Professor Skidmore's excellent and detailed account of Brazilian national politics from the rise of Vargas to the overthrow of his protégé, Goulart, marks a significant advance in the analysis of contemporary Latin-American politics. Such comprehensive treatment is unique not only for Brazil's notoriously complex politics, but for that of any Latin-American country. More importantly, the author has implicitly demonstrated the possibility and the necessity of avoiding the use of simplified concepts and labels often employed by foreigners of whatever ideological persuastion. He has shown that a meaningful analysis can and must be made employing largely the terms used by the Brazilians themselves. Brazil, of all Latin-American countries, is perhaps the most logical place for such an effort, since that country's fluid and complex political processes readily expose many simplistic assumptions. It is, for example, difficult to persist in a belief that a discussion of political parties summarizes major ideas and forces in Brazil, or that the military can be treated as a single, coherent political actor.

Eliminating misleading intellectual baggage, however, is not the same as providing a coherent interpretation capable of being compared with analyses of other political systems. Toward this end, the author has made but a small, if significant, step forward. He lays the groundwork by a strong and much needed emphasis on the growing seriousness and complexity of Brazil's economic problems, and the way in which these problems not only necessitated agonizing political choices, but activated a very complex set of groups and institutions, especially toward the end when extreme inflation and economic stagnation became apparent. Not least important is the author's analysis of how the economic crisis gave Washington and the International Monetary Fund great influence, however erratically employed.

Against this background, he analyzes the personal strategies of leading political actors and the character of political institutions in relation to the uneven but rapid social change taking place over thirty-four years. He shows how political leaders responded not by a major restructuring of parties, groups, and institutions, but by a policy of "improvisation" successfully used by Vargas and Kubitschek, and catastrophically by a less apt Goulart under more severe conditions. He describes how both those in power and those in opposition failed to find a firm political base. It is in his attempt to describe what took the place of firm alignments that the author employs most heavily the

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language of the Brazilians in a kind of vigorous eclecticism. Clientelism, populism, the "middle class," the "positive" and "negative" Left, neo-liberals and developmental nationalists, traditional elites and urban groups—all these terms dance by in dizzying confusion. As an insight in showing how the political world looked from the top in Brazil during the period, they are immensely enlightening. As analytical categories they are lacking precise definition or any integrating framework. They sometimes appear as policy positions, sometimes as definable political groups, sometimes as "styles."

The lack of an integrating framework shows in two ways. First, the author presents us with no coherent answer to his self-assigned task of explaining the fall of Goulart. Second, the notion, often repeated in the book, that 1964 marked a "watershed" and a fundamental change in the system is not convincing. The last chapter, discussing the "search for a new political order" after 1964, fails to provide the basis for assuming a fundamental change has taken place, and the author's difficulty is indicated, perhaps, by the liberal sprinkling of question marks in the chapter subheadings. He can, of course, show that aspects of "democracy" were jettisoned after 1964, but it is questionable how fundamental this is, in view of the rather peculiar and limited sense in which the 1945-64 period was "democratic."

As a historian, Professor Skidmore would perhaps rebut that his job has been that of exposing the facts and criticizing simplistic assumptions. This he has done admirably, and no student of Latin-American or Brazilian politics should be without this book for that reason. Even his failings are useful. The author has thrown down a challenge to future analysts to find simple (but not over-simplified) and comparable (but not ethnocentric) frames of analysis with which to make sense of the "Brazilian reality."

DOUGLAS A. CHALMERS
Columbia University

Politics and Economic Change in Latin America: The Governing of Restless Nations *by Charles W. Anderson. Princeton, Toronto, and London, D. Van Nostrand, 1967.—xi, 388 pp. $8.75; paperback, $4.95.*

There is, of course, a certain lack of realism in dealing with economic development problems in solely economic terms. Thus Charles Anderson's attempt to synthesize economic and political factors into a theory of economic development in Latin America is of considerable interest.

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Professor Anderson is one of our shrewdest analysts of Latin American politics, and is at the same time perfectly at home with economic data and concepts. Thus the reader is rewarded throughout the book with a great deal of insightful commentary. Yet despite the subtlety and pertinence of many of Anderson's observations, this reviewer could only regard the book taken as a whole as a disappointment.

In the seven chapters of Part I Professor Anderson gives the reader an introduction to Latin American politics and policy-making, with special reference to economic policy. This is by far the better half of the book. Although presumably aimed at introductory students, and therefore rehashing much elementary material, this section also contains substantial contributions, such as the author's concept of "political overhead," conceived of as analogous to social overhead. Professor Anderson's first-rate description of Latin American political dynamics, based on the paper he presented to a seminar at Vanderbilt in 1964, with its positing of "the demonstration of power capabilities" as the central imperative, is also included. Various thought-provoking typologies are developed in this section, including a typology of strategies of economic development.

Part II presents abbreviated histories of economic policy-making in ten Latin American countries since the depression, and attempts to draw conclusions as to which are the most effective. This section is the most frustrating for the reader, beginning with Anderson's puzzling account of why he picked the ten countries of Central America and northern South America for his study and culminating with the lameness of the conclusions in the penultimate Chapter 11. One's disappointment with the inconclusive ending of the book is in itself a measure of the expectations aroused by the objectives the author set himself and a tribute to his obvious capacity. The failure to come to conclusions of theoretical importance is not, as the author believes, due to ambiguities and difficulties in the data or in the nature of the problem itself, but to not having formulated questions that could be answered by the data in ways that would be of theoretical value. One or two very tentative conclusions are drawn, such as that in general rates of growth seem higher with policies favorable to foreign investment and lower where policies of social revolution were followed (pp. 312-13); but in general it was not possible to draw firm conclusions as to the consequences for economic development of different types of policy and different types of regime, since the statistics used always compared one *country* with another even though during the period under question each country might have been ruled by regimes of quite different types. It would obviously have made more sense to break the data down in

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different ways, comparing not countries but types of regime, even though there are doubtless continuities in a country's policies through different regimes.

The reader's impression of the misdirection of a substantial talent and of a promising enterprise is reinforced at another level, that of style. Professor Anderson combines a graceful and witty touch with the language with an unbelievable carelessness with words. Sources are cited incorrectly, the names of leading figures are misspelled, accents are misplaced, titles of books are scrambled, words are used in the wrong sense, and punctuation misleads rather than clarifies.

There remains much in the book that is worth salvaging. Part I might profitably be assigned, say, in a course on economic problems of Latin America in which students lacked familiarity with the political realities of the area. But Professor Anderson still has his best work ahead of him.

MARTIN C. NEEDLER
University of New Mexico

The Egyptian Agrarian Reform, 1952-1962 *by Gabriel S. Saab. London, New York, and Toronto, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1967.—xvi, 236 pp. $8.00.*

Egypt's intractable economic problems have at least induced good scholars to write about them. This book is the latest of several that take an independent approach to economic conditions in Egypt and assess the policies of the military regime since 1952. Dr. Saab, writing on agrarian problems, has had farming experience in Egypt and a variety of posts there and elsewhere that fit him for the task he has so well accomplished.

Not only does Dr. Saab know Egypt and the Middle East well. He prepared this study of the implementation and effects of the widely heralded and influential Egyptian agrarian reform on the basis of all available published and unpublished documents and on more than a year's field work (in 1959 and 1960) in seventeen of the forty-three regional administrative centers and in other areas where the reform applied. The result is an authoritative, clearly written discussion of the agrarian problem up to 1952, the provisions of the reform laws of 1952, the precise way in which land was expropriated and distributed, the work of the cooperatives, the effects of the reform upon the infrastruc-

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ture (housing, water, canal upkeep, roads, and the like), credit, production and marketing, tenancy and farm labor, and land reclamation. On all these matters Dr. Saab gives us the first full-scale independent report and evaluation.

The first objective of the reform was the "satisfaction of the land hunger of the landless rural community living on the large expropriated estates or in their immediate neighborhood" (p. 119). This goal was most successfully achieved in the "sparsely populated regions of the Delta," but throughout the country an average holding of about three acres each was distributed to nearly 120,000 farmers, benefiting a total population of 700,000 (p. 27). The second objective was the "improvement of the living conditions of the peasants" (p. 119). This was a more difficult goal, but as measured by income it was moderately achieved for those who actually received land (pp. 120-21). The third goal, "the raising of productive capacity," was, the author says (p. 126), "far from fulfilled" by 1960. In summary, Dr. Saab describes the land-distribution program "as a major delaying action, to win time by redistributing wealth, to be repeated again and again if need arose." The state had succeeded in transferring the costs of the reform to the victims and beneficiaries, but it had "also placed formidable obstacles in the way of a self-sustained process of economic, social, and cultural growth through its reluctance to envisage the emergence of any spontaneous constructive initiative in the redistributed estates, and through its insistence on itself implementing development projects designed to benefit the smallholders" (p. 140).

This governmental mistrust of the peasants' own initiative has led to a "tentacular growth ... of the administrative apparatus" (pp. 28, 53-56) and has hobbled virtually every aspect of the entire reform program. Rather than altering this course, the regime has plunged along it with increasing determination in the additional reforms of 1961 (pp. 180-82).

This thorough and independent study based on first-hand sources and direct observation puts all of us into the author's debt. This is all the more true where, as in this case, scholars cannot rely on official data and field work is difficult.

MORROE BERGER
Princeton University

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Independent Africa: The Challenge to the Legal Profession *by L. C. B. Gower. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967.—viii, 154 pp. $3.95.*

Mr. Gower, formerly a professor of law at London, gave these lectures at Harvard in 1966. Prior to that he had advised governments in West and East Africa and had served as dean of the law faculty in Lagos. Among the tasks he sets himself are to provide a frank criticism of colonial legacies and to pay tribute to those now struggling with problems flowing from the legacies.

There are two major ways for specialists to comment usefully on such wide topics: they may confine themselves to particular aspects which their special expertise equips them to deal with; or they may polemicize broadly, accepting the obvious risks. In effect, the author has chosen the second alternative, although at various points he appears to want it both ways.

We are given many interesting judgments on the nature of societies in today's Africa and some welcome, down-to-earth caveats on what works and does not work: education is overly concerned with prestige-giving superficialities and not enough with the basic needs of poor countries; there is too much slipshod thinking and verbosity in public places; one-party states tend to be unstable; civil service inflation, like interfering with due process of law, is immediately attractive and ultimately disastrous; Americans might like to think again about AID contracts, university teams in Africa, and the rationale of sending Negro officials there.

On the colonial legacy the author cites the usual secondary sources and arrives at predictable conclusions. He misses the organic development of society in colonial times, overestimates the importance of policy, and parrots many of the tired slogans of past years. In sum, colonialism was a "veneer," or a "yoke." This leads him to similarly specious tenets on the transition and on the independence period: new states were saddled with inappropriate social and educational relics; rapid progress since independence reflects ill on colonial government; Tanganyika's austerity is due to a more realistic policy than West African countries had; de-emphasis of tribalism in Ghana by comparison with Nigeria is attributable to Nkrumah's policy.

Mr. Gower is right to say that lawyers can help Africa. Perhaps he could have given more attention to explaining how their services should best relate to the biggest need of all: the evolution of competent political elites to run things for the next several generations.

R. HEUSSLER
Moscow, Vermont

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South Africa's Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism *by Gwendolen M. Carter, Thomas Karis, and Newell M. Stultz. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1967.—xiv, 200 pp. $6.50.*

The Political Economy of South Africa *by Ralph Horwitz. New York and Washington, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.—522 pp. $10.00.*

Both books are welcome additions to the voluminous South African literature. The first one is a detailed study of the Bantustan policy of the South African government as implemented in the Transkei. Some two thirds of the book deal with the background out of which that policy emerged, especially with the post-Nationalist era. While the historical background is essential to an understanding of the contemporary scene, the authors could perhaps have taken more knowledge of it for granted and condensed that part of the book. The book is written for an audience of specialists, and much of the historical material is well known. The real and novel contribution of the authors consists of the sixty pages of section four which deal with the actual sequence of political events in the Transkei from 1961 on. The epilogue concludes that the Bantustan policy of South Africa is not an adequate answer to the critics of apartheid, a finding which few will find surprising.

Like Carter's African *magnum opus, The Politics of Inequality,* this book looks at the situation primarily from the point of view of the dominant white group, and, as far as that goes, the authors do a good job of it. The presentation of the African point of view, however, is largely confined to public pronouncements of a few Transkeian leaders and an analysis of the 1963 election results. The difficulty of doing research in South Africa is unquestionably responsible for this one-sidedness in the data, but one lacks a sense of depth perception of African thinking, strategies, and reactions. Occasionally, a statement strikes one as incongruous. Thus, we are told: "Clearly the chiefs cannot permanently flout popular views and retain their positions" (p. 170). The sentence would be much more tenable if one substituted "government" for "popular," or alternatively if it read: "In order to retain their position, chiefs frequently have to flout popular views."

Also striking is the absence of references to basic and relevant works on the Transkei by leading scholars. For example, an anthropological nonentity like Van Warmelo (whom the authors refer to as "a distinguished government ethnographer") is quoted, but the monumental

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works of Monica Wilson and Philip Mayer on the Xhosa, though listed in the bibliography, are nowhere cited. Similarly, the authors do not give credit to Leo Marquard, who used the concept of domestic or internal colonialism in South Africa long before they themselves did.

Finally, careless editing is responsible for several errors and inconsistencies: on page 5, we are (correctly) told that Africans account for sixty-six per cent of the total population of South Africa, but six pages later they suddenly become "over three quarters" of the total; on page 74, we find "Westward-moving Dutch farmers" who must have thought they were in North America. (South African cowboys ride into the *rising* sun.)

With its five hundred-odd pages of fine print, Horwitz's book is in every respect a major work, and one to which this brief review cannot do justice. Horwitz's latest study stands out, with the works of Frankel and Van der Horst, as one of the few superior books on South African economics. In fact, it probably is the best one. Though not exactly an economic history of South Africa, Horwitz's book is written with a fine sense of history, and it analyzes economic and political change from the second half of the nineteenth century.

Briefly stated, Horwitz tries to answer why South Africa developed as much and as fast as it did in spite of such "irrational" factors as the racial caste system; traditionalism; distaste for manual labor and lack of economic initiative of the ruling whites; constant state interference with market mechanisms and private enterprise; and a lack of systematic economic planning in the state-owned or controlled sectors. His answer is that gold mining was the key factor which converted a stagnant, traditional, pastoralist economy into a dynamic, developing one. Gold mining had the unique properties of being "capital intensive, labor intensive, and export intensive." High profits led to rapid capital accumulation and investment. Secondary industry developed in turn with the specially favorable circumstances of the two World Wars.

A central theme of Horwitz's study, and, indeed, its greatest contribution, is its detailed analysis of the interplay between economics and government policy, including, of course, apartheid policies. In simple terms, apartheid is a set of policies trying to preserve a caste structure undermined by industrialization. The threat of a change in the racial *status quo* calls forth legislation to control market conditions in such a way as to eliminate racial competition between whites and non-whites. Market mechanisms are simply too dangerous to be trusted. Economic development should not be allowed to alter the master-servant relationship in favor of non-whites.

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One may, of course, take issue with some of Horwitz's statements, for example, when he says that the Boer land settlement pattern until the late nineteenth century was not geared at production for an outside market. Neumark has argued that the market for beef in Cape Town was a major factor in South African frontier expansion, and wool production for export grew rapidly in the early nineteenth century.

The fact remains that Horwitz has produced an original, elegant, and informative piece of economic analysis relevant not only to South African specialists but to all who are interested in developing economics.

As a good liberal, Horwitz concludes by optimistically predicting the primacy of economics over politics. "Economic rationality urges the polity forward beyond its ideology" (p. 427). Perhaps, but the ruling albinocracy has so much surrounded itself by protective walls of privilege that it could not survive at anywhere near its present economic level under "rational" conditions of open competition. Thus, the ruling caste is a prisoner of its own insane logic. Paradoxically, the economic monstrosity of apartheid has become vital to the *economic* as well as the political interests of the Herrenvolk. The whites will continue to oppress and exploit the non-whites until they are overthrown by violent revolution.

PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE
University of Washington

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Book Notes

It has taken the editors of the American Foreign Policy Library twenty-five years or more to get round to a volume on Canada—an indication perhaps of the intensity of American interest in the Dominion of the North. It is pleasant to say, however, that Gerald M. Craig's *The United States and Canada* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968; ii, 376 pp., $7.95) is one of the best books in a series that includes some notable descriptions of foreign countries and civilizations for the educated but non-expert reader. Almost always these books have been written by Americans. In this case the editor has turned to a Canadian author, and with reason. Professor Craig not only knows Canada intimately by birth and education, and by previously published research into its history, but he is presently a specialist on the history of the United States. He fixes unerringly on those aspects of his country—in its geography, history, politics, economic life, and external affairs—that the educated American most needs to learn about if he is to have an informed understanding of his northern neighbor. The author's lucid and well-constructed prose is able to carry a heavy freightage of facts without losing the reader's interest. He summarizes complicated questions of economics and diplomacy without giving an impression of superficiality. And he handles with delicacy though without obfuscation even the most abrasive issues of Canadian-American relations. Some American readers may be surprised to learn how many points of disagreement there are between Canada and his own country. Not surprisingly, Professor Craig is at his best in the two hundred pages he devotes to the past. He really ought to write a full-length history of Canada. But the preceding survey of land and resources,

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population, government, and economy is almost equally good. Only in the last two divisions of the book—on "Canadian Issues and Problems" and "Canada and the United States"—is there an occasional sense of repetition, of some letdown in exposition. As a whole, however, the book is very successfully done. Its usefulness is increased by an appendix with sixteen tables of facts about Canada, and by a twelve-page bibliographical note.—T. P. PEARDON, *Barnard College.*

A new book which ends at the point of Woodrow Wilson's elevation in 1902 to Princeton's presidency—George C. Osborn's *Woodrow Wilson: The Early Years* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1968; ix, 345 pp., $10.00)—supplies eloquent testimony by its appearance and self-imposed limitations to the monumental contributions of Arthur S. Link as Wilson's biographer and editor. Where Link's *Wilson: The Road to the White House* really begins, Professor Osborn's work ends, and where Link's editing of *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* has produced three volumes to 1885 to date, Osborn's writing rests upon the most thorough research available to historians and biographers. The author examines Wilson's family background, his frail boyhood in the war-ravaged South, his remarkably retarded maturation (he was eleven before he learned to read), his pious and prudish nature, his relationships with his domineering father, his possessive mother, his friend Bobby Bridges, his passionate awakening of love for his cousin Hattie Woodrow, his beloved first wife Ellen Axson. His studies at Davidson, Princeton, the University of Virginia, and The Johns Hopkins University, his brief and unhappy legal career in Atlanta, his professorships at Bryn Mawr, Wesleyan, and Princeton, are carefully recounted and presented clearly in well-balanced fashion. Yet Henry Wilkinson Bragdon's recent study (1967) of Woodrow Wilson's academic years covers the same ground in richer detail, and Wilson's presidency of Princeton University as well, though with a noticeable mustiness owing to its inordinately long period of gestation. Osborn himself announces that it was not his intention to offer a psychoanalytic study of the twenty-eighth president of the United States. He has provided a succinct account of Wilson's early years, therefore, together with useful insights into higher education for that period of Wilson's young adulthood. The author affirms that he has submitted the facts "to permit the reader to draw his own conclusions." Thus stated is the book's strength and weakness both. More adventuresome biographers will still have to unravel the murky paradoxes of Woodrow Wilson's personality.—ARTHUR P. DUDDEN, *Bryn Mawr College.*

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In a carefully researched monograph—*Congressional Insurgents and the Party System, 1909-1916* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967; viii, 188 pp., $5.50)—James Holt traces the life cycle of the Republican insurgents who during the Taft administration seemed capable, according to some observers, of possibly converting the GOP into the political vehicle of twentieth-century American liberalism. Elected mainly from rural, agrarian states west of the Ohio River, the insurgents were bound together by a hatred of corporate monopoly and a faith in popular government. (They were distrustful of cities, and "not particularly interested . . . in social reforms . . . which were chiefly of interest to city workers"). Despite a number of well-publicized victories over the Republican Old Guard between 1909 and 1912, the insurgents failed to capitalize on their potential for becoming the driving force in American reform. Their ingrained party loyalty inhibited most of them from hitching their wagons to the Bull Moose in 1912. The same consideration prevented them from forming an alliance with the Democratic progressives who dominated the government during the next eight years. Continuing instead their attempt to bore from within the GOP, the insurgents proved no match for the conservatives who, preferring national defeat to surrender of party control, refused to yield an inch to the dissidents. During the nineteen-twenties the insurgents became rather provincial champions of their rural constituents' interests, and in the nineteen-thirties the support that many of them lent to Franklin Roosevelt paid off in terms of welfare-state legislation for farmers. By the late thirties, however, "a reaction against the urban-oriented New Deal" had set in among prairie state voters, and thereafter they most often sent to Congress men who, while remaining loyal to the farm bloc, generally adopted a conservative view on national issues. Holt's thesis explicitly challenges George Mowry's contention that Teddy Roosevelt's bolt in 1912 accounted for the collapse of progressivism in the Republican party and consigned the GOP to the conservative role it played thereafter. The author does succeed in demonstrating that insurgent-type progressives remained active and hopeful within the party after 1912. Yet he fails to take into sufficient account the possibility that the limited kind of rural-oriented progressivism expounded by his insurgents was "dated" already in the period 1909-12, as a more sophisticated and urban-oriented liberalism developed during the Progressive era, passing the insurgents by. It may well be that they were "provincial" and largely irrelevant considerably before the nineteen-twenties and thirties. In that event they were hardly any better suited than the Republican standpatters to make the GOP the party of modern American liberalism.—JOSEPH HUTHMACHER, *Rutgers, The State University.*

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John Anthony Petropulos' *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968; xix, 646 pp., $17.50) concerns primarily the formation and development of political parties in Greece during the revolutionary period of the eighteen-twenties and the first ten years of the independent state, 1833-43. The Greek government in the eighteen-thirties was unique in many respects. It was established by and placed under the protection of three powers, Britain, Russia, and France. The first king, the Bavarian Prince Otho, ruled during his minority through a regency composed of three Bavarians appointed by his father, Ludwig I. After becoming of age in 1835 Otho reigned as an absolute monarch. During the revolution and after the formation of the state Greek political life centered in the activities of three political parties—the "French," the "English," and the "Russian"—each connected with and to some extent dependent on a protecting power. In 1843 a military coup, supported by the parties, forced the king to accept a constitutional regime, which was introduced in 1844.

This account is one of the best studies available on Balkan history. It is impossible to find its equivalent for any other East European country in the nineteenth century. It is exactly the type of book needed for the nations of this area, and it is to be hoped that other similar works will soon appear. It is based on meticulous research in the major archives of Europe and upon a thorough knowledge of the Greek material on the period. Particularly admirable are the descriptions and analyses of the Greek political world and how it functioned and the short but incisive biographies of the lives of the individual Greek leaders, their special interests, and their place within Greek society. This book will be of value not only to students of East European history in the nineteenth century, but also to anyone interested in the background of the political and social conditions in the Balkans today.—BARBARA JELAVICH, *Indiana University.*

Konrad Adenauer was not a Churchill who could write his own history with a flourish. Nor did he possess the desire or the talent to reflect upon or to justify his decisions as chancellor. Therefore, the third volume of his memoirs—*Erinnerungen 1955-1959* (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967; 551 pp., 24.80 DM)—which he completed shortly before his death, is rich in dates and quotes on European unity, reunification, NATO, atomic armament, de Gaulle and the succession crisis of 1959, poor on retrospective thoughts concerning these years. This apparently sober presentation, however, with its frank description of successes and failures is the vehicle Adenauer chose for rendering a strict personal

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accounting of his actions. The admission of errors of judgment which his candid descriptions imply is all the more remarkable when it is remembered that unlike the preceding years with their imposing triumphs in foreign affairs, these were years of frustration and continual struggle on the domestic and international level marked by few victories. Three events discussed in this volume illustrate his intent. First, the apparent victory of the Paris Treaties, from which the chancellor had promised himself reunification, soon turned into the major barrier to the attainment of this goal. Second, the friend whom Adenauer believed to have gained in de Gaulle after the statesmen's first meeting at Colombey in September 1958 soon proved himself to be the sharpest critic and opponent of the major goals upon which Adenauer had staked his political career: an integrated Europe and an alliance with the United States. Finally, most revealing because most indiscrete, is the last section of the volume which concerns the succession crisis. Adenauer's description makes clear how the role he played in this controversy shook his authority to a point from which it never recovered.—STEVEN WARNECKE, *Columbia University.*

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